Opinion
Civil Action No. 03-CV-4771.
June 14, 2004
MEMORANDUM ORDER
Presently before the Court is Plaintiff-Intervenor Vanessa Martin-Dennis' Motion for Leave to Amend Her Complaint (Doc. No. 14). Plaintiff-Intervenor seeks to amend the Complaint to include facts demonstrating that her claim of retaliatory discrimination was properly exhausted. Defendant argues that leave should not be granted because it would leave insufficient time to perform the necessary discovery. For the following reasons we will grant Plaintiff-Intervenor's Motion.
Factual Background
This action against Defendant, Chubb Son, was initiated by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"). The Complaint alleged that Defendant discriminated against Martin-Dennis on the basis of her sex and race, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VII"), 42 U.S.C. § 2000 et seq., by treating her less favorably in terms of compensation and conditions of employment than a white male employee performing substantially the same work. (Compl. ¶ 7.) The Complaint further alleged that Defendant paid this co-worker more than Martin-Dennis in violation of the Federal Equal Pay Act, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1). ( Id. ¶ 1.) Martin-Dennis then intervened with the Court's permission and filed the Intervenor-Complaint (Doc. No. 7). In the Intervenor-Complaint, (Doc. No. 7), Martin-Dennis made the additional claim that she was the victim of retaliatory discrimination in violation of Title VII and the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act ("PHRA"), 43 PA. CONS. STAT. § 953 et seq. In response to these allegations, Defendant has suggested that these claims are not properly before the Court because Plaintiff-Intervenor did not exhaust her administrative remedies. (Doc. No. 12 at 8.)
Plaintiff-Intervenor now seeks to amend her Complaint to add the factual allegations that on March 12, 2004, she filed a supplemental charge with the EEOC specifically asserting that she was a victim of retaliatory discrimination after she filed her suit in this Court, and that the EEOC subsequently issued her a "right-to-sue" letter on this claim. (Doc. No. 14 ¶ 14.)
Standard for Granting Leave to Amend
Where a defendant has already filed a responsive plea, a party may amend its pleadings only "by leave of court or by written consent of the adverse party; and leave shall be freely given when justice so requires." FED R. CIV. P. 15(a). "In the absence of any apparent or declared reason — such as undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive . . . undue prejudice to the opposing party by virtue of allowance of the amendment, futility of amendment, etc. — the leave sought should as the rules require, be `freely given.'" Forman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962).
Discussion
Plaintiff-Intervenor contends that Defendant began taking retaliatory actions against her after the filing of her complaint with the EEOC. She also contends that she subsequently filed a supplemental charge, and that EEOC then issued her a right-to-sue letter. Plaintiff-Intervenor now asks the Court to allow her to amend her Complaint to reflect these facts.
In Gooding v. Warner Lambert Co., the plaintiff filed a "discrimination in promotion" claim as well as a retaliatory discrimination claim. 744 F.2d 354 (3d Cir. 1984). The plaintiff failed to plead the issuance of a right-to-sue letter for the claim of retaliatory discrimination, and the district court dismissed that claim, concluding that it lacked jurisdiction.Id. at 357. The Third Circuit reversed the dismissal indicating that the issuance of a right to sue letter was not a jurisdictional requirement. The court also determined that the district court abused its discretion in denying the plaintiff the opportunity to amend her complaint to plead the fact that she had been issued a right-to-sue letter. Id. at 358-59. The court held that based on the standard in Rule 15(a) and "the fact that the plaintiff's complaint adequately alleged the basis of her claim," the defendant would not be prejudiced by allowing the plaintiff to amend the complaint. Id. See also Anjelino v. New York Times Co., 200 F.3d 73, 96-97 (3d Cir. 2000) (holding that "that the failure to obtain a right-to-sue letter, in particular a second one for a retaliation claim, is curable at any point during the pendency of the action"). We are satisfied that Gooding is controlling here.
Defendant does not dispute the application of Gooding to this case. Rather, Defendant contends that it will be severely prejudiced if we allow Plaintiff-Intervenor to amend the Complaint. Defendant argues that the proposed amendments add allegations of retaliation which will require substantial discovery. Defendant argues that the work necessary to investigate these additional claims along with the discovery deadline supports the conclusion that Defendant will be severely prejudiced by the amendment and compels the denial of Plaintiff-Intervenor's Motion. Defendant's argument is premised on the fact that our Order of March 15, 2004, directed that discovery be completed by July 3, 2004. (Doc. No. 13.) On May 20, 2004, we entered an Amended Scheduling Order which extended the time for discovery three months, until October 4, 2004. Under the circumstances, Defendant will suffer no prejudice by the filing of the amended complaint. We recognize the burden of preparation will increase with this amendment. Nevertheless, the extension of discovery should be sufficient for the Defendant to investigate the details of the new charge and perform the needed tasks to prepare its defense.
An appropriate Order follows.
ORDER
AND NOW, this 14th day of June, 2004, upon consideration of Plaintiff-Intervenor Venessa Martin-Dennis' Motion for Leave to Amend Her Complaint (Doc. No. 14), and all documents in support thereof, and opposition there to, it is ORDERED that Plaintiff-Intervenor's Motion is GRANTED. Plaintiff-Intervenor is directed to file the Amended Complaint within five (5) days of the date hereof.IT IS SO ORDERED.