Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
San Diego County Super. Ct. No. 222301
PROCEEDINGS in mandate after superior court denied juvenile's discovery motion. Francis M. Devaney, Judge. Petition granted.
McINTYRE, J.
THE COURT:
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Eric R. is charged with felony and misdemeanor counts, including burglary, assault with a deadly weapon by means likely to produce great bodily injury on a peace officer and resisting arrest. Eric denies all of the counts against him.
The arresting officers' reports make the following allegations: Escondido Police Officers Ruiz and Gann reportedly witnessed seventeen-year-old Eric and another unidentified boy fleeing (on foot) from a market. Eric reportedly had bottled beverages in his arms. The officers chased Eric in their marked patrol car and used the car to cut off Eric's escape path. Just as she was poised to leave the car to apprehend Eric, Officer Ruiz heard a loud noise and perceived that the patrol car had been struck with a bottle of Gatorade. Eric was arrested at gunpoint.
Eric's counsel filed a Pitchess motion requesting evidence of false statements in reports, excessive or improper use of force, or dishonesty or tampering with or manufacturing of evidence by Officers Ruiz or Gann. (The motion also requested evidence of the officers' racial bias, but that request was subsequently withdrawn.) Eric's motion explained how he intended to use the discovered information at trial in his defense.
Eric's counsel submitted a declaration in support of the discovery motion. The declaration stated that Eric denied the allegation that he threw a bottle of Gatorade at the patrol car and further denied the allegation that he threw a bottle of Gatorade with force to cause injury or with the intent to escape officers. The declaration stated that Officers Ruiz and Gann lied when they stated that Eric assaulted Officer Ruiz or used force or violence to resist arrest. The declaration also stated that Officers Ruiz and Gann used unreasonable or excessive force in attempting to detain him.
The superior court denied Eric's motion, declining to conduct an in camera review of Officers Ruiz's and Gann's personnel records to determine whether responsive documents existed. The court stated that the declaration amounted to little more than a denial of the allegations underlying the charges against Eric and commented that that is what the trial would be about.
Eric timely filed this petition. He contends that the superior court erred in denying the Pitchessmotion and requests issuance of a writ of mandate requiring the court to review relevant portions of the officers' personnel files to identify relevant, responsive documents.
We obtained a response from the Escondido City Attorney's Office and subsequently issued Palma notice. (Palma v. U.S. Industrial Fasteners, Inc. (1984) 36 Cal.3d 171.)
DISCUSSION
A criminal defendant showing good cause is entitled to discovery of relevant documents or information in the personnel records of a police officer accused of misconduct against the defendant. (Evid. Code, §§ 1043, 1045; Pen. Code, §§ 832.7, 832.8.) To obtain such discovery, a defendant files a motion, typically called a Pitchessmotion, which describes the information sought, along with a supporting affidavit to show good cause. (Evid. Code, § 1043, subd. (b); Pitchess v. Superior Court (1974) 11 Cal.3d 531.) To demonstrate good cause for discovery, a defendant must show only " 'materiality' to the subject matter of the pending litigation and a 'reasonable belief' that the agency has the type of information sought." (City of Santa Cruz v. Municipal Court (1989) 49 Cal.3d 74, 84.) "A showing of good cause is measured by 'relatively relaxed standards' that serve to 'insure the production' for trial court review of 'all potentially relevant documents.' " (Warrick v. Superior Court (2005) 35 Cal.4th 1011, 1016 (Warrick), quoting City of Santa Cruz, at p. 84.) When a Pitchess motion is granted, the trial court "reviews the pertinent documents in chambers and discloses only that information falling within the statutorily defined standards of relevance." (Id. at p. 1019.)
In Warrick, the California Supreme Court found reversible error in the trial court's denial of a Pitchess motion. "To show good cause as required by section 1043, defense counsel's declaration in support of a Pitchess motion must propose a defense or defenses to the pending charges. The declaration must articulate how the discovery sought may lead to relevant evidence or may itself be admissible direct or impeachment evidence [citations] that would support those proposed defenses. These requirements ensure that only information 'potentially relevant' to the defense need be brought by the custodian of the officer's records to the court for its examination in chambers. [Citations.] [¶] Counsel's affidavit must also describe a factual scenario supporting the claimed officer misconduct. That factual scenario, depending on the circumstances of the case, may consist of a denial of the facts asserted in the police report." (Warrick, supra, 35 Cal.4th at pp. 1024-1025, italics added.) "[A] witness account corroborating the occurrence of officer misconduct... is not required. What the defendant must present is a specific factual scenario of officer misconduct that is plausible when read in light of the pertinent documents." (Id. at p. 1025.) "[A] plausible scenario of officer misconduct is one that might or could have occurred. Such a scenario is plausible because it presents an assertion of a specific police misconduct that is both internally consistent and supports the defense proposed to the charges." (Id. at p. 1026.)
Eric met the "relatively relaxed standard" to obtain Pitchess discovery. He denied the key facts alleged by the arresting officers and alleges that the officers used excessive force and lied. As Eric's counsel argued at the hearing, these allegations are not implausible. It is conceivable that chasing Eric with the patrol car while he was on foot and arresting him at gunpoint potentially could support a determination that the officers used excessive force. It is also conceivable, as Eric has alleged, that the officers lied. Further, as Eric demonstrated in his motion, the evidence sought could be admissible at trial to show that the police report's statements were fabricated to cover up the officers' use of excessive force, or the evidence could otherwise bear on the officers' credibility.
Eric has demonstrated good cause for Pitchess discovery. Therefore, the court should have granted the Pitchess motion and conducted an in camera review of the requested personnel files to determine whether they contained any relevant evidence.
Because the relevant facts are not in dispute and Eric's entitlement to relief is clear, we conclude that a peremptory writ in the first instance is proper. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1088; Alexander v. Superior Court (1993) 5 Cal.4th 1218, 1222-1223, disapproved on another ground in Hassan v. Mercy American River Hospital (2003) 31 Cal.4th 709, 724, fn. 4; Ng v. Superior Court (1992) 4 Cal.4th 29, 35.)
DISPOSITION
Let a peremptory writ of mandate issue directing the superior court to vacate its June 30, 2009, order denying Eric's Motion for Discovery of Information in Police Files and Records and directing the superior court to conduct an in camera review to determine whether responsive, relevant documents and information exist. This opinion is made final as to this court seven days after this decision is filed. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.490(b)(3).)
WE CONCUR: McCONNELL, P. J., AARON, J.