Opinion
No: 5:01-cv-10
January 30, 2002
OPINION
This is a civil rights action brought by a state prisoner pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Presently pending before the Court are Defendants' Rule 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss Claims of February 24, 1998 (docket #20) and Defendants' Rule 56(b) Motion for Summary Judgment (docket #35). Plaintiff filed a brief and affidavit in response. After reviewing the pleadings, motions, and response, the Court will grant Defendants' Rule 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss with regard to the claims arising on February 24, 1998, and grant Defendants' Rule 56(b) Motion for Summary Judgment in part. Summary judgment will be granted to Defendants with regard to Plaintiff's claim of discrimination, but denied with regard to Plaintiff's remaining Eighth Amendment claims arising on March 5, 1998, against Defendants Struble, Loomis and Bierstetel.
Defendants filed a supplemental brief in support of their motion to dismiss the claims of February 24, 1998 (docket #26).
Defendants filed two sets of supplemental exhibits to their motion for summary judgment (docket ##36, 39.)
Factual Background
Plaintiff is currently incarcerated in the Ionia Maximum Correctional Facility (IMAX). In his verified complaint, he sues the Michigan Department of Corrections (MDOC) and the following IMAX employees: Al Visser, Robert Struble, Mark Loomis, Richard Hamilton, (unknown) Bierstetel, and Talisa Cole. Plaintiff claims that he was physically assaulted by prison staff on February 24, 1998 and March 5, 1998. In a memorandum opinion and order issued on March 16, 2001, the Court dismissed the MDOC and Al Visser from this action.
Officer Hamilton was served in this action on April 7, 2001 (docket #12), but has ot filed an appearance in the case or responded to the complaint. For the reasons set forth below, Hamilton will be dismissed from this action otwithstanding his failure to comply with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
The claims arising from the February 24, 1998, incident were the subject of a previous lawsuit in this Court, Erby v. Struble et al., Case No. 1:98-cv-597 (W.D. Mich.). In that action, Plaintiff amed the Michigan Department of Corrections and Officers Struble, Hamilton and Loomis. The previous action was dismissed without prejudice on September 2, 1999, because it was filed before Plaintiff had exhausted his administrative remedies. Plaintiff has ow satisfied the exhaustion requirement with regard to his claims arising from February 24, 1998 and March 5, 1998.
I. February 24. 1998
At about 3:30 p.m. on February 24, 1998, Officer Struble stopped at Plaintiff's cell and asked him if he wanted to go to the exercise yard. (Compl., ¶ 1, docket #1.) Plaintiff claims that when he said "yes," Struble responded, "You got your yard coming and something special to go with it." (Compl., ¶ 2.) Officers Struble and Hamilton came back to Plaintiff's cell at 7:15 p.m. to escort him to the yard. (Compl., ¶ 3.) Pursuant to normal procedure at IMAX, Plaintiff was handcuffed behind his back through the food slot before being removed him from his cell. (Compl., ¶ 3.) As they approached the back doors of the unit leading to the yard, Plaintiff asserts that Struble struck him on the left side of the head with a closed fist and Hamilton pushed him down the stairs. (Compl., ¶ 4.)
Officers Struble, Hamilton, and Loomis, who was sitting in a chair at the bottom of the stairs, then began stomping and kicking Plaintiff and beating him with closed fists. (Compl., ¶ 5.)
Plaintiff claims that he suffered extensive injuries from the assault, including "a huge lump-like swelling to the left side of [his] head, a large abrasion to [his] left shoulder and elbow, and an abrasion to [his] left knee and multiple abrasions and cuts all over [his] body. (Compl., ¶ 6.) A memorandum written by Nurse McClure confirms that Plaintiff had a swollen area on the left side of his head, a large abrasion on his left shoulder, a scraped area on his right elbow, an abrasion on his left knee, and tiny cuts on both wrists. (See Attach. to Compl, 2/24/98 Memorandum from McClure to 2-10 Shift Command.)
