City of Englewood v. Denver & South Platte Railway Co.

7 Citing cases

  1. Gilchrist v. Interborough Co.

    279 U.S. 159 (1929)   Cited 79 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Discussing the final authority of a state to interpret doubtful regulatory laws of the state

    But, whether superseded or not, the fare provisions of Contracts Nos. 1 and 2 were subject to the later exercise by the State of New York of its police power to regulate them. City of New York v. Campbell, 277 U.S. 573 (involving a contract with the City of New York); Trenton v. New Jersey, 262 U.S. 182; Englewood v. Denver S.P.R. Co., 248 U.S. 294; Hunter v. Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161; People v. Budd, 117 N.Y. 1; People ex rel. N.Y. Electric Lines v. Squire, 107 N.Y. 593; People ex rel. Bridge Operating Co. v. Public Service Comm'n, 153 A.D. 129 . The State of New York did exercise its police power in 1907 by its delegation to the Public Service Commission thereby created of the power to regulate substantially all public utility rates.

  2. Southern Iowa Elec. Co. v. Chariton

    255 U.S. 539 (1921)   Cited 32 times
    In Southern Iowa Electric Co. v. Chariton, 255 U.S. 539, a case coming from Iowa, it was held, following Iowa decisions, that since the city lacked power to bind itself, there was no contract.

    And, indeed, the necessity for this conclusion becomes doubly manifest when it is borne in mind that the right here asserted to contract in derogation of the state law and of the rule of public policy announced by the court of last resort of the State is urged by municipal corporations whose every power depends upon the state law. Covington v. Kentucky, 173 U.S. 231, 241; Worcester v. Worcester Consolidated Street Ry. Co., 196 U.S. 539, 548; Braxton County Court v. West Virginia, 208 U.S. 192; Englewood v. Denver South Platte Ry. Co., 248 U.S. 294, 296; Pawhuska v. Pawhuska Oil Gas Co., 250 U.S. 394, 399. Decrees reversed and causes remanded for further proceedings in conformity with this opinion.

  3. Pawhuska v. Pawhuska Oil Co.

    250 U.S. 394 (1919)   Cited 55 times
    In Pawhuska v. Pawhuska Oil Gas Co., 250 U.S. 394, 399, it was held that a legislative grant to a city of the power to regulate rates to be charged to the city and its inhabitants by a gas company might be withdrawn by the State from the city and conferred upon a commission, and that thereby no question was presented under the contract clause of the Federal Constitution.

    The principles announced and applied in these cases have been reiterated and enforced so often that the matter is no longer debatable. Covington v. Kentucky, 173 U.S. 231, 241; Worcester v. Worcester Street Ry. Co., 196 U.S. 539, 548; Braxton County Court v. West Virginia, 208 U.S. 192; Englewood v. Denver South Platte Ry. Co., 248 U.S. 294, 296. Writ of error dismissed.

  4. Illinois Cent. R.R. Co. v. Miss. P.S. Comm

    71 So. 2d 176 (Miss. 1954)   Cited 22 times
    In Illinois Central Railroad Company v. Mississippi Public Service Commission, 220 Miss. 439, 71 So.2d 176 (1954), the railroad desired to terminate passenger service on its lines, and after a hearing, the Commission ordered the railroad to continue its service.

    And on appeal to the circuit court, that tribunal has the power to review the findings and actions of the Commission, affirm, reverse, amend or change them, and from this action an appeal may be taken to this Court, where the actions, findings and proceedings of both the Commission and the trial judge may be reviewed, affirmed, altered, remanded and changed, and from which action, where a Federal question is involved, appeal may be taken to the Supreme Court of the United States for such review by that Court. From this it is seen, we think, that the remedy of appellant, thus set out, is adequate and complete. The following cases, at least in principle, sustain that conclusion: City of Englewood v. Denver South Platte Railway Company, 62 Colo. 229, 161 P. 151, Writ of Error dismissed, 63 L.Ed. 253; Hoyne v. Chicago O.P. Elevated R. Company, 294 Ill. 412, 128 N.E. 587; South Bay Motor Freight Company v. Schaaf, 3 Wn.2d 466, 101 P.2d 584; West New York v. Board of Public Utility Commissioners, (N.J.) 148 A. 402; Swain v. Oklahoma R. Company, 168 Okla. 133, 32 P.2d 251. In the Hoyne case the ground for injunction was based upon the proposition that the order of the Commission fixing rates was void.

