(2) Missouri follows the majority rule that, in the absence of an apportionment statute, the burden of the estate tax falls on the general estate, which usually results in the residuary estate bearing the burden of the tax. In re Holmes' Estate, 328 Mo. 143, 40 S.W.2d 616; In re Bernheimer's Estate, 352 Mo. 91, 176 S.W.2d 15; Bryant v. Green, 328 Mo. 1226, 44 S.W.2d 7; Bemis v. Converse, 246 Mass. 131, 140 N.E. 686; Turner v. Cole, 118 N.J. Eq. 497, 179 A. 113; Farmers' Loan Trust Co. v. Winthrop, 238 N.Y. 488, 144 N.E. 769; Central Trust Co. v. Burrow, 144 Kan. 79, 58 P.2d 469; Ericson v. Childs, 124 Conn. 66, 198 A. 176, 115 A.L.R. 907; Ragan v. Taylor, 136 F.2d 598; Y.M.C.A. v. Davis, 264 U.S. 47, 44 S.Ct. 291, 68 L.Ed. 558; 47 C.J.S. 1016, sec. 776; C.C. II. Federal Estate and Gift Tax Rep., sec. 3140.16. (3) An intent to transfer the "thrust" of the Federal Estate Tax from the residuary estate โ where it is cast by the law โ to the beneficiaries of the annuity contract may not be lightly inferred, but such intent must be made to "clearly appear" from the will.
S.Ct. 361, 317 U.S. 476; 47 C.J.S. 1017; 47 C.J.S. 1019-1020, Sec. 776-b. As to South Carolina Courtsnot countenancing judicial legislation: 233 S.C. 233, 104 S.E.2d 357; 200 S.C. 127, 20 S.E.2d 645; 169 S.E. 843, 170 S.C. 86; 42 S.E.2d 531, 210 S.C. 324; 106 S.E.2d 258, 233 S.C. 567; 82 S.E.2d 520, 225 S.C. 389; 190 S.E. 249, 183 S.C. 38; 22 S.E.2d 715, 201 S.C. 257; 71 S.E.2d 603, 222 S.C. 79; 103 S.E.2d 923, 233 S.C. 165; 54 S.E.2d 777, 215 S.C. 193; 77 S.E.2d 583, 224 S.C. 105; 110 S.E. 393, 118 S.C. 245; 115 S.E. 202, 122 S.C. 158; 94 S.E.2d 177, 230 S.C. 75; 90 S.E.2d 632, 228 S.C. 458; 54 S.E.2d 791, 215 S.C. 224; 194 S.E. 21, 185 S.C. 296; 195 S.E. 646, 186 S.C. 374; 9 S.E.2d 218, 194 S.C. 105; 21 S.E.2d 393, 201 S.C. 50. As to Courts having no power to decree apportionment,in the absence of an apportionment statute: J.K. Lasser, Estate Tax Techniques, 2142-2145; 246 Mass. 131, 140 N.E. 686; 233 Mass. 471, 124 N.E. 265; 325 Mass. 469, 91 N.E.2d 334; 238 N.Y. 488, 144 N.E. 769; 124 Conn. 66, 198 A. 176; 89 N.H. 471, 200 A. 786; 164 Ark. 411, 262 S.W. 324; 212 Ark. 221, 205 S.W.2d 198; 172 Tenn. 375, 112 S.W.2d 827; 144 Kan. 79, 58 P.2d 469; 98 Cal.App.2d 393, 220 P.2d 580; 136 F.2d 598; 74 Cal.App.2d 898, 170 P.2d 111; 50 Cal.App.2d 724, 123 P.2d 873; 28 Pa. D. C. 663; 29 Pa. D. C. 341; C.C.H. Inher. Tax Rep. Par. 17, 155; C.C.H. Inher. Tax Rep. Par. 17, 282; 229 Minn. 516, 40 N.W.2d 342; 32 Wn.2d 696, 203 P.2d 1078; 38 Wn.2d 259, 229 P.2d 312; 289 Ill. 475, 124 N.E. 662; 284 Ill. 450, 120 N.E. 286; 383 Ill. 489, 50 N.E.2d 461; 124 Conn. 66, 198 A. 176, 115 A.L.R. 907; 115 A.L.R. 914; 246 Mass. 131, 140 N.E. 686; 325 Mass. 469, 91 N.E.2d 334; 7. N.J. Sup. 576, 72 A.2d 363. As to the Will directing that all inheritance, transferand estate taxes, State and Federal, imposed against theestate, be paid out of the residuary estate: 173 S.E. 801, 172 S.C. 250; 34 S.E.2d 787, 211 S.C. 543; 12 S.E.2d 10, 195 S.C. 431; 85 S.E. 1064, 102 S.C. 227; 97 S.E.2d 24, 230 S.C. 568; 56 S.E.2d 343,
So, also, Commercial Trust Co. v. Millard, 122 N.J. Eq. 290, 193 A. 814, allowed reimbursement of federal estate and other taxes from the trustees under an inter vivos trust. Decisions of a similar nature, involving state death taxes, are Ericson v. Childs, 124 Conn. 66, 198 A. 176, 115 A.L.R. 907, and Hackett v. Bankers Trust Co., 122 Conn. 107, 187 A. 653. Compare annotation in 115 A.L.R. 916. These cases hold that a testamentary provision effective to make a change in the burden of a tax should be apt and unambiguous for the specific purpose, and directions concerning transfer taxes on other property, as on the share "herein given" (Gaede v. Carroll, supra) or "in respect to my estate or any of the bequests of this my will" (Ericson v. Childs, supra [ 124 Conn. 66, 198 A. 177, 115 A.L.R. 907]), are not sufficient to shift the normal burden of taxes on property not passing as a part of the estate of the deceased at his death. Such judicial caution seems justified, for with increasing taxes a residuary legatee under a will made long previous may find himself with an undue burden, even though, as is often the case, the residuary legatee is a special object of the testator's affection.
