Opinion
No. 05-06-00927-CR
Opinion issued February 29, 2008. DO NOT PUBLISH Tex. R. App. P. 47.
On Appeal from the 363rd Judicial District Court Dallas County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. F06-62164-HW.
Before Justices MORRIS, FITZGERALD, and LANG Opinion By Justice MORRIS.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
In this case, Jesus Deleon Enriquez waived a jury and pleaded guilty to unlawful possession with intent to deliver more than 400 grams of cocaine. He now complains his guilty plea was not entered knowingly and voluntarily and the trial court's acceptance of the plea violated his right to due process. We affirm the trial court's judgment. The background of the case and the evidence adduced at trial are well known to the parties, and therefore we limit recitation of the facts. We issue this memorandum opinion pursuant to Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 47.1 because the law to be applied in the case is well settled. In spite of his plea of guilty at trial, appellant now contends in two issues on appeal that his guilty plea was entered involuntarily and unknowingly because he did not understand the nature of the charges against him and his testimony that he was unsure what contraband he was carrying rendered his guilty plea "violative of Due Process." When considering the voluntariness of a guilty plea, we must examine the entire record. See Martinez v. State, 981 S.W.2d 195, 197 (Tex.Crim.App. 1998) (per curiam). If the trial court properly admonished the defendant before a guilty plea was entered, there is a prima facie showing the plea was both knowing and voluntary. See id. At that point, the burden shifts to the defendant to demonstrate that he did not fully understand the consequences of his plea such that he suffered harm. Id. Here, the record shows the trial court properly admonished appellant orally and in writing. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 26.13(a), (c) (Vernon Supp. 2006); Kirk v. State, 949 S.W.2d 769, 771 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1997, pet. ref'd). Moreover, during the plea hearing, appellant testified he understood the charges in the indictment, understood the punishment range for the offense, and was voluntarily and freely pleading guilty to the indictment. Appellant's signed judicial confession and stipulation of evidence that he committed the offense exactly as stated in the indictment are also included in the record. Nowhere in the record does appellant demonstrate he was actually unaware of the consequences of his plea, despite his claim that he only suspected the contraband he was to be paid nearly $350 to carry across the border to Mexico was drugs. Appellant has failed to show he entered his plea involuntarily or unknowingly. Appellant further contends the acceptance of his guilty plea, in the wake of his professed innocence, violated due process. But when the trial court acts as the fact finder in a case, even if evidence is presented that raises an issue as to the defendant's guilt, it is not required to withdraw a defendant's guilty plea sua sponte and enter a plea of not guilty because no purpose would be served by doing so. See Aldrich v. State, 53 S.W.3d 460, 467 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2001), aff'd, 104 S.W.3d 890 (Tex.Crim.App. 2003). In such a case, the trial court's duty is to consider all the evidence submitted. The trial court may then find the defendant guilty as charged, guilty of a lesser-included offense, or not guilty, as the evidence requires. See id. Thus, the trial court had no duty to withdraw appellant's guilty plea. Having reviewed the record, we conclude appellant has not shown he did not understand the consequences of his guilty plea or that his plea was involuntary. Nor did the trial court, as finder of fact, violate appellant's due process in accepting the plea. We resolve appellant's two issues against him. We affirm the trial court's judgment.