Opinion
Civil No. 99-16 (DWF/AJB).
February 25, 2003
Robert M. Frazee, Esq., Jeffry C. Schmidt, Esq., and Clinton S. Bogden, Esq., Meagher Geer, 4200 Multifoods Tower, 33 South Sixth Street, Minneapolis, MN 55402; Robert J. Lentz, Esq., Steven B. Fisher, Esq., and Joseph J. Janatka, Esq., Daar Fisher Kanaris Vanek, 200 Wacker Drive South, Suite 3350, Chicago, IL 60606; and Bradley D. Fisher, Esq., Foley Mansfield, 200 Lafayette Building, 1108 Nicollet Mall, Minneapolis, MN 55403, counsel for Plaintiffs Emmett and Karen Erpelding.
Jeffrey W. Lambert, Esq., Lambert Bissonette, 407 E. Lake Street, Suite 200, Wayzata, MN 55391; Derrick Kirby, Esq., Alan K. Goldstein, Esq., and Daniel E. Tranen, Esq., Goldstein Price, One Memorial Drive, Suite 1000, St. Louis, MO 63102, counsel for Plaintiffs Stephen Bennington and Gerald Shannon.
Aaron Biber, Esq., Mansfield Tanick Cohen, 220 South Sixth Street, Suite 1700, Minneapolis, MN 55402-1409, counsel for Plaintiffs Michael S. and Deborah J. Cox.
Thomas Peterson, Esq., Peterson Hektner, 7831 Glenroy Road, Suite 145, Minneapolis, MN 55439, counsel for Plaintiffs David Johnson and The Afton Marina Yacht Club.
Craig T. Dokken, Esq., Henningson Snoxell, Sixth Floor, 6160 Summit Drive, Minneapolis, MN 55430, counsel for Intervenor United Services Automobile Association.
Patrick Reilly, Esq., and Leon R. Erstad, Esq., Erstad Riemer, 200 Riverview Office Tower, 8009 Thirty-Fourth Avenue South, Minneapolis, MN 55425-4409, counsel for Defendant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
The above-entitled matter came on before the undersigned United States District Court Judge on January 24, 2003, pursuant to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. For the reasons stated, the Defendant's motion is granted.
Background
Skipperliner designs, assembles, and sells boats. In October of 1996, the Erpeldings entered into a contract with Skipperliner to purchase a large, luxury houseboat. The boat, as delivered in May of 1997, came equipped with a number of amenities and appliances, including a Kenmore dishwasher manufactured by Third-Party Defendant Sears, Roebuck Co.
The Erpeldings lived on the boat from May of 1997 to October of 1997. In October of 1997, the boat was "winterized" and placed in storage at the Afton Marina and Yacht Club. On May 5, 1998, the Erpeldings returned to the Afton Marina and Yacht Club to resume residence on the boat.
In the early morning hours of May 28, 1998, Karen Erpelding — who was alone on the boat — awoke to discover that the vessel was on fire. Mrs. Erpelding saw flames in the galley of the boat and went to a neighboring vessel to call for emergency assistance. Despite Mrs. Erpelding's attempts to unmoor the boat, the boat burned while docked. The flames spread to a number of nearby boats, seriously damaging and/or destroying them.
The Erpeldings allege that the fire was electrical in nature and that the fire was the result of some latent defect in the dishwasher or other kitchen appliance, or, at a minimum, the result of some latent defect in the wiring of the boat itself.
The Erpeldings brought this action against Skipperliner alleging breach of implied and express warranties as a result of the alleged defect in the boat. The remaining plaintiffs are individuals and entities who lost property as a result of the fire on the Erpeldings' boat.
On this motion for summary judgment, Skipperliner asserts that the record is devoid of any evidence that a defect in the boat or in an appliance on the boat caused the fire.
