Loewer v. National Bank

8 Citing cases

  1. Medical Liability Mutual Insurance v. Alan Curtis LLC

    519 F.3d 466 (8th Cir. 2008)   Cited 28 times
    Reasoning by analogy to A.C.A. § 16–123–105

    " In Arkansas "[i]t is well settled that the gist of the action as alleged [in the complaint] determines which statute of limitations applies." Shelter Ins. Co. v. Arnold, 57 Ark.App. 8, 940 S.W.2d 505, 506 (1997) (emphasis added); see Ernest F. Loewer, Jr. Farms, Inc. v. Nat'l Bank of Ark, 316 Ark. 54, 870 S.W.2d 726, 728 (1994); O'Bryant v. Horn, 297 Ark. 617, 764 S.W.2d 445, 445 (1989). Advocates argue that the RRA is more in the nature of a "privately enforceable" civil rights law "than a codification of ordinary duties of care," however, because it gives residents a remedy for deprivation of a wide range of enumerated rights including freedom of choice in selecting a physician and the right to participate in social and religious activities. If the Arkansas Supreme Court were to characterize RRA claims as civil rights actions, it would no doubt look at the limitation periods applied to such cases in Arkansas.

  2. Lippe v. Stone Bank

    3:21-CV-03043 (W.D. Ark. Jul. 13, 2022)

    Under Arkansas law, “[conversion is the exercise of dominion over property in violation of the rights of the owner or person entitled to possession with the specific intent to dominate or control property claimed by another.” Ernest F. Loewer, Jr. Farms, Inc. v. Nat'l Bank of Ark., 316 Ark. 54, 58 n.3 (1994).

  3. Sturgis v. Skokos

    335 Ark. 41 (Ark. 1998)   Cited 54 times
    Finding that in a legal malpractice lawsuit involving claims for negligence and breach of contract, the "gist" of the action was for attorney negligence and the statute of limitations as to all claims would be three years, as "[t]he obligation to act diligently is present in every lawyer-client relationship" and "[t]he violation of that obligation is, by definition, nothing more than negligence"

    If two or more statutes of limitation apply, generally the statute with the longest limitations period will govern. Id. at 470; Loewer Farms v. National Bank of Ark., 316 Ark. 54, 870 S.W.2d 726 (1994). The Sturgises' amended complaint reads as follows:

  4. Zufari v. Architecture Plus

    323 Ark. 411 (Ark. 1996)   Cited 22 times
    In Zufari, the breach occurred before substantial completion, and the court held that the cause of action accrued at that time.

    304 Ark. at 34, 800 S.W.2d at 417. Section 16-56-111(b) is the applicable statute of limitations for written contract actions. See Ernest F. Loewer, Jr. Farms, Inc. v. National Bank of Arkansas, 316 Ark. 54, 870 S.W.2d 726 (1994). A written contract is what is involved in this case.

  5. Arkansas Dept. of Human Services v. Harris

    910 S.W.2d 221 (Ark. 1995)   Cited 2 times

    This court has handed down many opinions over a long period that involve different statutes of limitations, and each of the opinions holds that the issue is whether the action was commenced within the time allowed by the applicable statute of limitations. Among the recent holdings are: Johnson v. Gilliand [Gilliland], 320 Ark. 1, 896 S.W.2d 856 (1995); Norris v. Banker, 320 Ark. 629, 899 S.W.2d 70 (1995); Ernest F. Loewer, Jr. Farms, Inc. v. National Bank of Arkansas, 316 Ark. 54, 870 S.W.2d 726 (1994); Forrest City Machine Works v. Lyons, 315 Ark. 173, 866 S.W.2d 372 (1993); Pope County v. Friday, Eldredge Clark, 313 Ark. 83, 852 S.W.2d 114 (1993); Smith v. Elder, 312 Ark. 384, 849 S.W.2d 513 (1993); Wilson v. General Elec. Capital Auto Lease, Inc., 311 Ark. 84, 841 S.W.2d 619 (1992); First Pyramid Life Ins. Co. v. Stolz, 311 Ark. 313, 843 S.W.2d 842, cert. denied, 114 S.Ct. 290 (1992); Goldsby v. Fairley, 309 Ark. 380, 831 S.W.2d 142 (1992); and Smackover State Bank v. Oswalt, 307 Ark. 432, 821 S.W.2d 757 (1991). The issue on appeal in this case, the operative date for the period of limitations in back child support cases, has been the subject of three recent decisions by this court.

  6. Payton v. Coleman

    2012 Ark. App. 160 (Ark. Ct. App. 2012)

    Given the conflicting evidence, we cannot say that the trial court clearly erred in finding that the distribution was intended as payment on the note. See Ernest F. Loewer, Jr., Farms v. National Bank of Arkansas, 316 Ark. 54, 870 S.W.2d 726 (1994). Appellant next asserts that, despite the note's stated interest rate of five percent per annum, the interest rate was usurious.

  7. Tony Smith Trucking v. Woods Woods

    75 Ark. App. 134 (Ark. Ct. App. 2001)   Cited 10 times

    McQuay v. Guntharp, 331 Ark. 466, 963 S.W.2d 583 (1998). If two or more statutes of limitation apply, generally the statute with the longest limitations period will govern. Id. at 470; Loewer Farms v. National Bank of Ark., 316 Ark. 54, 870 S.W.2d 726 (1994).Id. at 48, 977 S.W.2d at 220.

  8. Shelter Ins. Co. v. Arnold

    57 Ark. App. 8 (Ark. Ct. App. 1997)   Cited 8 times

    This argument is unpersuasive. Furthermore, Shelter's reliance upon Courtney v. First National Bank, 300 Ark. 498, 780 S.W.2d 536 (1989), as authority for the general proposition that the statute only begins to run when there is a "complete and present cause of action" is likewise clearly misplaced. [1, 2] It is well settled that the gist of the action as alleged determines which statute of limitations applies, Ernest F. Loewer, Jr. Farms, Inc. v. National Bank, 316 Ark. 54, 870 S.W.2d 726 (1994), and that the three-year statute of limitations for tort actions begins to run when the underlying tort is complete. Faulkner v. Huie, 205 Ark. 332, 168 S.W.2d 839 (1943).