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finding "that the in-court identification was reliable notwithstanding the prior photographic display" because "Santiago already knew Espinal 'by first name as well as street name, ... knew where [Espinal] lived and the car he drove, and had seen him at least 20 times in the prior year.' " (alterations in original)
Summary of this case from United States v. BrownOpinion
00 Civ. 4844 (RWS).
December 4, 2000.
OPINION
Petitioner Henry Espinal ("Espinal"), a prisoner in state custody due to a second-degree murder conviction, has filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. For the reasons stated below, the petition is denied.
Parties
Espinal is a prisoner in the custody of New York Correctional Services held at the Great Meadows Correctional Facility in Comstock, New York.
Respondent George B. Duncan is the superintendent of the Great Meadows Correctional Facility.
Prior Proceedings
A jury convicted Espinal of second-degree murder on April 2, 1996, for the 1994 stabbing of a teenaged boy outside an upper Manhattan bodega. Two of the victim's friends, who witnessed the attack, knew Espinal from the neighborhood by the names, "Henry" and "Salivitas," and subsequently made photographic identifications of him. In a pretrial hearing, Espinal moved to suppress the in-court identifications due to the taint of the allegedly unduly suggestive photographic identification procedure, but the motion was denied. See United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967). The Honorable Ira Beal of the Supreme Court, New York County, sentenced Espinal to a term of 25 years to life on May 20, 1996.
On or about October 1, 1996, Espinal filed a pro se motion pursuant to New York C.P.L. § 440.10, in which he collaterally attacked the conviction on the ground that his trial counsel had been ineffective. The motion was denied without a hearing on October 29, 1996, and Espinal was granted leave to appeal to the Appellate Division on June 26, 1997.
Before the Appellate Division, Espinal raised three grounds for appeal: (1) the eyewitness testimony of witness, Julio Santiago, should have been suppressed; (2) police officers should not have been allowed to testify that Espinal had identified himself as "Salivitas" upon his arrest and that he possessed a gravity knife about a month before the crime; (3) the court had wrongly denied his § 440 motion without a hearing; and (4) his sentence was excessive. In a supplemental pro se brief, Espinal also argued that evidence of a statement he had made to police had been received at trial in violation of both his right to counsel and the notice requirement of CPL § 710.30. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction on June 29, 1999. See 262 A.D.2d 245 (N.Y. A.D. 1999). On August 26, 1999, leave to appeal to the New York Court of Appeals was denied. 93 N.Y.2d 1017 (N.Y. 1999).
Espinal filed the instant petition on June 30, 2000, raising six grounds for relief: (1) due process violations arising out of the admission of an in-court identification that had been tainted by an unduly suggestive prior procedure; (2) and (3) improper admission of evidence without the requisite notice pursuant to CPL § 710.30; (4) the admission of evidence that he had possessed a knife a month before the crime; (5) violation of his right to counsel; and (6) ineffective assistance of counsel.
Discussion
I. Lega1 Standard for Habeas Corpus Petitions Brought Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254
Section § 2254 of the 1996 Arititerrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act ("AEDPA") provides a federal remedy for state prisoners if their continued custody is in violation of federal law. Pub.L. No. 104-132, 100 Stat. 1214, codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a); see Chandler v. Florida, 449 U.S. 560, 571 (1981) ("This Court has no supervisory authority over state courts, and, in reviewing a state court judgment, we are confined to evaluating it in relation to the Federal Constitution."). Errors of state law are not cognizable on federal habeas review. Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 71-72, 112 S.Ct. 475, 116 L.Ed.2d 385 (1991); Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 81 (1977). Petitioners bear the burden of proving violations of federal law by a preponderance of the evidence. See Jones v. Vacco, 126 F.3d 408, 415 (2d Cir. 1997).
Federal habeas courts must presume State courts' factual findings to be correct, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1), and may not grant relief unless they find that the state court's adjudication of the merits of the claims either:
(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or
(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), (2); see Williams v. Taylor , ___ U.S. ___, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 1519, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000).
