Under the facts here there is no dispute that defendant Snyder had not abandoned his plan for living part time in Dalhart. Faires v. Young, supra; Cross v. Johns, Tex.Civ.App. 1922, 238 S.W. 354; Seale v. Garvey, Tex.Civ.App. 1923, 247 S.W. 672; Eppenauer v. Schrup, Tex.Civ.App. 1938, 121 S.W.2d 473. Defendant Snyder occupied consistently and with continuity a fixed place of abode in Dalhart in such a manner that the trial court could find that he had ceased to be a visitor and that the proof supplied this element of the definition of a resident.
Based on the above summary of the evidence, we conclude there is some evidence that in October 1986, the Mauzys were in the process of moving their residence from Dallas County to Travis County. If a defendant is in the process of moving from one county to another, and his affairs are in such a state that it is uncertain in which county his residence is, he may be sued in either county. Haney v. Henry, 307 S.W.2d 649, 653 (Tex.Civ.App. — Amarillo 1957, no writ); Eppenauer v. Schrup, 121 S.W.2d 473, 477 (Tex.Civ.App. — Fort Worth 1938, no writ). For venue purposes, moreover, a defendant may have a residence in two or more counties.
It is stated in the case of Fester v. Locke, 285 S.W.2d 239 at 241 as follows: "The rule is succinctly stated in the case of Kasishke v. Ekern, Tex.Civ.App., Amarillo, 1954, 278 S.W.2d 274, at pages 276 and 277, viz.: "In construing the provisions of Exception 4 of Article 1995, it is well established that to maintain suit against a nonresident defendant, plaintiff must allege a joint cause of action against the resident and the nonresident defendants, and must introduce competent evidence sufficient to prove a cause of action against the resident defendant, under the allegations relied upon. Tunstill v. Scott, Tex.Civ.App., 120 S.W.2d 274; Dearing v. Morgan, Tex.Civ.App., 120 S.W.2d 555; Eppenauer v. Schrup, Tex.Civ.App., 121 S.W.2d 473; Lanham v. Lanham, Tex.Civ.App., 175 S.W.2d 286."
The mere demonstration that the outcome of a cause of action against one defendant is necessarily contingent upon the ultimate result of another and different cause of action against another defendant is not such a 'showing'. The rule is succinctly stated in the case of Kasishke v. Ekern, 1954 (Tex.Civ.App., Amarillo), 278 S.W.2d 274, at pages 276 and 277, viz: 'In construing the provisions of Exception 4 of Article 1995, it is well established that to maintain suit against a nonresident defendant, plaintiff must allege a joint cause of action against the resident and the nonresident defendants, and must introduce competent evidence sufficient to prove a cause of action against the resident defendant, under the allegations relied upon. Tunstill v. Scott, Tex.Civ.App., 120 S.W.2d 274; Dearing v. Morgan, Tex.Civ.App., 120 S.W.2d 555; Eppenauer v. Schrup, Tex.Civ.App., 121 S.W.2d 473; Lanham v. Lanham, Tex.Civ.App., 175 S.W.2d 286. It is true that cases growing out of the same transaction which are closely connected together may be joined together to avoid a multiplicity of suits, but appellee has failed to bring his alleged cause of action within such a rule in this case. * * * Neither can venue be maintained against a nonresident defendant over his protests in the county of a resident defendant unless the nature of the alleged cause of action is joined together with or is the same against both defendants so as to make them both liable jointly and severally, or at least make them both necessary parties in order to recover against either.' Upon causes of action closely connected and therefore joinable, see: McDonald, Texas Civil Practice, pp. 337-343, sec. 4.10; Atlas Roofing Co. v. Hall, 1952, 150 Tex. 611, 245 S.W.2d 477; Shaver v. Hughes, 1948 (Tex.Civ.App., Fort Worth), 214 S.W.2d 176; Pearson v. Guardian Trust Co., 1935 (Tex.Civ.App., Galveston), 84 S.W.2
It was improperly joined and should be eliminated as a party plaintiff. Alexander v, Alexander, Tex.Civ.App., 265 S.W. 1072, error dism.; Eppenauer v. Schrup, Tex.Civ.App., Ft. Worth 1938, 121 S.W.2d 473. We are of the opinion, however, that its joinder as a party plaintiff with the other plaintiffs who are property owners and members of the Association has not resulted in any harm to appellants.
