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EPIE v. NEIMAN MARCUS DIRECT MARLA DUBIN

United States District Court, N.D. Texas, Dallas Division
May 29, 2001
CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:00-CV-2724-G (N.D. Tex. May. 29, 2001)

Opinion

CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:00-CV-2724-G.

May 29, 2001.


MEMORANDUM ORDER


Before the court is the motion of individual defendants Ernest Banda and Julie Alexander for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. See generally Motion to Dismiss and Brief in Support of Defendants Ernest Banda and Julie Alexander ("Motion"). The plaintiff, Makia Epie ("Epie"), proceeding pro se, has failed to respond to the motion.

I. BACKGROUND

Epie alleges that he was employed by Neiman Marcus direct from June, 1999. See Complaint. During that time, he contends that his pay was less than that of similarly situated white employees and that he was wrongly denied an increase by supervisors Ernest Banda ("Banda") and Julie Alexander ("Alexander") on the basis of his race. Id. He also claims that a camera was installed to monitor him while working and that this created a hostile work environment. Id. As a result, Epie resigned his position with Neiman Marcus. Id. When Epie's pro se complaint is liberally construed, it appears to charge a violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VII"), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.

I. ANALYSIS

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) authorizes dismissal of a complaint for "failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." However, a motion under Rule 12(b)(6) should be granted only if it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff could prove no set of facts in support of his claim that would entitle him to relief. See Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957); Leffall v. Dallas Independent School District, 28 F.3d 521, 524 (5th Cir. 1994); see also Kaiser Aluminum Chemical Sales, Inc. v. Avondale Shipyards, Inc., 677 F.2d 1045, 1050 (5th Cir. 1982) (citing WRIGHT MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE CIVIL § 1357 at 598 (1969), for the proposition that "the motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim is viewed with disfavor and is rarely granted"), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1105 (1983).

In determining whether dismissal should be granted, the court must accept all well-pleaded facts as true and view them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. See Capital Parks, Inc. v. Southeastern Advertising and Sales System, Inc., 30 F.3d 627, 629 (5th Cir. 1994); Norman v. Apache Corporation, 19 F.3d 1017, 1021 (5th Cir. 1994); Chrissy F. by Medley v. Mississippi Department of Public Welfare, 925 F.2d 844, 846 (5th Cir. 1991). Banda and Alexander contend that dismissal of the plaintiff's claims against them is warranted because the law of this circuit provides that Title VII does not impose liability on individual managers and supervisors. Motion at 3. They are correct. The Fifth Circuit has held that "individuals who do not otherwise qualify as an employer cannot be held liable for a breach of title VII." Grant v. Lone Star Company, 21 F.3d 649, 653 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1015 (1994). Because Banda and Epie are individuals who do not otherwise qualify as employers, they may not be held liable under Title VII. Accordingly, Epie's claims against Banda and Alexander are dismissed with prejudice.

III. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, the defendants' motion to dismiss is GRANTED.

SO ORDERED.


Summaries of

EPIE v. NEIMAN MARCUS DIRECT MARLA DUBIN

United States District Court, N.D. Texas, Dallas Division
May 29, 2001
CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:00-CV-2724-G (N.D. Tex. May. 29, 2001)
Case details for

EPIE v. NEIMAN MARCUS DIRECT MARLA DUBIN

Case Details

Full title:MAKIA EPIE, Plaintiff, v. NEIMAN MARCUS DIRECT MARLA DUBIN, ERNEST BANDA…

Court:United States District Court, N.D. Texas, Dallas Division

Date published: May 29, 2001

Citations

CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:00-CV-2724-G (N.D. Tex. May. 29, 2001)