Officers Struble and Hamilton claim that it was Plaintiff who assaulted them on the way to the yard. The officers aver that when they arrived at the stairwell leading to the outside door of the unit, Plaintiff lifted his leg and kicked Struble in the right knee. (Struble Aff., ¶ 8, Defendants' Exhibit 1, docket #35; Hamilton Aff., ¶ 5, Defendants' Exhibit B, docket #35.) After that, Plaintiff attempted to break away from the officers toward the yard. (Struble Aff., ¶ 9; Hamilton Aff., ¶ 5.) When the officers grabbed onto Plaintiff's shirt to restrain him, he fell on the floor at the bottom of the stairs. (Struble Aff., ¶ 9; Hamilton Aff., ¶ 5.) Plaintiff then spun around on his back and kicked Hamilton in the right knee. (Struble Aff., ¶ 9; Hamilton Aff., ¶ 5.) The two officers held Plaintiff on his stomach on the floor until Officer Loomis arrived with leg restraints. (Struble Aff., ¶ 10.) Loomis had been outside of entryway placing padlocks on the yard modules when he saw Officers Struble and Hamilton struggling with Plaintiff. (Loomis Aff., ¶ 4, Defendants' Exhibit 2, docket #39.)
Officer Hamilton's Affidavit was filed in the previous action brought by Plaintiff concerning the event of February 24, 1998, Erby v. Struble et al., 1:98-cv-597.
According to Officer Struble, Plaintiff was escorted back to his cell without further incident. (Struble Aff., ¶ 9.) The officers contend that the bumps and bruises Plaintiff sustained from the fall were caused by his own actions. (Struble Aff., ¶¶ 11-12; Hamilton Aff., ¶ 6; Loomis Aff., ¶¶ 5-6.) They claim to have used the minimum amount of force ecessary to restrain Plaintiff and gain control of him. (Struble Aff., ¶¶ 11-12; Hamilton Aff., ¶ 7.) The officers deny kicking or punching Plaintiff or purposefully injuring him in any way. (Struble Aff., ¶ 12; Hamilton Aff., ¶ 7; Loomis Aff. ¶, 4.) Struble also denied threatening Plaintiff when he came to his cell the first time. (Struble Aff., ¶ 5.)
Officers Struble and Hamilton each wrote a major misconduct report against Plaintiff for assault and battery as a result of the incident. (See Misconduct Reports, Defendants' Exhibit D, docket #35). At the administrative hearing held on March 17, 1998, Plaintiff claimed that the officers assaulted him without provocation. (See Misconduct Hearing Report, Defendants' Exhibit D, docket #35.) The hearing officer found the officers to be credible and found Plaintiff guilty of both offenses. Officer Hamilton had to undergo knee surgery as the result of Plaintiff's assault and had to take time off to recuperate. (Hamilton Aff., ¶ 10.)
II. March 5, 1998
Officer Struble avers that while he was picking-up food trays on March 5, 1998, Plaintiff threw a milk carton full of fecal matter and urine on him, striking him in the head, face, back and legs. (Struble Aff., ¶ 16.) According to Struble, Plaintiff said, "I ain't finished yet you fuck honky ext time I am sticking you" (sic). (Struble Aff., ¶ 16.) Struble immediately showered and changed clothes and then went to the Ionia County Memorial Hospital for treatment. (Struble Aff., ¶ 17.) Struble wrote a major misconduct against Plaintiff for assault and battery as a result of the incident. (Struble Aff., ¶ 18; Misconduct Hearing Report, Defendants' Exhibit H, docket #35.) Plaintiff was convicted of the offense on March 17, 1998. (Misconduct Hearing Report, Defendants' Exhibit H, docket #35.)
