( Ibid.; see Annot., Will — Donee — "Husband" — "Wife" — "Widow" (1961) 75 A.L.R.2d 1413, 1415-1422 supp.) Similarly, a Pennsylvania court in In re Erny's Trust (1964) 415 Pa. 8 [ 202 A.2d 30] decided that the time-of-deed wife, the first wife, was the only one for whom a life estate was intended, as opposed the time-of-death wife, who was thus denied a life income from the trust. ( Id., 202 A.2d at p. 31.)

The sum of these decisions is that "wife" is merely descriptive of the particular individual, not that the individual name is an identification of the person who is then the wife, used in a generic sense. If, of course, the term "wife" were used alone, unaccompanied by the name of a person, the contrary result would be indicated. Erny Trust, 415 Pa. 8, 202 A.2d 30 (1964). Indeed, prior to the enactment of Section 7 (2) of the Wills Act of 1947, the rule we have stated also applied in construing wills.

However, as we said in Chambers' Estate, 438 Pa. 22, 24, 263 A.2d 746, 747 (1970): In re Girard Corn Exchange Bank, 418 Pa. 112, 115 n. 4, 208 A.2d 857, 859 n. 4 (1965); Pew Trust Estate, 411 Pa. 96, 106-07, 191 A.2d 399, 405 (1963); see Erny Trust, 415 Pa. 8, 202 A.2d 30 (1964). E. g., Thomas Estate, 457 Pa. 546, 551-52, 327 A.2d 31, 34 (1974); Pew Trust Estate, 411 Pa. 96, 106-07, 191 A.2d 399, 405 (1963), and authorities cited by those cases.

Although we rely upon cases which concern the proper interpretation of wills, the principles enunciated in those cases apply with equal validity in this situation to the interpretation of the trust instrument. Pew Trust, 411 Pa. 96, 106-07, 191 A.2d 399, 405 (1963); see Erny Trust, 415 Pa. 8, 202 A.2d 30 (1964). Evidence of extrinsic facts and circumstances is admissible to show that an ambiguity exists, Herr Estate, 400 Pa. 90, 161 A.2d 32 (1960); Metzger's Estate, 222 Pa. 276, 71 A. 96 (1908), but we find appellee's evidence unpersuasive in that regard.