The acknowledgment of a deed making such a conveyance is as necessary to the validity of the deed as the signing and recording of it. It was said in Erickson v. White, 288 Mass. 451, 452, that "This section is complete in itself covering a new subject and conferring rights and privileges not theretofore existing. . . . The validity of a deed such as is described in G.L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 209, § 3, depends entirely upon the terms of that section.
No effect can be given to it.” 320 Mass. at 415, 69 N.E.2d 806 (citing Erickson v. White, 288 Mass. 451, 193 N.E. 25 ). McOuatt, 320 Mass. at 415, 69 N.E.2d 806.
2-3. The defendant has cited White v. Erickson, 141 Minn. 141, 169 N.W. 535, and Bradford v. Doherty, 186 Minn. 18, 242 N.W. 339, as controlling cases in support of its contention that the construction of the agreement herein should have been submitted to the jury. Defendant does not contend, however, that the language in the contract is ambiguous.
"This section is complete in itself covering a new subject and conferring rights and privileges not theretofore existing." Erickson v. White, 288 Mass. 451, 452. Thus what was excluded from the application of G.L. (Ter.
Catherine S. Barrow therein released "to said grantees" all rights of dower and homestead. It is not suggested that the deed was not recorded during the lifetime of both spouses. Erickson v. White, 288 Mass. 451. Thomas H. Barrow, the elder, died intestate on April 17, 1924, leaving as heirs his wife, Catherine, and his son, the defendant.
See Daggett v. Simonds, 173 Mass. 340. It is more nearly comparable with the situation considered in Erickson v. White, 288 Mass. 451. Cases in other jurisdictions are of little assistance in view of the differences in the governing statutes. Church v. McLaren, 85 Wis. 122, however, is in accord with the conclusion here reached.