  5. State ex Rel. Burr v. Jacksonville Terminal Co.

    90 Fla. 721 (Fla. 1925)   Cited 38 times
    In State v. Jacksonville Terminal Co., 90 Fla. 721, 106 So. 576, this court was confronted with a question not materially different from that in the case at bar and we there approved a contract on the part of the Terminal Company granting the Jacksonville Baggage Company the exclusive right to conduct its transfer business on the premises of the Terminal Company so long as the privilege was not exercised so as to cause unjust discrimination among passengers.

    Rep. 236; Southern Utilities Co. v. City of Palatka, Fla., ___ U.S. ___, 45 Sup. Ct. Rep. 488; City of Opelika v. Opelika Sewer Co. 265 U.S. 215, ___ Sup. Ct. Rep. ___; Ortega Co. v. Triay, 260 U.S. 103; Union Dry Goods Co. v. Georgia Public Service Corporation, 248 U.S. 372, 39 Sup. Ct. Rep. 117; Union Dry Goods Co. v. Georgia Public Service Corporation, 142 Ga. 841, 83 S.E. Rep. 946; Producers' Transp. Co. v. Railroad Commission of State of California, 251 U.S. 228, 40 Sup. Ct. Rep. 131; Louisville N. R. Co. v. Mottley, 219 U.S. 467, 31 Sup. Ct. Rep. 265; Pawhuska v. Pawhuska Oil Gas Co., 250 U.S. 394, 39 Sup. Ct. Rep. 526; Englewood v. Denver S. P. R. Co., 248 U.S. 294, 39 Sup. Ct. Rep. 100; City of San Antonio v. San Antonio Public Service Co., 255 U.S. 547; Paducah v. Paducah R. Co., 261 U.S. 267, 43 Sup. Ct. Rep. 335; Attorney General v. Atlantic Coast Line Ry., 52 Fla. 646, 41 South. Rep. 705; State ex rel. Triay v. Burr, 79 Fla. 290, 84 South.

  6. People ex Rel. City of New York v. Nixon

    229 N.Y. 356 (N.Y. 1920)   Cited 61 times
    In People ex rel. City of New York v. Nixon (229 N.Y. 356) the Court of Appeals held that statutes existing at the time of granting railroad consents are read into the contract.

    Restraint under the Federal Constitution, there certainly was none ( City of Worcester v. Worcester Con. St. Ry. Co., 196 U.S. 539, 548; Hunter v. City of Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161, 178; Union Dry Goods Co. v. Georgia Pub. Service Corp., supra; Postal-Tel. Cable. Co. v. Associated Press, supra; City of Englewood v. Denver So. P. Ry. Co., 248 U.S. 294; New Orleans v. New Orleans Water Works Co., 142 U.S. 79; People ex rel. Vil. of South Glens Falls v. P.S. Comm., supra).

  7. Matter of International Ry. Co. v. P.S. Comm

    124 N.E. 123 (N.Y. 1919)   Cited 21 times
    In Matter of International R. Co. v. Public Serv. Comm. (226 N.Y. 474) the court said: "The power to regulate rates is the power to increase them if inadequate just as truly as it is the power to reduce them if excessive.

    No contract can withdraw from the legislature the power of regulation while the consent of the municipality to the presence of the road continues. That is settled beyond doubt ( Matter of Quinby v. Public Service Comm., supra, p. 260; Union Dry Goods Co. v. GeorgiaP.S. Corp., 248 U.S. 372; City of Englewood v. Denver S.P. Ry. Co., 248 U.S. 294; Milwaukee Electric Ry. Light Co. v. Wisconsin R.R. Comm., 238 U.S. 174; City of Rochester v. Rochester R.R. Co., 182 N.Y. 99, 115). The legislature may say that, subject to the condition subsequent annexed to the consent of the locality, there shall be a change of motive power or an increase of the rates.