II. Analysis A. Evidentiary Claims
The grounds for attacking the conviction in Claims 1-3 and 5 of Espinal's habeas petition are essentially evidentiary in nature. As a general rule, state evidentiary rulings do not implicate federal law and are therefore not reviewable by federal courts. See Ayala v. Leonardo, 20 F.3d 83, 91 (2d Cir. 1994). A habeas court may review a state court's allegedly erroneous evidentiary ruling only if it was so egregious that it rendered the petitioner's trial fundamentally unfair in violation of due process. See Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 302-03, 93 S. Ct. 1038, 1049, 35 L.Ed.2d 297 (1973); Taylor v. Curry, 708 F.2d 886, 891 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1000 (1983). An erroneous evidentiary ruling renders a trial fundamentally unfair only if the ruling was "material," in essence if in light of the evidence as a whole, a contrary ruling would have left reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the accused.See Johnson v. Ross, 955 F.2d 178, 181 (2d Cir. 1992); Taylor, 708 F.2d at 891. In order to prevail on such a claim, a petitioner must show a reasonable probability that the admission of the evidence affected the outcome of the trial. Collins v. Scully, 755 F.2d 16, 19 (2d Cir. 1985).
1. Claim 1: The Identification
Espinal alleges that the in-court identification of him by Santiago should not have been admitted because it had been tainted when police initially showed him a single photo that was unduly suggestive. However, the trial court found that the identification of the photograph merely confirmed the "independent source" of the identification, namely that Santiago already knew Espinal "by first name as well as `street name,' . . . knew where [Espinal] lived and the car he drove, and had seen him at least 20 times in the prior year." 262 A.D.2d at 245. This factual finding is adopted because it is not unreasonable in light of the uncontradicted evidence presented. See 28 U.S.C. § 2243(d)(2).
Based upon these facts, the trial court properly admitted the in-court identification despite the prior procedure. New York law provides that in-court identifications may be allowed despite prior unduly suggestive procedures if the witness knew the defendant and was therefore immune from suggestion. People v. Rodriguez, 79 N.Y.2d 445, 449-50 (1992). This "confirmatory identification" rule tracks the federal standard that identification procedures violate due process only if they yield "unreliable" identifications. See Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 114 (1977); Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 199-201 (1972). Santiago's prior acquaintance with Espinal established that the in-court identification was reliable notwithstanding the prior photographic display. See United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 241-42 n. 33 (1967).
As no due process violation resulted from the admission of Santiago's in-court identification, Claim 1 will be dismissed.
Espinal also apparently advances the ground that hearsay was improperly admitted in the Wade hearing. This claim is both unexhausted,see Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509 (1982); Daye v. Attorney General, 696 F.2d 196 (2d Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1048 (1984), and erroneous as a matter of law because hearsay is admissible in suppression proceedings, see United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 172-75 (1974).
2. Claims 2 and 5: Failure to Provide Notice under New York Law
In Claims 2 and 5, Espinal alleges that the prosecution introduced evidence at trial without providing the requisite notice under New York's discovery law, CPL § 710.30. However, state law errors are not cognizable on federal habeas review. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a); Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 71-72, 112 S.Ct. 475, 116 L.Ed.2d 385 (1991);Chandler v. Florida, 449 U.S. 560, 571 (1981) ("in reviewing a state court judgment, we are confined to evaluating it in relation to the Federal Constitution.").Therefore, Claims 2 and 5 will be dismissed.
3. Claim 3: Admission of Evidence Regarding Prior Knife Ownership
Next, Espinal contends that the admission of police testimony that he had been found in possession of a gravity knife in the month prior to the crime violated due process, both because the knife was not shown to have been the murder weapon or even the same type of knife as the murder weapon.
Like federal law, New York law allows the introduction of prior bad act evidence as long as its probative value outweighs its prejudicial impact. People v. Alvino, 71 N.Y.2d 233, 241-42 (1987); People v. Molineux, 268 N.Y. 264 (1901); see Fed.R.Crim.P. 404(b). Evidence presented at trial showed that five weeks before the murder, Officer George Resto had taken from Espinal a knife with a wooden handle and a "stainless steel" blade that flicked open, and turned it over to Espinal's mother. Both witnesses to the murder testified that Espinal stabbed the victim with a knife that had a wooden handle and a silver or chrome blade that flicked open. Evidence that Espinal was in possession of such a unique weapon during the same general time period as the crime was highly relevant, and of only minimal prejudicial impact in light of the gruesome stabbing the witnesses described Espinal as having committed. See People v. Hernandez, 139 A.D.2d 472, 467-77 (N.Y. A.D. 1988); accord United States v. Robinson, 560 F.2d 507, 512-13 (2d Cir. 1977) (en banc), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 905 (1978).
