VisionQuest must demonstrate that "even if all of the inferences which could reasonably be drawn from the evidentiary materials of record were viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, no reasonable jury" could find for Wagenhoffer. And in an employment discrimination case, "summary judgment is to be used sparingly, especially where the court is viewing the case at first glance."Ennis v. Del. Transit. Corp., 2015 WL 1542151, at *3 (Del. Super. Ct. Mar. 9, 2015) (citing Doe v. C.A.R.S. Protection Plus, Inc., 527 F.3d 358, 369 (3rd Cir. 2008), order clarified, 543 F.3d 178 (3d Cir. 2008)). Doe, 527 F. 3d at 362; Ennis, 2015 WL 1542151, at *3.

It is not clear whether Warren is advancing her age discrimination claim under the federal statute, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 26 U.S.C. § 621 et seq. (hereinafter the "ADEA"), or the Delaware statute, the Delaware Discrimination in Employment Act, 19 Del. C. §710 et seq. (hereinafter the "DDEA"), which addresses age discrimination as well as other forms of discrimination. The MERB referred to the ADEA in its analysis of Warren's prima facie case but also cited the DDEA in a footnote, and later cited, as referenced below, to Ennis v. Delaware Transit Corporation, 2015 WL 1542151 (Del. Super. Mar. 9, 2015), which was decided under the DDEA. The distinction is of no matter, as the legal standards, including the test for a. prima facie case, are the same under both statutes.

Simply put, the actions of Ms. Herring-Myers, which are substantially dissimilar from those of the Plaintiff, do not constitute evidence of pretext. Plaintiff contends that the facts of this case are "remarkably similar" to those in Ennis v. Delaware Transit Corp., 2015 WL 1542151 (Del. Super. Mar. 9, 2015). In that case, a Caucasian employee threw banana peels on the roof of a vehicle being used by several African American co-workers.

The Delaware courts have elaborated that, because the DDEA is modeled on Title VII and contains virtually identical language, the Delaware courts "take the 'interpretive lead' from [federal] decisions regarding interpretations of Title VII." Ennis v. Del. Transit. Corp., 2015 WL 1542151, at *5 (Del. Super. Mar. 9, 2015) (internal quotation marks omitted). Based on the same reasoning, the Court predicts that the Delaware Supreme Court would treat federal courts' interpretations of Title I of the ADA as persuasive authority regarding the meaning of the DEPA, which contains substantially similar language to the ADA.

411 U.S. 792 (1973). See Ennis v. Del. Transit Corp., 2015 WL 1542151, at *5-7 (Del. Super. Mar. 9, 2015) (explaining the burden-shifting framework for employment discrimination actions pursuant to McDonnell Douglas).

"Ennis v. Del. Transit Corp., 2015 WL 1542151, at *5 (Del. Super. Ct. Mar. 9, 2015) (cleaned up). Id. (cleaned up).

For a discrimination claim, an individual must establish: (1) he was a member of a protected class; (2) that he suffered an adverse employment action; and (3) that there is a casual connection between the protected class and the adverse employment action. Ennis v. Del. Transit. Corp., 2015 WL 1542151, at *5 (Del. Super., Mar. 9, 2015). To prevail on a disability discrimination claim, an individual must establish: (1) he has a disability; (2) he is otherwise qualified to perform the essential functions of the job, with or without accommodation; and (3) he suffered an adverse employment action because of his disability.

Assuming, arguendo, that Jeanbaptiste is bringing a claim of racial discrimination under the DDEA and that Clarios has been put on notice of the claims against it, Jeanbaptiste has nevertheless failed to state a prima facie case of such a claim because he has failed to allege that there was a nexus between Clarios's decision to terminate his employment and his race. See Ennis v. Del. Transit. Corp., 2015 WL 1542151, at *5 (Del. Super. Mar. 9, 2015) (to state a prima facie case of racial discrimination, claimant must establish that: (1) he is a member of a protected class; (2) he was qualified for the position at issue; (3) he suffered an adverse employment action sufficient to invoke DDEA protection; and (4) there is a nexus between his protected trait and the employment decision). Instead, Jeanbaptiste appears to allege that he was terminated for requesting a raise, which is not a protected characteristic under the DDEA.

See Doe v. C.A.R.S. Protection Plus, Inc., 527 F.3d 358, 366 (3d Cir. 2008) (requiring the Plaintiff to show a nexus between her pregnancy and her termination to make the prima facie showing of discrimination required under the McDonnell Douglas framework). E.g., id.; Ennis v. Del. Transit. Corp., 2015 WL 1542151, at *5 (Del. Super. Mar. 9, 2015). Here, Ms. Cosby is able to easily satisfy the first three elements of the McDonnell Douglas test.

That evidence may be sufficient to impose liability on DSU, even if the formal decision-maker had no discriminatory intent. Ennis v. Del. Transit Corp., 2015 WL 1542151, at * 2, n.10 (Del. Super. Mar. 9, 2015); see also Dolan v. Penn Millers Ins. Co., 625 F. App'x 91, 94, n.7 (3d Cir. 2015); Greenawalt v. Clarion Cty., 459 F. App'x. 165, 169 (3d Cir. 2012).