Plaintiff claims that at about 9:20 p.m., Officers Struble, Loomis, and Bierstetel came into his cell and assaulted him. (Compl., ¶ 9.) According to Plaintiff, they kicked him and beat him with closed fists all over his body for approximately three minutes. (Compl., ¶ 9.) Plaintiff allegedly suffered facial swelling; multiple contusions, abrasions and cuts all over his body; and extreme back pain. He asserts that IMAX health care staff intentionally failed to process his requests for medical treatment for his injuries. (Compl., ¶ 11.) Officers Struble, Loomis and Bierstetel deny that they entered Plaintiff's cell and assaulted him on March 5, 1998. (Struble Aff., ¶ 15; Loomis Aff, ¶ 8; Bierstetel Aff., ¶ 13, Defendants' Exhibit 3, docket #36.) Officer Bierstetel avers that he stopped at Plaintiff's cell when he was conducting rounds at about 9:20 p.m. on March 5, 1998. (Bierstetel Aff., ¶ 11.) It was too dark for the officer to see Plaintiff through the cell door window, so he opened Plaintiff's food slot and looked in with his flashlight. (Bierstetel Aff, ¶ 11.) At that time, Plaintiff grabbed Bierstetel's hat. (Bierstetel Aff., ¶ 11.) Officer Bierstetel immediately logged the incident in the unit log book, but his hat was ot returned until the following day when Plaintiff's cell was opened. (Bierstetel Aff., ¶ I1.)
Plaintiff contends that Officer Talisa Cole was working in the #2 or #3 post gun tower a short distance from his cell and witnessed the March 5 attack through the back window of his cell. (Compl., ¶ 12.) He further claims that she reported the incident to Lieutenant Visser and other IMAX administrators. Officer Cole avers that she was assigned to Gun Post 3 on March 5, 1998, which is approximately 255 feet away from the end of Housing Unit 2 where Plaintiff's cell was located. (Cole Aff., ¶ 6, Defendants' Exhibit 4, docket #35.) Officers assigned to gun posts are responsible for scanning the prison grounds and perimeter fence for any signs of unusual activity or escape attempts. (Cole Aff., ¶ 10.) Typically, a gun post officer would only observe the housing units for purposes of monitoring prisoners in the yard behind the unit. (Cole Aff, ¶ 10.) Cole claims that she did ot have a full view of Plaintiff's cell from her post, and has no recollection of witnessing an assault on Plaintiff that ight. (Cole Aff., ¶¶ 6, 9.)
Legal Standards
Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure enables a defendant to file a motion to dismiss for a plaintiff's failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Motions to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) are designed to test "whether a cognizable claim has been pleaded in the complaint." Scheid v. Fanny Farmer Candy Shops. Inc., 859 F.2d 434, 436 (6th Cir. 1988). Dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is appropriate where there is no set of facts which would entitle the plaintiff to recover. Hammond v. Baldwin, 866 F.2d 172, 175 (6th Cir. 1989). In reviewing a defendant's Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a district court should construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and determine whether the plaintiff undoubtedly can prove no set of facts in support of his claims that would entitle him to relief. Meador v. Cabinet for Human Resources, 902 F.2d 474, 475 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 867 (1990). As the Supreme Court said in Hishon v. King Spalding, 467 U.S. 69 (1984), "[a] court may dismiss a complaint only if it is clear that no relief could be granted under any set of facts that could be proved consistent with the allegations." Hishon, 467 U.S. at 73. A district court may not grant a defendant's Rule12(b)(6) motion to dismiss based on its disbelief of the plaintiff's factual allegations. In Re Sofamor Danek Group. Inc., 123 F.3d 394, 400 (6th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1106 (1998). It is ot the court's function to weigh evidence or evaluate the credibility of witnesses. Miller v. Currie, 50 F.3d 373, 377 (6th Cir. 1995). Rather, the court should accept all well-pleaded facts as true and not consider matters outside the pleadings. Hammond, 866 F.2d at 175.
Summary judgment is appropriate when the record reveals that there are no issues as to any material fact in dispute and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c); Parker v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 121 F.3d 1006, 1009 (6th Cir. 1997) (en banc), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1084 (1998); Sable v. General Motors Corp., 90 F.3d 171, 175 (6th Cir. 1996); Payne v. Board of Education, 88 F.3d 392, 397 (6th Cir. 1996) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986)). The standard for determining whether summary judgment is appropriate is "whether 'the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law."' See Adcox v. Teledyne. Inc, 21 F.3d 1381, 1385 (6th Cir.) (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 251-52) cert denied, 513 U.S. 871 (1994); see also Crabbs v. Copperweld Tubing Products Co., 114 F.3d 85, 88 (6th Cir. 1997).