As the admission of evidence establishing Espinal's possession of the knife before the murder did not violate due process, Claim 3 will be dismissed.
B. Claim 4: Violation of the Right to Counsel
Espinal was arrested at Harlem Hospital, where he was being treated for gunshot wound. During the pedigree interview, Espinal told the detective that his street name was "Salivitas." This evidence was introduced at trial because both eyewitnesses had identified "Salivitas" as the perpetrator.
Espinal advances a number of grounds for why the admission of this statement warrants habeas relief, including, inter alia, violation of New York's notice provisions and statutory right to a suppression hearing. Only the grounds claiming that the statement was elicited in violation ofMiranda and his right to counsel raise a cognizable federal claim. The Appellate Division found that the question that led to this statement was a "pedigree question" that was "asked as a part of routine processing, reasonably related to administrative concerns, even though the statement ha[d] some inculpatory value." 262 A.D.2d at 245. This was not an unreasonable finding of fact in light of the evidence presented. As the Appellate Division properly went on to hold, Miranda warnings of the right to counsel need not be given during pedigree questioning, see Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582, 601-02 (1990), because pedigree questions do not implicate the right to counsel, see United States v. Carmona, 873 F.2d 569, 573-74 (2d Cir. 1989).
Because no federal constitutional error was committed due to the admission of the pedigree statement, Claim 4 is dismissed.
C. Claim 6: Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
Finally, Espinal claims that his trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective for failing to either to object to or seek to preclude the admission of testimony that Espinal had admitted his street name was "Salivitas," once that evidence was introduced without notice at trial. Pet. at 7 (referencing pro se § 440 motion). In addition, Espinal claims that trial counsel's failure to request a reopening of the omnibus motion to suppress once the existence of the statement became known at trial, was also ineffective. Id.
In order to prove that an attorney was constitutionally ineffective, a petitioner must show both that the representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, and that petitioner was prejudiced by the ineffective assistance. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2039 (1984). To meet the first element, a petitioner must show that counsel omitted a significant and obvious issue while pursuing issues that were clearly and significantly weaker. Mayo v. Henderson, 13 F.3d 528, 533 (2d Cir. 1994). To show prejudice, a petitioner must show that but for counsel's errors, the outcome of the case would have been different. Clark v. Stinson, 214 F.3d 315 (2d Cir. 2000).
However, Espinal cannot make out the first element because the admission of his pedigree statement was proper, as discussed above. It was certainly not constitutionally defective for trial counsel to fail to object to and pursue an issue that clearly had no grounds for success. And, even if counsel's performance had been deficient, Espinal has failed to show that the outcome of the trial would have been different if the statement had not been admitted. Two eyewitnesses who knew Espinal from the neighborhood as either "Henry" or "Salivitas," and saw him from close range, witnessed him stab their friend repeatedly with a knife. The admission of testimony that Espinal admitted that his street name was "Salivitas" had little or no bearing on the case in light of the vivid testimony from the two eyewitnesses. The admission of the statement did not prejudice Espinal's defense.
No grounds having been advanced that would support a finding that Espinal's trial counsel's performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, Claim 6 is dismissed.
III. A Certificate of Appealability Will Be Denied
As Espinal has failed to make a substantial showing of the denial of any constitutional right, a certificate of appealability will not issue. 28 U.S.C. § 2253 (as amended by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA")); see United States v. Perez, 129 F.3d 255, 259-60 (2d Cir. 1997); Lozada v. United States, 107 F.3d 1011, 1016 (2d Cir. 1997). I certify pursuant to the Prisoner Litigation Reform Act of 1996 ("PLRA"), 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3), that any appeal from this opinion would not be taken in good faith. See Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 444-45 (1962).
Conclusion
For the aforementioned reasons, the petition for a writ of habeas corpus is denied. No certificate of appealability will issue.