We believe the testimony taken in the light most favorable to Haney would indicate he was only in the process of moving at the time the suit was filed. As was said in R. R. Brown v. Boulden, 18 Tex. 431, 432 and approved in Eppenauer v. Schrup, Tex.Civ.App., 121 S.W.2d 473, 477: 'If a defendant has a known residence, he must be sued in the county of his residence. But if he is in the act of removing from one county to another, and his affirs are in such a state, that it can not be certainly known in which county his residence in fact is, we think it may be held, consistently with the legislative intention, that the suit may be brought in either county.' So, it is our opinion that the court below was correct in holding venue as to appellant, James (Jay) L. Haney was properly in Lubbock County. Appellants' points one and six are overruled.
nt, and introduce proof which shows that the subject cause of action actually exists against the resident defendant, -or, if the causes are not joint but only related, he must show that the causes of action are so closely or intimately connected that it is necessary that they be tried together in order that a multiplicity of suits be avoided. The rule is succinctly stated in the case of Kasishke v. Ekern, Tex.Civ.App., Amarillo, 1954, 278 S.W.2d 274, at pages 276 and 277, viz.: 'In construing the provisions of Exception 4 of Article 1995, it is well established that to maintain suit against a nonresident defendant, plaintiff must allege a joint cause of action against the resident and the nonresident defendants, and must introduce competent evidence sufficient to prove a cause of action against the resident defendant, under the allegations relied upon. Tunstill v. Scott, Tex.Civ.App., 120 S.W.2d 274; Dearing v. Morgan, Tex.Civ.App., 120 S.W.2d 555; Eppenauer v. Schrup, Tex.Civ.App., 121 S.W.2d 473; Lanham v. Lanham, Tex.Civ.App., 175 S.W.2d 286. It is true that cases growing out of the same transaction which are closely connected together may be joined together to avoid a multiplicity of suits, but appellee has failed to bring his alleged cause of action within such a rule in this case. * * * Neither can venue be maintained against a nonresident defendant over his protests in the county of a resident defendant unless the nature of the alleged cause of action is joined together with or is the same against both defendants so as to make them both liable jointly and severally, or at least make them both necessary parties in order to recover against either.' Upon causes of action closely connected and therefore joinable, see: McDonald, Texas Civil Practice, pp. 337-343 CIV. PRAC. REM., sec. 4.10; Atlas Roofing Co. v. Hall, 1952, 150 Tex. 611, 245 S.W.2d 477; Shaver v. Hughes, Tex.Civ.App., Fort Worth, 1948, 214 S.W.2d 176; Pearson v. Guardian Trust Co., Tex.Civ.App., Galveston,
In construing the provisions of Exception 4 of Article 1995, it is well established that to maintain suit against a nonresident defendant, plaintiff must allege a joint cause of action against the resident and the nonresident defendants, and must introduce competent evidence sufficient to prove a cause of action against the resident defendant, under the allegations relied upon. Tunstill v. Scott, Tex.Civ.App., 120 S.W.2d 274; Dearing v. Morgan, Tex.Civ.App., 120 S.W.2d 555; Eppenauer v. Schrup, Tex.Civ.App., 121 S.W.2d 473; Lanham v. Lanham, Tex.Civ.App., 175 S.W.2d 286. It is true that case growing out of the same transaction which are closely connected together may be joined together to avoid a multiplicity of suits, but appellee has failed to bring his alleged cause of action within such a rule in this case.
While the statute does not require that they be necessary parties, the cause of action asserted against the resident defendant must grow out of the same transaction and be so intimately connected with the cause of action alleged against the nonresident defendant that the two may be joined under the rule intended to avoid multiplicity of suits. Stockyards Nat. Bank v. Maples, 127 Tex. 633, 95 S.W.2d 1300 (Com.App.); Henderson Grain Co. v. Russ, 122 Tex. 620, 64 S.W.2d 347 (Com.App.); Richardson v. D. S. Cage Co., 113 Tex. 152, 252 S.W. 747; Behrens Drug Co. v. Hamilton, 92 Tex. 284, 48 S.W. 5; Texas P. R. Co. v. Mangum, 68 Tex. 342, 4 S.W. 617; Abney v. DeWald, Tex.Civ.App., 228 S.W.2d 297; Means v. Marshall, Tex.Civ.App., 210 S.W.2d 605, 606 Page v. Patterson, Tex.Civ.App., 180 S.W.2d 660; Eppenauer v. Schrup, Tex.Civ.App., 121 S.W.2d 473; Padgett v. Lake Cisco Amusement Co., Tex.Civ.App., 54 S.W.2d 201. To hold the suit in Nueces County it was also incumbent upon the plaintiffs to prove a bona fide suit against Heldenfels Brothers, the resident defendants.
We believe that the nature of plaintiff's action and the evidence offered are sufficient under Subdivision 4 to sustain the trial court's judgment overruling the defendants' plea of privilege. Eppenauer v. Schrup, Tex.Civ.App., 121 S.W.2d 473; Central Motor Co. v. Roberson, Tex.Civ.App., 139 S.W.2d 287; American Seed Co. v. Wilson, Tex.Civ.App., 140 S.W.2d 269; Super-Cold Southwest Co. v. Green Romans, Tex.Civ.App., 185 S.W.2d 749. The pertinent portion of Subdivision 4 reads as follows: '4.