The father's appeal must be dismissed, since he consented to the underlying finding of willfulness that he now challenges on appeal (see CPLR 5511; Matter of Schiavone v Mannese, 169 A.D.3d 1052, 1053; Matter of O'Sullivan v Schebilski, 138 A.D.3d 1170, 1172). To the extent that the father contends that there is no sound and substantial basis in the record for the Family Court's determination that he knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his right to a hearing on the violation petition and consented to the willfulness finding because the transcript of the subject court appearance is missing, he failed to seek a reconstruction hearing prior to this appeal being perfected even though he was aware of the missing transcript (see Matter of Nancy R. v Anthony B., 121 A.D.3d 555, 555; see also Matter of Mikel B. [Carlos B.], 115 A.D.3d 1348, 1348). Moreover, the Support Magistrate's order specifically states that the father waived his right to a hearing on the violation petition and consented to a willfulness finding.

The father’s appeal must be dismissed, since he consented to the underlying finding of willfulness that he now challenges on appeal (see CPLR 5511; Matter of Schiavone v. Mannese, 169 A.D.3d 1052, 1053, 92 N.Y.S.3d 916; Matter of O’Sullivan v. Schebilski, 138 A.D.3d 1170, 1172, 30 N.Y.S.3d 351). To the extent that the father contends that there is no sound and substantial basis in the record for the Family Court’s determination that he knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his right to a hearing on the violation petition and consented to the willfulness finding because the transcript of the subject court appearance is missing, he failed to seek a reconstruction hearing prior to this appeal being perfected even though he was aware of the missing transcript (see Matter of Nancy R. v. Anthony B., 121 A.D.3d 555, 555, 995 N.Y.S.2d 18; see also Matter of Mikel B. [Carlos B.], 115 A.D.3d 1348, 1348, 984 N.Y.S.2d 253).

Contrary to the mother’s con- tention, the record establishes that she violated the terms of the suspended judgment by failing to arrange for the children’s transportation to the New Year’s Day home visit in 2022, failing to confirm every scheduled visit 24 hours in advance when required to do so, and missing scheduled appointments or home visits with the caseworker. [3] Finally, a preponderance of the evidence supports that it was in the children’s best interests to terminate the mother’s parental rights (seeMatter of Jenna D. [Paula, D.], 165 A.D.3d 1617, 1619, 85 N.Y.S.3d 318 [4th Dept. 2018], lv denied 32 N.Y.3d 912, 2019 WL 150570 [2019]; Matter of Mikel B. [Carlos B.], 115 A.D.3d 1348, 1849, 984 N.Y.S.2d 253 [4th Dept. 2014]). "Although [the mother’s] breach of the express conditions of the suspended judgment does not compel termination of [her] parental lights, [it] is strong evidence that termination is, in fact, in the best interests of the child[ren]" (Matter of Jerimiah H. [Kiarra M.], 213 A.D.3d 1298, 1299, 188 N.Y.S.3d 654 [4th Dept. 2023], lv denied 39 N.Y.3d 913, 2023 WL 3513087 [2023] [internal quotation marks omitted]).

Finally, a preponderance of the evidence supports that it was in the children's best interests to terminate the mother's parental rights (see Matter of Jenna D. [Paula D.], 165 A.D.3d 1617, 1619 [4th Dept 2018], lv denied 32 N.Y.3d 912 [2019]; Matter of Mikel B. [Carlos B.], 115 A.D.3d 1348, 1349 [4th Dept 2014]). "Although [the mother's] breach of the express conditions of the suspended judgment does not compel termination of [her] parental rights, [it] is strong evidence that termination is, in fact, in the best interests of the child[ren]" (Matter of Jerimiah H. [Kiarra M.], 213 A.D.3d 1298, 1299 [4th Dept 2023], lv denied 39 N.Y.3d 913 [2023] [internal quotation marks omitted]).

Initially, we note that the father contends that he has been denied adequate appellate review because the transcript of the testimony of several of petitioner's witnesses is missing due to the apparent failure to record the proceedings of that day. The father failed to seek a reconstruction hearing with respect to the missing parts of the record (seeMatter of Mikel B. [Carlos B.] , 115 A.D.3d 1348, 1348, 984 N.Y.S.2d 253 [4th Dept. 2014] ). Thus, the father's contention is not properly before us inasmuch as it is raised for the first time on appeal (see generallyMatter of Abigail H. [Daniel D.] , 172 A.D.3d 1922, 1923, 97 N.Y.S.3d 924 [4th Dept. 2019], lv denied 34 N.Y.3d 901, 2019 WL 5269441 [2019] ; Ciesinski v. Town of Aurora , 202 A.D.2d 984, 985, 609 N.Y.S.2d 745 [4th Dept. 1994] ).

Initially, we note that the father contends that he has been denied adequate appellate review because the transcript of the testimony of several of petitioner's witnesses is missing due to the apparent failure to record the proceedings of that day. The father failed to seek a reconstruction hearing with respect to the missing parts of the record (see Matter of Mikel B. [Carlos B.], 115 A.D.3d 1348, 1348 [4th Dept 2014]). Thus, the father's contention is not properly before us inasmuch as it is raised for the first time on appeal (see generally Matter of Abigail H. [Daniel D.], 172 A.D.3d 1922, 1923 [4th Dept 2019], lv denied 34 N.Y.3d 901 [2019]; Ciesinski v Town of Aurora, 202 A.D.2d 984, 985 [4th Dept 1994]). In any event, we conclude that "the record as submitted is sufficient for this Court to determine" the issues raised on appeal (Matter of Stephen B. [appeal No. 2], 195 A.D.2d 1065, 1065 [4th Dept 1993]).

