In the instant case, Defendant Sally Nucci has affirmatively taken an interest in Delaware real property and would presumably invoke the protection and benefit of its laws if the mortgage terms were not complied with. See also Equitable Trust Co. v. O'Neill, Del.Super., 420 A.2d 1196, 1199 (1980) (minimum contacts established by nonresident mortgagor's interest in Delaware real estate). As the consideration of the World-Wide Volkswagen factors would be the same as in the case of John Nucci, this Court finds that the exercise of personal jurisdiction is properly exercised over Sally Nucci.
The contention that such service obviates the need to provide separate notice to the defendant for purposes of rule 15(c) is, however, without merit. While service on the Secretary of State may operate as "personal" service upon a nonresident defendant for purposes of in personam jurisdiction, Equitable Trust Co. v. O'Neill, 420 A.2d 1196, 1199 (Del.Super.Ct. 1980), it does not suffice as notice to the "party" as that term is used in rule 15(c). A contrary conclusion would require an interpretation of the rule not justified by its language.
It is certain that Equitable has had interests in property located in Delaware. See Equitable Trust Co. v. O'Neill, 420 A.2d 1196, 1198 (Del.Super. 1980). Equitable also has engaged in litigation in this State concerning its Delaware financial affairs, and has benefited from the Delaware court system.
Moreover, the court's research of Delaware law supports the proposition that there has long been a presumption that a mortgage creates a lien, and not title, in favor of a mortgagee. Equitable Trust Company v. O'Neill, 420 A.2d 1196, 1201 (Del.Sup.Ct. 1980). The court could find no Delaware statutory provisions or case law specifically pertaining to the issue of whether Delaware accords a rent assignment to a mortgagee the status of an absolute conveyance of title.
A sci fa judgment, by its very nature, creates a lien on the mortgaged property. Skelly, 38 B.R. at 1003; see 2 Woolley on Delaware Practice § 1373, at 927 (1906) (hereinafter cited as "Woolley"); cf. Equitable Trust Co. v. O'Neill, 420 A.2d 1196, 1199-1200 (Del.Super. 1980). It is axiomatic that a lien against property owned by the debtor operates as a claim against the debtor in bankruptcy. See 11 U.S.C. § 102(2) ("claim against the debtor includes claim against property of the debtor").
" Id. Stated another way, "the property itself, as a contact, may tip the balance in favor of exercising jurisdiction and may, itself, be a sufficient contact in certain actions." 16 James Wm. Moore, Moore's Federal Practice § 108.80[1] (3d ed. 1998); see also Equitable Trust Co. v. O'Neill, 420 A.2d 1196, 1199 (Del.Super.Ct. 1980) (holding that non-residents' "interest in, use and possession" of real property in the forum state constituted minimum contacts so as to allow litigation arising out of mortgage default to proceed in the forum state). The appellants were limited partners in Silver State Oil and Gas, which had acquired a leasehold interest in West Virginia real property for the purpose of conducting oil exploration.
See Lawhon v. Winding Ridge Homeowners Ass'n, Inc., 2008 WL 5459246, at *5 (Del. Ch. Dec. 31, 2008) ("[R]estrictions based on abstract aesthetic desirability are impermissible."). Equitable Tr. Co. v. O'Neill, 420 A.2d 1196, 1201 (Del. Super. Ct. 1980) (restrictive covenants "will not be enforced beyond the fair and natural meaning of the words used"); Seabreak Homeowners Ass'n, Inc. v. Gresser, 517 A.2d 263, 269 (Del. Ch. 1986) ("[W]here the language used in the restrictive covenant empowering the committee is overly vague, imprecise, or so unclear as not to lend itself to evenhanded application, then the grant of authority is normally not enforceable."), aff'd, 538 A.2d 1113 (Del. 1988). AMC relies on Paragraph 5 of the Deed Restrictions applicable to Alapocas.
Therefore, Equitable Trust Co. is inapposite to Plaintiffs' contentions, and their argument is rejected. Equitable Trust Co. v. O'Neill, 420 A.2d 1196, 1200 (Del. Super 1980)). Id.; see also Town of Cheswold v. Central Delaware Business Park, 188 A.3d 810, 820 (Del. 2018) ("While we have recognized that contracts should be read in full and situated in the commercial context between the parties, the background facts cannot be used to alter the language chosen by the parties within the four corners of their agreement.") (citations and quotations omitted) (emphasis supplied).
Concord Steel, Inc. v. Wilm. Steel Processing Co., 2008 WL 902406, at *6 (Del. Ch. Apr. 3, 2008); Equitable Trust Co. v. O'Neill, 420 A.2d 1196, 1201 (Del. Super. 1980) ("It is no surprise that restrictive covenants which act to restrain trade, are strictly construed."). See Allied Cap. Corp. v. GC-Sun Hldgs., L.P., 910 A.2d 1020, 1024 (Del.
"Equitable Trust Co. v. O'Neill, 420 A.2d 1196, 1200 (Del.Super.Ct. 1980).Gordy v. Preform Building Components, Inc., 310 A.2d 893, 897 (Del.Super.Ct. 1973), citing Mackey v. O'Neil, 47 Del. 483, 93 A.2d 526 (1952).