In short, "the important question in the context of official immunity is not merely whether an officer owed a duty of care, but rather, whether the official owed a duty that is particularized and certain enough to render her duty a ministerial one." Eshleman v. Key , 297 Ga. 364, 367, 774 S.E.2d 96 (2015). Even in the context of functions that are typically discretionary, a written (or unwritten) policy, a supervisor’s specific directive, or a statute may establish a ministerial duty—but only if the directives are so clear, definite, and certain as to merely require the execution of a specific, simple, absolute, and definite duty, task, or action in a specified situation without any exercise of discretion.

The statute was amended in 1985 to change "shall be liable" to "may be liable" in order to clarify that the standard for liability is negligence, not strict liability. See Eshleman v. Key , 297 Ga. 364, 368 (2), n. 3, 774 S.E.2d 96 (2015). The 1985 amendment also added a second sentence to OCGA § 51-2-7, which provides that, "[i]n proving vicious propensity, it shall be sufficient to show that the animal was required to be at heel or on a leash by an ordinance of a city, county, or consolidated government, and the said animal was at the time of the occurrence not at heel or on a leash."

In the same legislation, the General Assembly also amended the statute by changing "shall be liable" to "may be liable" in the first sentence. See Eshleman v. Key , 297 Ga. 364, 368 (2), n.3, 774 S.E.2d 96 (2015), overruled in part on other grounds, Rivera v. Washington, 298 Ga. 770, 784 S.E.2d 775 (2016). Starting with the text of the statute, we observe that although neither the first nor the second sentence of OCGA § 51-2-7 speaks of the owner's knowledge of the animal's vicious or dangerous nature, we have nevertheless concluded that scienter was carried over from the common law as an essential element of a claim under OCGA § 51-2-7.

s progeny, as authority to apply the collateral order doctrine in cases claiming sovereign, official, qualified, or other immunity. Such cases include the following, which together with any other cases that hold contrary to this opinion, are hereby overruled: Ga. Dept. of Community Health v. Neal, 334 Ga. App. 851 (780 SE2d 475 ) (2015); Postell v. Anderson, 334 Ga. App. 331 (779 SE2d 397 ) (2015); Vidal v. Leavell, 333 Ga. App. 159 (775 SE2d 633 ) (2015); Tattnall County v. Armstrong, 333 Ga. App. 46 (775 SE2d 573 ) (2015); Cooley v. Bryant, 331 Ga. App. 718 (771 SE2d 411 ) (2015); Bd. of Regents of Univ. System of Ga. v. Winter, 331 Ga. App. 528 (771 SE2d 201 ) (2015); Effingham County v. Roach, 329 Ga. App. 805 (764 SE2d 600 ) (2014); Ga. Dept. of Transp. v. Jarvie, 329 Ga. App. 681 (766 SE2d 94 ) (2014); Liberty County School Dist. v. Halliburton, 328 Ga. App. 422 (762 SE2d 138 ) (2014); Eshleman v. Key, 326 Ga. App. 883 (755 SE2d 926 ) (2014) (reversed on other grounds, Eshleman v. Key, 297 Ga. 364 (774 SE2d 96 ) (2015)); City of Atlanta v. Shavers, 326 Ga. App. 95 (756 SE2d 204 ) (2014); Taylor v. Campbell, 320 Ga. App. 362 (739 SE2d 801 ) (2013); DeKalb County School Dist. v. Gold, 318 Ga. App. 633 (734 SE2d 466 ) (2012); Fulton County v. Colon, 316 Ga. App. 883 (730 SE2d 599 ) (2012) (reversed on other grounds, Colon v. Fulton County, 294 Ga. 93 (751 SE2d 307 ) (2013); Ga. Dept. of Transp. v. Crooms, 316 Ga. App. 536 (729 SE2d 660 ) (2012); Bd. of Regents of Univ. System of Ga. v. Ruff, 315 Ga. App. 452 (726 SE2d 451 ) (2012); Ga. Dept. of Transp. v. Smith, 314 Ga. App. 412 (724 SE2d 430 ) (2012); Ga. Dept. of Corrections v. James, 312 Ga. App. 190 (718 SE2d 55 ) (2011); Hendricks v. Dupree, 311 Ga. App. 96 (714 SE2d 739 ) (2011).

As our Supreme Court also noted in Barnett , " ‘the important question in the context of official immunity is not merely whether an officer owed a duty of care, but rather, whether the official owed a duty that is particularized and certain enough to render her duty a ministerial one.’ " Barnett , 302 Ga. at 848 (II), 809 S.E.2d 813, quoting Eshleman v. Key , 297 Ga. 364, 367 (2), 774 S.E.2d 96 (2015). The Court explained:

“As a general rule, a county law enforcement officer enjoys official immunity from a lawsuit alleging that she is personally liable in tort for her performance of official functions.” Eshleman v. Key, 297 Ga. 364, 365(1), 774 S.E.2d 96, 2015 WL 3936075 (2015) (citations and footnote omitted). Such immunity is abrogated, however, in two specific circumstances.

Consistent with his role as a school resource officer, he exercised "personal deliberation and judgment" to resolve a tense situation. See Eshleman v. Key, 774 S.E.2d 96, 99 (Ga. 2015) (internal quotation marks omitted). Second, no reasonable jury could find that Vickers acted willfully or wantonly, with actual malice, or with actual intent to cause injury.

O.C.G.A. § 4–8–21(b) provides that "[n]o dog shall be classified as a dangerous dog or vicious dog [for purposes of O.C.G.A. § 51–2–7 ] for actions that occur while the dog is being used by a law enforcement ... officer to carry out the law enforcement ... officer's official duties." See also Eshleman v. Key, 297 Ga. 364, 774 S.E.2d 96, 99 (2015) (assuming for purposes of argument that a police canine may qualify as a "vicious or dangerous animal" under O.C.G.A. § 51–2–7, while acknowledging that § 4–8–21(b) precludes that conclusion). But even if any ambiguity existed over whether a police dog may be sued in tort for acts committed while serving as a police dog, the notion of a tort lawsuit directly against a dog in these circumstances would create an abundance of practical problems as well: even setting aside the issues of service on a dog and a dog's retention of legal representation, and even assuming that Draco can qualify as a "[s]tate officer or employee" under Georgia law, how could we reasonably apply Georgia's concept of official immunity?

In Georgia, county law-enforcement officers like Wheeler generally enjoy official immunity from suits alleging personal liability in tort for performance of official functions. See Eshleman v. Key , 297 Ga. 364, 774 S.E.2d 96, 98 (2015) ; see also Ga. Const. art. I, § 2, para. IX (d). Under this immunity, a state official may not be held liable for injuries caused through his performance of discretionary functions unless he acts "with actual malice or with actual intent to cause injury."

Put simply, the question is not merely whether the school officials owed SGT a duty of care, “but rather, whether the official owed a duty that is particularized and certain enough to render her duty a ministerial one.” Eshleman v. Key, 774 S.E.2d 96, 100 (Ga. 2015).