Finally, a preponderance of the evidence supports the court's determination that it was in the child's best interests to terminate the mother's parental rights (see Jenna D., 165 A.D.3d at 1619; Matter of Mikel B. [Carlos B.], 115 A.D.3d 1348, 1349 [4th Dept 2014]). "Although [the mother's] breach of the express conditions of the suspended judgment does not compel the termination of [her] parental rights, [it] is strong evidence that termination is, in fact, in the best interests of the child[ ]" (Jenna D., 165 A.D.3d at 1619 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Matter of Michael HH. [Michael II.], 124 A.D.3d 944, 945-946 [3d Dept 2015]).

Again, the failure to comply with "any of the terms of the suspended judgment" permits the court to revoke the suspended judgment ( Joseph M., Jr. , 150 A.D.3d at 1648, 52 N.Y.S.3d 602 [emphasis added]). Finally, a preponderance of the evidence supports the court's determination that it was in the child's best interests to terminate the mother's parental rights (seeJenna D. , 165 A.D.3d at 1619, 85 N.Y.S.3d 318 ; Matter of Mikel B. [Carlos B.] , 115 A.D.3d 1348, 1349, 984 N.Y.S.2d 253 [4th Dept. 2014] ). "Although [the mother's] breach of the express conditions of the suspended judgment does not compel the termination of [her] parental rights, [it] is strong evidence that termination is, in fact, in the best interests of the child[ ]" ( Jenna D. , 165 A.D.3d at 1619, 85 N.Y.S.3d 318 [internal quotation marks omitted]; seeMatter of Michael HH. [Michael II.] , 124 A.D.3d 944, 945-946, 1 N.Y.S.3d 442 [3d Dept. 2015] ).

Here, the court conducted a lengthy hearing that addressed both the alleged violations of the suspended judgment and the child's best interests, and there was no need for an additional hearing (seeMatter of Jeremiah J.W. [Tionna W.], 134 A.D.3d 848, 849, 22 N.Y.S.3d 215 [2d Dept. 2015], lv dismissed 27 N.Y.3d 1061, 35 N.Y.S.3d 294, 54 N.E.3d 1166 [2016] ; see alsoKim Shantae M., 221 A.D.2d at 200, 633 N.Y.S.2d 151 ). Finally, a preponderance of the evidence supports the court's determination that it was in the child's best interests to terminate the mother's parental rights (seeMatter of Mikel B. [Carlos B.], 115 A.D.3d 1348, 1349, 984 N.Y.S.2d 253 [4th Dept. 2014] ). "Although [the mother's] breach of the express conditions of the suspended judgment does not compel the termination of [her] parental rights, [it] is strong evidence that termination is, in fact, in the best interests of the child[ ]" ( Michael HH., 124 A.D.3d at 945–946, 1 N.Y.S.3d 442 [internal quotation marks omitted] ). "The court's determination that [the mother] was not likely to change sufficiently to enable her to parent the child[ ] is entitled to great deference[,]" and we thus conclude that "any progress that [the mother] made was not sufficient to warrant any further prolongation of the child[ ]'s unsettled familial status" ( Matter of Brendan S., 39 A.D.3d 1189, 1190, 834 N.Y.S.2d 602 [4th Dept. 2007] [internal quotation marks omitted] ), and termination of the mother's parental rights was therefore proper (seeMatter of Douglas H. [Catherine H.], 1 A.D.3d 824, 825–826, 767 N.Y.S.2d 173 [3d Dept. 2003], lv denied 2 N.Y.3d 701, 778 N.Y.S.2d 459, 810 N.E.

While the 2003 neglect adjudication is somewhat attenuated, this Court consistently has held that "there is no bright-line, temporal rule beyond which we will not consider older child protective determinations" (Matter of Iryanna I. [Benjamin K.], 132 AD3d 1096, 1097 [2015] [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]; accord Matter of Sumaria D. [Madelyn D.], 121 AD3d 1203, 1204 [2014]; Matter of Paige WW. [Charles XX.], 71 AD3d 1200, 1203 [2010]; see Matter of Evelyn B., 30 AD3d 913, 915 [2006], lv denied 7 NY3d 713 [2006]). Similarly, evidence that a parent permanently neglected one child has long been considered in the context of determining whether such parent derivatively neglected another child in his or her care (see Matter of Alexander Z. [Melissa Z.], 129 AD3d 1160, 1163 [2015], lv denied 25 NY3d 914 [2015]; Matter of Mikel B. [Carlos B.], 115 AD3d 1348, 1349 [2014]; Matter of Michael N. [Jason M.], 79 AD3d 1165, 1167-1168 [2010]; Matter of Krystal J., 267 AD2d 1097, 1098 [1999]) — particularly where, as here, the underlying adjudications reflect both a longstanding pattern of neglect and, more to the point, a longstanding inability and/or unwillingness to address serious substance abuse issues. As evidenced by the documentary evidence in the record, the father repeatedly was directed to undergo substance abuse counseling and treatment. Despite making some progress in this area over the years, the father frequently tested positive for marihuana (including on the date of the dispositional hearing) — purportedly due to the stress occasioned by petitioner's involvement in his life.