The Court must consider all pleadings, depositions, affidavits, and admissions on file, and draw all justifiable inferences in favor of the party opposing the motion. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986); Wathen v. General Elec. Co., 115 F.3d 400, 403 (6th Cir. 1997). The parties moving for summary judgment bear the initial burden of pointing out to the district court that there is an absence of evidence to support the onmoving party's case, but eed ot support its motion with affdavits or other materials "negating" the opponent's claim. Moore v. Philip Morris Companies. Inc., 8 F.3d 335, 339 (6th Cir. 1993). Once the defendants show that "there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case,"s the plaintiff has the burden of coming forward with evidence raising a triable issue of fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325 (1986). To sustain this burden, the plaintiff may ot rest on the mere allegations of his pleadings. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(e); Copeland v. Machulis, 57 F.3d 476, 479 (6th Cir. 1995). A party opposing a motion for summary judgment has the burden to come forth with requisite proof to support his legal claim, particularly where he has had an opportunity to conduct discovery. See Noble v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 32 F.3d 997, 999 (6th Cir. 1994); Booker v. Brown Williamson Tobacco Co., 879 F.2d 1304, 1310 (6th Cir. 1989). In so doing, the plaintiff must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(e); see Kensu v. Haigh, 87 F.3d 172, 175 (1996); Brennan v. Township of Northville, 78 F.3d 1152, 1156 (6th Cir. 1996).
Discussion
A. February 24. 1998
In their motion to dismiss brought pursuant to FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6), Defendants argue that Plaintiff's claims arising from the alleged assault on February 24, 1998, call into question the validity of Plaintiff's major misconduct convictions for assault and battery arising From the same incident, and, thus, are barred by the doctrine of Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994). In Heck the Supreme Court held:
[I]n order to recover damages for allegedly unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment, or for other harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence invalid, a § 1983 plaintiff must prove that the conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called into question by a federal court's issuance of a writ of habeas corpus, 28 U.S.C. § 2254.512 U.S. 477, 486-87 (1994). This rule, sometimes called the "favorable termination requirement," was extended by the Supreme Court to civil right actions in which prisoners allege due process violations in prison misconduct proceedings resulting in the loss of good-time credits. See Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641, 648 (1997). The Sixth Circuit has applied the favorable termination requirement to prevent prisoners from using a § 1983 action to collaterally attack the validity of a prison misconduct hearing. Huey v. Stine, 230 F.3d 226, 228-29 (6th Cir. 2000)
In Huey, the prisoner claimed that he and Officer Stine got into an argument as he was being escorted from the shower to his cell. 230 F.3d at 227. Once he was in his cell, Huey put his hands to the food slot so that Stine could remove his handcuffs. According to Huey, Stine grabbed his hand, pulled it through the slot, and began twisting it. Id. at 227-28. Stine claimed that Huey assaulted him when Stins attempted to gain control of a handcuff key, and Stine charged Huey with a major misconduct for assault and battery. Id. at 227. The hearing officer found that Huey's story was ot credible and convicted him of the misconduct. Id. at 228.
Huey brought an Eighth Amendment claim that was dismissed by the district court under Heck. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The Sixth Circuit recognized that federal courts generally hold that Eighth Amendment claims are ot barred by Heck because the question of the degree of force used is analytically distinct from the question of whether the plaintiff violated the law or prison regulations. Huey, 230 F.3d at 230-31. However, in unpublished cases, the Sixth Circuit had also held that the claim may be barred. Id. (citations omitted). From these cases, the Sixth Circuit drew the conclusion that although Heck generally does ot bar Eighth Amendment claims, Heck does bar a claim that is founded solely on an allegation that a corrections officer falsified a misconduct report. Id. at 231. Because Huey claimed that Stine had twisted his arm even though Huey had done othing wrong and Huey did ot claim that Stine's response had been excessive, granting relief on Huey's claim would require annulling the misconduct conviction. Thus, the claim was barred under Heck. Id.