Discussion
1. Standard of Review
Summary judgment is proper if there are no disputed issues of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). The court must view the evidence and the inferences which may be reasonably drawn from the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Enterprise Bank v. Magna Bank of Missouri, 92 F.3d 743, 747 (8th Cir. 1996). However, as the Supreme Court has stated, "[s]ummary judgment procedure is properly regarded not as a disfavored procedural shortcut, but rather as an integral part of the Federal Rules as a whole, which are designed 'to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action.'" Fed.R.Civ.P. 1. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 327 (1986).
The moving party bears the burden of showing that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Enterprise Bank, 92 F.3d at 747. The nonmoving party must demonstrate the existence of specific facts in the record which create a genuine issue for trial. Krenik v. County of Le Sueur, 47 F.3d 953, 957 (8th Cir. 1995). A party opposing a properly supported motion for summary judgment may not rest upon mere allegations or denials, but must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 256 (1986); Krenik, 47 F.3d at 957.
2. Causation of the Fire
The Court considered the issue of causation in this matter once before, in the context of an earlier motion for summary judgment, and concluded at the time that summary judgment was not appropriate. At the time, however, the record contained several expert reports that identified the dishwasher and/or the wiring of the boat as the source and cause of the fire. In the interim between that motion and this, the Court has excluded two of those expert opinions as unreliable under Daubert v. Merrill Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993), and Kumho Tire Co., Ltd. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999), and the remaining expert opinions have been withdrawn.
The parties agree that a cause of action for breach of warranty requires a showing that a defect in the product at issue caused the damages alleged. See Nelson v. Wilkens Dodge, Inc., 256 N.W.2d 472 (Minn. 1977). Moreover, the parties further agree that the existence of a defect and causation may be proven by circumstantial evidence, and that no specific defect needs to be alleged. Id.; see also Lindsay v. McDonnell Douglas Aircraft Corp., 460 F.2d 631 (8th Cir. 1972).
However, "[w]here the record shows that there are several possible causes of an injury, for one or more of which the defendant was not responsible, and it is just as reasonable and probable that the injury was the result of the latter, the plaintiff may not recover, since he has failed to prove that the defendant's breach caused the injury." Chisholm v. J. B. Simplot Co., 495 P.2d 1113, 1116 (Idaho 1972) (quoted approvingly in Heil v. Standard Chemical Mfg. Co., 223 N.W.2d 37, 42 (Minn. 1974), and Nelson v. Wilkins Dodge, Inc., 256 N.W.2d 472, 476 (Minn. 1977). "A plaintiff may use circumstantial evidence to establish a prima facie case, but the evidence may not be such that a jury would need to engage in speculation." Western Sur. and Cas. Co. v. General Elec. Co., 433 N.W.2d 444, 447 (Minn.Ct.App. 1989). Indeed, "where lapse of time and substantial opportunity for mishandling of a product by third parties make it equally probably a defective condition developed after leaving the defendant's control, neither the principles of res ipsa loquitur nor strict liability will support a finding of liability." Id.
The record in this case indicates that the Erpeldings introduced several electrical appliances to the boat, at least two of which (the toaster and the cell phone charger) were in the galley where the fire originated. Absent any additional evidence of the specific origin of the fire or the existence of a defect in one of the appliances, it is at least as likely that either of these two electrical appliances caused the fire as that the dishwasher or coffee-maker malfunctioned. Moreover, the fire occurred more than a year after the boat left the control of Skipperliner. In the interim, the Erpeldings lived on the boat, treating it as their home; the dishwasher — one possible source of the fire — was repaired on several occasions; and the boat was winterized and stored. The "lapse of time and substantial opportunity for mishandling . . . by third parties" renders the Erpeldings' strict liability and res ipsa loquitur claims untenable.
Ultimately, based upon the record before the Court, a jury charged with this matter would be forced to resort to rank speculation to ascertain the cause of the fire. Under the circumstances, then, the Court must conclude that the Defendant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
For the reasons stated, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:
1. Defendant Skipperliner Industries, Inc.'s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. No. 122) is GRANTED and the COMPLAINT is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
LET JUDGMENT BE ENTERED ACCORDINGLY.