Summary
rejecting claim that denial of motion for postconviction relief under Rule 61 constituted an unconstitutional ex post facto violation because Rule 61 was adopted after the defendant's trial
Summary of this case from Thomas v. StateOpinion
No. 42, 2004.
Submitted: March 2, 2004.
Decided: April 26, 2004.
Superior Court of the State of Delaware, in and for New Castle County, Cr. A. Nos. IN87-07-0944; 0945.
Before HOLLAND, BERGER and STEELE, Justices.
ORDER
This 26th day of April 2004, upon consideration of the appellant's opening brief and the appellee's motion to affirm pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 25(a), it appears to the Court that:
(1) The defendant-appellant, Kevin S. Epperson, filed an appeal from the Superior Court's January 22, 2004 order denying his motion for correction of sentence. The plaintiff-appellee, the State of Delaware, has moved to affirm the judgment of the Superior Court on the ground that it is manifest on the face of Epperson's opening brief that the appeal is without merit. We agree and AFFIRM.
Supr. Ct. R. 25(a).
(2) In 1987, Epperson was convicted of two drug offenses and, in 1988, was sentenced to two years imprisonment, to be suspended for six months at the Plummer Center, and probation. Epperson was discharged from probation in 1992 and, in 2003, moved for postconviction relief. The Superior Court denied the motion under Superior Court Criminal Rule 61 on the ground that Epperson already had completed his sentence. This Court affirmed the Superior Court's decision.
Postconviction relief under Rule 61 is available only to "a person in custody or subject to future custody under a sentence of [the Superior] court." Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(a)(1).
Epperson v. State, 2003 WL 21692751 (Del. Jul. 18, 2003).
(3) In the instant appeal, Epperson claims that the Superior Court's 2003 denial of his motion for postconviction relief under Rule 61 constitutes an unconstitutional ex post facto violation, since Rule 61 was not in effect at the time of his trial in 1987.
(4) Generally, a criminal law violates the ex post facto clause of the United States Constitution if the law a) applies to events occurring prior to its enactment; and b) adversely affects the offender. The ex post facto clause, however, was not meant to restrict legislative or judicial control of remedies and modes of procedure that do not affect substantive rights.
Bailey v. State, 588 A.2d 1121, 1124 (Del. 1991).
Id. at 1125.
(5) When adopted in 1987, Rule 61 was intended as a purely procedural mechanism for presenting collateral claims for postconviction relief and was not intended to affect substantive rights by modifying, for example, the extent of punishment for a crime or the degree of proof necessary to prove guilt. The application of Rule 61 to Epperson's postconviction motion in 2003, thus, did not constitute an ex post facto violation, since no substantive right of Epperson was affected.
Id.
(6) It is manifest on the face of Epperson's opening brief that this appeal is without merit because the issues presented on appeal are controlled by settled Delaware law and, to the extent that judicial discretion is implicated, clearly there was no abuse of discretion.
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that, pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 25(a), the State of Delaware's motion to affirm is GRANTED. The judgment of the Superior Court is AFFIRMED.