Plaintiff's case falls squarely within Huey. Plaintiff asserts that he did othing wrong and Defendants attacked him without provocation. In his compliant, Plaintiff claimed that the officers planned the assault in advance and he did nothing to start the altercation. (See Compl., ¶¶ 2-5. ) Furthermore, in his written statement presented at the misconduct hearing, Plaintiff stated:
[W]hile we walked to the yard there was completely no type of an exchange of hostilities between myself either one of these guards; in fact there was no exchange of any type of communication(s) between me and these guards periods [sic]. When we got between the back door of the two unit, when guard Struble hit me on the left side of my head guard Hamilton than [sic] pushed me down the steps. When I landed at the bottom of the steps, is when the two of them and C/O Loomis began to stump [sic] kick me with their feet hit me with their fist [sic].
(Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, p. 3, docket #20.) The hearing officer found the officers' version of the events to be credible and found Plaintiff guilty of assaulting Officers Struble and Hamilton. Plaintiff does not contend that the convictions have been invalidated. According to Richard Stapleton, the Administrator of the Office of Policy and Hearings of the MDOC, Plaintiff did ot attempt to challenge the misconduct convictions by seeking a rehearing with the Office of Policy and Hearings or by appealing to the state circuit court pursuant to M.C.L. 791.254. (Affidavit of Richard Stapleton, docket #26.)
Because the hearing officer found that Plaintiff started the February 24 altercation by assaulting the officers, Plaintiff's claim that he was subjected to an unprovoked assault is inconsistent with the misconduct convictions. Accordingly, Plaintiff may ot bring an § 1983 action alleging a violation of his Eighth Amendment rights arising from the events of February 24, 2001, until his misconduct convictions have been invalidated. Under Huey. Plaintiff's Eighth Amendment claims arising on February 24, 1998, are ot cognizable and will be dismissed. Plaintiff's claims are premature; therefore, it is unnecessary to resolve Defendants' contention that the force used was reasonable or that they are entitled to qualified immunity. Furthermore, Officer Hamilton will be dismissed from this action because Plaintiff's claims against him relate only to the events of February 24, 1998.
B. March 5, 1998
Plaintiff was also convicted of assaulting Officer Struble on March 5, 1998, for throwing a carton filled with urine and feces on the officer. Heck is ot implicated with regard to the events of March 5, however, because the assault on Officer Struble occurred several hours before Plaintiff alleges that he was assaulted in his cell by Officers Struble, Loomis and Bierstetel. Plaintiff claims that at about 9:20 p.m. the three officers came into his cell and assaulted him. According to Plaintiff, they kicked him and beat him with closed fists all over his body for approximately three minutes. Plaintiff allegedly suffered facial swelling and multiple contusions and abrasions all over his body. He asserts that IMAX health care staff intentionally failed to process his requests for medical treatment for his injuries. In their affidavits, Officers Struble, Loomis and Bierstetel deny that they entered Plaintiff's cell and assaulted him on March 5, 1998. (Struble Aff., ¶ 15; Loomis Aff., ¶ 8; Bierstetel Aff., ¶ 13.)
Plaintiff did not sue any members of the IMAX health care staff in this action.
The Eighth Amendment imposes a constitutional limitation on the power of the states to punish those convicted of crimes. Punishment may ot be "barbarous" or may it involve the "unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain." Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 346 (1981); see
also Ivey v. Wilson, 832 F.2d 950, 954 (6th Cir. 1987) (per curiam). In its prohibition of "cruel and unusual punishments," the Eighth Amendment places restraints on prison officials, directing that they may ot use excessive physical force against prisoners and must also "take reasonable measures to guarantee the safety of the inmates." Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994) (quoting Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 526-527 (1984)).
