Equitable Life Assur. Soc. of United States v. Kit

8 Citing cases

  1. Leimer v. State Mut. Life Assur. Co.

    108 F.2d 302 (8th Cir. 1940)   Cited 173 times

    In view of the means which the Rules of Civil Procedure afford a defendant to obtain a speedy disposition of a claim which is without foundation or substance, by either securing a more definite statement or a bill of particulars under Rule 12(e) and thereafter applying for judgment on the pleadings under Rule 12(h)(1), or by moving for a summary judgment under Rule 56, we think there is no justification for dismissing a complaint for insufficiency of statement, except where it appears to a certainty that the plaintiff would be entitled to no relief under any state of facts which could be proved in support of the claim. See and compare, Van Dyke v. Broadhurst, D.C., 28 F. Supp. 737, 740; Sierocinski v. E.I. DuPont De Nemours Co., 3 Cir., 103 F.2d 843; Equitable Life Assurance Soc. of United States v. Kit, D.C., 26 F. Supp. 880, 882; Id., D.C., 29 F. Supp. 260. In this case it is obvious that, under the claim stated in the amended complaint, evidence would be admissible to prove that the plaintiff was a beneficiary under the policies in suit; that, by the terms of these policies, she, upon the death of the insured, became entitled to receive one-half of the proceeds thereof, and that the defendant is wrongfully withholding from her moneys which, as a matter of right, should be paid over to her. No matter how improbable it may be that she can prove her claim, she is entitled to an opportunity to make the attempt, and is not required to accept as final a determination of her rights based upon inferences drawn in favor of the defendant from her amended complaint. It will not do to circumvent a determination of a suit upon the merits by accepting an assertion that the claim stated in the complaint is groundless. "Lawsuits also often prove to have been groundless; but no way has been discovered of relieving a defenda

  2. Young v. Coder

    346 F. Supp. 165 (M.D. Pa. 1972)   Cited 10 times
    In Young v. Coder, 346 F. Supp. at 169, the court, although declining to reach the constitutionality of the "spoils system", concluded that the spoils system "has to date been considered a valid exercise of discretionary authority.

    See Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v. Brown, 260 F. Supp. 323, 357 (E.D.Pa. 1966). Cf. Gibbs v. Buck, 307 U.S. 66, 76-77, 59 S.Ct. 725, 83 L.Ed. 1111 (1939); Equitable Life Assur. Soc. of United States v. Kit, 26 F. Supp. 880 (E.D.Pa. 1939). II. FINDINGS OF FACT.

  3. Spohn v. United States

    16 F.R.D. 240 (S.D.N.Y. 1954)   Cited 4 times

              The court there deferred the ruling on the motion to dismiss until the facts should be before it, pursuant to Rule 12(d). Cf. Hawn v. American S. S. Co., D.C., 26 F.Supp. 428; Kaus v. Huston, D.C., 35 F.Supp. 327; Equitable Life Assurance Society of United States v. Kit, D.C., 26 F.Supp. 880.           On the present state of the record, the motion to dismiss the complaint is deferred, in both its parts, pursuant to Rule 12(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

  4. Edelman v. Locker

    6 F.R.D. 272 (E.D. Pa. 1946)   Cited 13 times

    The parties are entitled to a hearing on these questions of fact, Equitable Life Assur. Soc. of United States v. Kit, D.C.E.D.Pa., 26 F.Supp. 880; Central Trust Co. of Altoona, Pa. v. Second National Bank of Altoona, Pa., D.C.W.D. Pa., 1 F.R.D. 98, 99, and the motion for judgment on the pleadings must therefore be denied.          The motion for judgment on the pleadings and the motion to dismiss the counterclaim are denied.

  5. Calabrese v. Chiumento

    3 F.R.D. 435 (D.N.J. 1944)   Cited 6 times

             ‘ In view of the means which the Rules of Civil Procedure afford a defendant to obtain a speedy disposition of a claim which is without foundation or substance, by either securing a more definite statement or a bill of particulars under Rule 12(e) and thereafter applying for judgment on the pleadings under Rule 12(h)(1), or by moving for a summary judgment under Rule 56, we think there is no justification for dismissing a complaint for insufficiency of statement, except where it appears to a certainty that the plaintiff would be entitled to no relief under any state of facts which could be proved in support of the claim. See and compare, Van Dyke v. Broadhurst, D.C., 28 F.Supp. 737, 740; Sierocinski v. E. I. Dupont De Nemours & Co., 3 Cir., 103 F.2d 843; Equitable Life Assurance Soc. of United States v. Kit, D.C., 26 F.Supp. 880, 882; Id., D.C., 29 F.Supp. 260.’ 108 F.2d 302, at page 306.          The second and third objections to the complaint made by the defendants in this motion fall within the scope of the cases cited herein.

  6. Tyler Fixture Corp. v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc.

    3 F.R.D. 258 (W.D. Mich. 1943)   Cited 5 times

             It is further said ( page 306 of 108 F.2d): ‘ In view of the means which the Rules of Civil Procedure afford a defendant to obtain a speedy disposition of a claim which is without foundation or substance, by either securing a more definite statement or a bill of particulars under Rule 12(e) and thereafter applying for judgment on the pleadings under Rule 12(h)(1), or by moving for a summary judgment under Rule 56, we think there is no justification for dismissing a complaint for insufficiency of statement, except where it appears to a certainty that the plaintiff would be entitled to no relief under any state of facts which could be proved in support of the claim. See and compare Van Dyke v. Broadhurst, D.C., 28 F.Supp. 737, 740; Sierocinski v. E. I. DuPont De Nemours & Co., 3 Cir., 103 F.2d 843; Equitable Life Assurance Soc. of United States v. Kit, D.C., 26 F.Supp. 880, 882; Id., D.C., 29 F.Supp. 260.’

  7. French v. French Paper Co.

    1 F.R.D. 531 (W.D. Mich. 1941)   Cited 11 times

             It is further said (page 306): ‘ In view of the means which the Rules of Civil Procedure afford a defendant to obtain a speedy disposition of a claim which is without foundation or substance, by either securing a more definite statement or a bill of particulars under Rule 12(e) and thereafter applying for judgment on the pleadings under Rule 12(h)(1), or by moving for a summary judgment under Rule 56, we think there is no justification for dismissing a complaint for insufficiency of statement, except where it appears to a certainty that the plaintiff would be entitled to no relief under any state of facts which could be proved in support of the claim. See and compare, Van Dyke v. Broadhurst, D.C., 28 F.Supp. 737, 740; Sierocinski v. E. I. DuPont De Nemours & Co., 3 Cir., 103 F.2d 843; Equitable Life Assurance Soc. of United States v. Kit, D.C., 26 F.Supp. 880, 882; Id., D.C., 29 F.Supp. 260.’ See also, Hughes Federal Practice, section 20328.

  8. Equitable Life Assur. Soc. of United States v. Kit

    29 F. Supp. 260 (E.D. Pa. 1939)   Cited 3 times
    In Equitable Life Assurance Society v. Kit, (U.S.D.C.) 29 F. Supp. 260, the court held that where the policy requires that a notice of change of beneficiary reach the insurer "the insured must at least start a communication of his intention moving in that direction."

    KIRKPATRICK, District Judge. When this case was before the Court upon a statutory demurrer, an opinion was filed, D.C., 26 F. Supp. 880, in which the question involved was discussed rather fully, and that opinion may be referred to in connection with what is said here. A ruling upon the question raised by the demurrer (which is still the only question in the case) was deferred because the case appeared to be one in which the circumstances ought to be fully developed by testimony.