Opinion
A-13922 0364
04-10-2024
RICHARD ARLEN ERDMANN, Appellant, v. STATE OF ALASKA, Appellee.
David T. McGee, Attorney at Law, under contract with the Public Defender Agency, and Samantha Cherot, Public Defender, Anchorage, for the Appellant. Madison M. Mitchell, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Criminal Appeals, Anchorage, and Treg R. Taylor, Attorney General, Juneau, for the Appellee.
UNPUBLISHED See Alaska Appellate Rule 214(d)
Appeal from the Superior Court, Third Judicial District, Anchorage, Trial Court No. 3AN-15-01256 CR Catherine M. Easter, Judge.
David T. McGee, Attorney at Law, under contract with the Public Defender Agency, and Samantha Cherot, Public Defender, Anchorage, for the Appellant.
Madison M. Mitchell, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Criminal Appeals, Anchorage, and Treg R. Taylor, Attorney General, Juneau, for the Appellee.
Before: Allard, Chief Judge, and Wollenberg and Harbison, Judges.
SUMMARY DISPOSITION
Richard Arlen Erdmann appeals the superior court's denial of his presentencing motion to withdraw his guilty plea. As we explained in Erdmann's previous appeal, Erdmann asked to withdraw his plea because, according to Erdmann, his trial counsel had told him that he could withdraw his plea "as a matter of course" at any time before sentencing. Erdmann also argued that he should be allowed to withdraw his plea because his trial counsel had failed to obtain and investigate ankle monitoring location data that, according to Erdmann, would have provided an alibi for his offense. The superior court held an evidentiary hearing and denied Erdmann's request on the grounds that Erdmann had failed to establish a "manifest injustice." We vacated that ruling and remanded for further proceedings because Erdmann moved to withdraw his plea prior to sentencing and therefore was only required to show a "fair and just reason" to withdraw his plea, not "manifest injustice."
Erdmann v. State, 2021 WL 2134983, at *1 (Alaska App. May 26, 2021) (unpublished).
Id.
Id. at *2.
On remand, the superior court applied the correct "fair and just reason" standard and again rejected Erdmann's request. The superior court found that Erdmann's attorney had not told him that he could withdraw his plea "as a matter of course" and that Erdmann was not under a mistaken but good-faith belief that he could withdraw his guilty plea as a matter of course. Instead, the court concluded that Erdmann "simply regretted his decision to take the State's plea deal and has not otherwise shown a fair and just reason to withdraw his plea." The court also found that the ankle monitoring data Erdmann claimed would have provided him with an alibi was not, in fact, helpful to Erdmann's defense, and that his trial counsel's decision not to investigate it further therefore did not provide a fair and just reason for Erdmann to withdraw his plea.
On appeal, Erdmann challenges the superior court's ruling, but we have reviewed the record, and the superior court's factual findings are amply supported by the record, especially the testimony of Erdmann's trial attorney. We also note that Erdmann declined to testify in this case and instead relied on the assertions he made in his affidavit, which the superior court described as "self-serving" and "conclusory." Under these circumstances, the superior court's factual findings are not clearly erroneous, and, given those findings, the superior court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that Erdmann failed to establish a fair and just reason to withdraw his plea.
See Monroe v. State, 752 P.2d 1017, 1020 (Alaska App. 1988) (reviewing a court's factual findings on a motion to withdraw a plea for clear error); McClain v. State, 742 P.2d 269, 271 (Alaska App. 1987) ("The trial court's ruling on [a] withdrawal motion will only be reversed where that court abuses its discretion.").
The judgment of the superior court is AFFIRMED.