Opinion
Nos. 05-03-00943-CR, 05-03-00944-CR, 05-03-00945-CR
Opinion Filed November 3, 2004. DO NOT PUBLISH. Tex.R.App.P. 47.
On Appeal from the 291st Judicial District Court, Dallas County, Texas, Trial Court Cause Nos. F03-00639-U, F03-00643-U, F03-00648-U. Affirm.
Before Justices WRIGHT, RICHTER, and MASSANT.
OPINION
Gilbert Escobar appeals his convictions for three counts of aggravated robbery. After appellant pleaded guilty without the benefit of a plea bargain agreement, the trial court assessed punishment, enhanced by two previous felony convictions, at 50 years' confinement in each case. In a single issue, appellant contends his convictions should be reversed because the trial court did not sua sponte hold a hearing to determine appellant's competency to enter his pleas. We overrule appellant's sole issue and affirm the trial court's judgments. A person is incompetent to stand trial if he does not have sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding or rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 46B.003(a) (Vernon Supp. 2004-05). The trial court must conduct a competency inquiry on whether to hold a jury trial on a defendant's competency "if evidence of the defendant's competency is brought to the attention of the court from any source" and the evidence raises a bona fide doubt in the judge's mind about the defendant's competency to stand trial.McDaniel v. State, 98 S.W.3d 704, 710 (Tex.Crim.App. 2003). Evidence is usually sufficient to create a bona fide doubt if it shows "recent severe mental illness, at least moderate retardation, or truly bizarre acts by the defendant." Id. We review a trial court's decision under an abuse of discretion standard. See Moore v. State, 999 S.W.2d 385, 393 (Tex.Crim.App. 1999). Here, appellant contends evidence of his incompetency was raised by his "inappropriate behavior, a lack of attention, and an inability to understand the structure of the proceedings against him; as well as the fact that the [trial court] had evidence before it of [his] sustained and prolonged use of a variety of drugs-including LSD and methamphetamine." After reviewing the record, we cannot agree that appellant had an inability to understand the proceedings against him. To the contrary, the record shows that appellant did understand the consequences of pleading guilty and was frustrated only because he said he "didn't do it like that" when he was asked to enter a plea. Shortly thereafter, he candidly explained to the judge that he had "been trying to tell you since I've been here. I didn't do it with no gun." Although appellant was somewhat inattentive and uncooperative, he also showed evidence of an understanding of the proceedings against him. There is no indication that he had severe mental illness or moderate retardation, nor was he acting in a bizarre manner. A general failure to be cooperative is not probative of competence to stand trial. Burks v. State, 792 S.W.2d 835, 840 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1990, pet. ref'd). To the extent appellant relies on the evidence of his past drug use to show evidence of incompetency, we reject the assertion. Evidence of past drug use does not constitute a per se finding that a person is incompetent to stand trial. See Reeves v. State, 46 S.W.3d 397, 399-400 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 2001, pet. dism'd) (evidence that defendant's birth mother drank heavily while she was pregnant with defendant, drug addiction, and suicide attempt was no reflection on appellant's ability to understand and participate in proceedings against her); Ward v. State, 906 S.W.2d 182, 185 (Tex.App.-Austin 1995, pet. ref'd) (evidence regarding the nature and causes of appellant's drug addiction raised no issue regarding appellant's ability to understand the proceedings against him or to consult with his attorney with a reasonable degree of rational understanding). Considering the record, no evidence suggests appellant did not have (1) sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding or (2) a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him. Under these circumstances, we cannot conclude the trial court abused its discretion in failing to sua sponte conduct an inquiry into appellant's competency to stand trial. We overrule appellant's sole issue. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's judgments.
As of January 1, 2004, the provisions regarding competency to stand trial have been amended and renumbered. Because appellant's trial occurred prior to that time, we refer to the version in effect at the time of appellant's trial.