An Eighth Amendment claim contains both an objective and a subjective component. Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298 (1991). The objective component requires Plaintiff to demonstrate that he has been subjected to specific deprivations that are so serious that they deny him "the minimal civilized measure of life's necessities." See Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 347; see also Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1992). In an excessive use of force claim, the subjective component requires the plaintiff to show that the defendants acted "'maliciously and sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm,"' rather than "'in a good faith effort to maintain or restore discipline."' McMillian, 503 U.S. at 6 (quoting Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 320-21 (1986)). An unprovoked beating by prison guards, as alleged by Plaintiff, violates the Eighth Amendment.
This case turns largely on the credibility of the parties. "Credibility determinations, the weighing of the evidence, and the drawing of legitimate inferences from the facts are jury functions, ot those of a judge." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255 (citation omitted); see also Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Services, Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 456 (1992). The Sixth Circuit has repeatedly held in excessive use of force cases that contested issues of fact that turn on credibility determinations preclude a finding of summary judgment. See, e.g., Bass v. Robinson, 167 F.3d 1041, 1046 (6th Cir. 1999) ("Defendants' motion for summary judgment should have been denied because it was impossible for the district court to make an objective determination under these contested facts which turn on credibility, and because this Court must consider any evidence in the light most favorable to Plaintiff'); Adams v. Metiva, 31 F.3d 375, 382 (6th Cir. 1994) (finding in an excessive force case that "the district court erred in finding plaintiff's and the two witnesses accounts implausible and in granting summary judgment where the issue of credibility was determinative of the case at hand"); Jackson v. Hoylman 933 F.2d 401, 403 (6th Cir. 1991) (stating that when "[t]he parties dispute virtually all of the essential facts surrounding the excessive force claim [,] . . . It is impossible to determine, without choosing between the parties' sharply different factual accounts, whether the force the officers used, objectively assessed, was reasonable"). Because the Court may ot assess credibility on a motion for summary judgment, Defendants' motion for summary judgment must be denied with regard to the events of March 5, 1998.
C. Discrimination
In his "Second Cause of Action," Plaintiff generally claims that Defendants discriminated against him and treated him unlike other MDOC prisoners when they subjected him to the excessive use of force. The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides that a state may not "deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws," which is essentially a direction that all persons similarly situated should be treated alike. U.S. CONST., amend. XIV; City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985). Plaintiff's allegations on this point are wholly conclusory. He merely states that he is being treated differently than other prisoners. Plaintiff provides no specific factual allegations to support his contention, or does he allege any basis for the discrimination, i.e., race, ethnicity, religion. Conclusory allegations of unconstitutional conduct without specific factual allegations fail to state a claim under 1983. See Lillard v. Shelby County Bd. of Educ., 76 F.3 d 716, 726 (6th Cir. 1996); Chapman v. City of Detroit, 808 F.2d 459, 465 (6th Cir. 1986); Smith v. Rose, 760 F.2d 102, 106 (6th Cir. 1985); Turnboe v. Stegall, No. 00-1182, 2000 WL 1679478, at *2 (6th Cir. Nov. 1, 2000), cert. denied, 121 S.Ct. 1616 (2001). Accordingly, Plaintiff's claim of discrimination will be dismissed.
D. Qualified Immunity
Defendants assert that they are entitled to qualified immunity in this action. In Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982), the Supreme Court held that "government officials performing discretionary functions, generally are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does ot violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known." Id. at 818. The standard to be applied in deciding a claim of qualified immunity is one of objective reasonableness. Id. The question whether qualified immunity attaches to an official's actions is a purely legal issue for the trial court. See Summar v. Bennett, 157 F.3d 1054, 1057 (6th Cir. 1998); Dominque v. Telb, 831 F.2d 673, 677 (6th Cir. 1987).
The Supreme Court emphasized in its recent decision in Saucier v. Katz, 121 S.Ct. 2151, 2155-56 (2001), that the defense of qualified immunity must be considered in proper sequence.