Prior to that time, the burden of federal and state estate taxes rested on the estate as a whole and, in the absence of a directive in the will to the contrary โ a situation which through ignorance, thoughtlessness or carelessness often prevailed โ the taxes were paid out of the residuary estate. Ericson v. Childs, 124 Conn. 66, . 81, 198 A. 176. This created many instances of hardship upon and injustice to widows and children, who, as the natural objects of a testator's bounty, were customarily the residuary legatees and, as such, were frequently saddled with the entire tax, while other beneficiaries, more distantly related to the testator or not related at all, paid no taxes at all. The proration statute was contrived to circumvent these instances of hardship and injustice. It is not a taxing statute.
Prior to the passage of this statute by the Connecticut General Assembly in 1945, the burden of federal and state estate taxes fell on the estate as a whole and, in the absence of a directive in the will to the contrary, the taxes were paid out of the residuary estate. Ericson v. Childs, 124 Conn. 66, 81, 198 A. 176 (1938). In order to mitigate the hardships upon many widows and children, who as natural objects of a testator's bounty were usually the residuary legatees, the legislature enacted the proration statute which more equitably distributes the burden of estate taxes.
" From everything that is properly before us on this reservation, it is apparent to us that the questions as reserved are framed too broadly for us to be able to "give to each a categorical or very definite answer," as we are required to do on a reservation. Rothkopf v. Danbury, 156 Conn. 347, 351, 242 A.2d 771 (1968); Second National Bank v. Montesi, 144 Conn. 311, 315, 130 A.2d 796 (1957); Ericson v. Childs, 124 Conn. 66, 82, 198 A. 176 (1938); see Practice Book 4147. Particularly, the framing of the reserved questions, applying as they do, to any Connecticut hospital renders it impossible to answer these questions on a record that is replete with the controversy only between this plaintiff and the Norwalk Hospital and the other named defendants and not to any other Connecticut hospital. The only bylaws in the record are those of the Norwalk Hospital; there are no bylaws of any other Connecticut hospital before us. The briefs of the parties, as well as their oral argument before us, also developed at length the claims between the plaintiff physician and this defendant hospital.
"Questions in a reservation should be so stated that each will present a definite point of law and the court may give to each a categorical or very definite answer." Second National Bank v. Montesi, 144 Conn. 311, 315, 130 A.2d 796; Barnes v. New Haven, 140 Conn. 8, 11, 98 A.2d 523; Ericson v. Childs, 124 Conn. 66, 82, 198 A. 176. Without reference to any specific constitutional provision or to any specific provision of the statutes or of the consolidation ordinance or to the possible illegal impact of any of them upon any specific right of any of the plaintiffs, the questions seek an opinion as to whether the Home Rule Act and the Danbury consolidation ordinance are generally unconstitutional or illegal "in whole or in part" for any reason whatsoever. There is no suggestion in either of the questions as to which of the many provisions of the constitution are claimed to be applicable or for what reason the consolidated ordinance might be illegal or unconstitutional.
The plaintiff also claims that the imposition of the tax would lead to injustice in this case because the executor may be compelled to pay the tax without an opportunity to obtain reimbursement from the nonresident remaindermen against whose share it is imposed. General Statutes 12-376, 12-378, 12-384, 12-385; see Ericson v. Childs, 124 Conn. 66, 79, 198 A. 176; Hackett v. Bankers Trust Co., supra, 126. The claim is unsound.
In the absence of statute or testamentary direction, some courts hold the probate estate is liable for the tax without any right of contribution from the nonprobate properties. Ericson v. Childs, 198 A. 176, 115 A.L.R. 907; Warfield v. Merchants Nat. Bank of Boston, 147 N.E.2d 809; Central Trust Co. v. Burrow, 58 P.2d 469, are illustrative of a line of cases holding no right of contribution exists in favor of the probate estate against the nonprobate estate. The rule to announced was in several instances stated prior to the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in Riggs v. Del Drago, supra. Some decisions assumed the Federal statute did not permit contribution. That question, as previously noted, was settled in the Riggs case.
"Questions in a reservation should be so stated that each will present a definite point of law and that the court may give to each a categorical or very definite answer." Ericson v. Childs, 124 Conn. 66, 82, 198 A. 176; Practice Book 470. Because of the importance of the public interest involved, however, we will entertain the reservation. General Motors Corporation v. Mulquin, 134 Conn. 118, 133, 55 A.2d 732; Barnes v. New Haven, 140 Conn. 8, 11, 98 A.2d 523; Stanton v. Stanton, 140 Conn. 504, 509, 101 A.2d 789.