In a suit against an officer for an alleged violation of a constitutional right, the requisites of a qualified immunity defense must be considered in proper sequence. Where the defendant seeks qualified immunity, a ruling on that issue should be made early in the proceedings so that the costs and expenses of trial are avoided where the defense is dispositive. Qualified immunity is an entitlement ot to stand trial or face other burdens of litigation. The privilege is an immunity from suit rather than a mere defense to liability; and like an absolute liability, it is effectively lost if a case is erroneously permitted to go to trial. As a result, we repeatedly have stressed the importance of resolving immunity questions at the earliest possible stage in litigation.121 S.Ct. at 2155-56 (citations omitted). Accordingly, the court's initial inquiry must be whether the plaintiff has alleged and supported with evidence facts showing that the defendants' conduct violated a constitutional right. 121 S.Ct. at 2156. If the first question is answered in the affirmative, the second inquiry is whether the right was clearly established." Id. "The relevant dispositive inquiry in determining whether a right is clearly established is whether it would be clear to a reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful in the situation he confronted." Id.
The facts alleged, taken in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, show that the conduct of Officers Struble, Loomis and Bierstetel on March 5, 1998, violated Plaintiff's Eighth Amendment right against cruel and unusual punishment. Therefore, the Court must consider whether Plaintiff's constitutional rights against a retaliation, unprovoked assault by corrections officers was clearly established on March 5, 1998.
In their motions for summary judgment, Defendants do not discuss any Eighth Amendment cases in an effort to show that a prisoner's right to be free from an unprovoked beating was not clearly established on March 5, 1998. Rather, Defendants assert that Plaintiff cannot establish a constitutional violation. The Court rejected that argument in the first step of the qualified immunity analysis. If Defendants had analyzed the state of the law in 1998, they would have concluded that a prisoner's Eighth Amendment rights were clearly established in this circuit. By 1986, the Supreme Court had announced that the Eighth Amendment prohibits the malicious and sadistic use of force. Whitley, 475 U.S. at 320-21. The Sixth Circuit held in the same year that prison guards in the Michigan system violated the Eighth Amendment by waving a knife in the face of a paraplegic prisoner, without provocation, even though the prisoner had sustained no physical injury. Parrish v. Johnson, 800 F.2d 600, 605 (6th Cir. 1986). Later cases squarely held that an unprovoked physical attack upon a prisoner by a guard violates the Eighth Amendment. McHenry v. Chadwick, 896 F.2d 184 (6th Cir. 1990); Haynes v. Marshall, 887 F.2d 700 (6th Cir. 1989). In fact, Haynes v. Marshall held that by 1984, it was clearly established that the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain by an unprovoked beating was forbidden by the Eighth Amendment. 887 F.2d at 703. Likewise, a prisoner's right not to be retaliated against for voicing complaints about his conditions of confinement was well established in 1998. See Cale v. Johnson, 861 F.2d 943 (6th Cir. 1988). Consequently, Defendants have no tenable argument in support of their assertion of qualified immunity in this case.
Conclusion
For the reasons set forth above, the Court will grant Defendants' Rule 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss with regard to the claims arising on February 24, 1998, and grant Defendants' Rule 56(b) Motion for Summary Judgment in part. Summary judgment will be granted to Defendants with regard to Plaintiff's claim of discrimination, but denied with regard to Plaintiff's remaining Eighth Amendment claims arising on March 5, 1998, against Defendants Struble, Loomis and Bierstetal. In addition, Defendant Hamilton will be dismissed because there are no remaining claims against him.
An Order consistent with this Opimon will be entered.
ORDER
In accordance with the Opinion Filed this Date:
IT IS ORDEREDthat Defndants' Rule 12(b)(6) Motion to dismiss with regard to the claims arising on February 24, 1998 (docket #20), is GRANTED.
GRANTED IN PART. Summary judgment is granted to Defendants' with regard to Plaintiff's claim of discrimination, but denied with regard to Plaintiff's remaining Eighth Amendment claims arising on March 5, 1998, against Defendants Struble, Loomis and Bierstetal.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant Hamilton is DISMISSED from this action because there are no remaining claims against him.