In general, covenants should be strictly construed in favor of the full and unlimited use of property. ( Engler v. Tenhaaf (1979), 74 Ill. App.3d 799, 803.) However, the rule of strict construction will not be applied to defeat the obvious purpose of the covenant.
Paragraph 1 of clause V of the covenants provides that the architectural review committee is to be appointed by Saddle Hill Farms, Inc. Restrictive covenants are to be construed so as to give effect to the actual intent of the parties when it was made. Forest Glen Community Homeowners Association v. Nolan (1982), 104 Ill. App.3d 108, 111, 432 N.E.2d 636; Engler v. Tenhaaf (1979), 74 Ill. App.3d 799, 803, 393 N.E.2d 1266. • 2 Here, the provisions of the declaration of protective covenants evidence an express intent by the parties to establish and maintain an architectural review committee having the power to approve or disapprove all architectural construction or alterations within the subdivision.
( Garden Quarter I Association v. Thoren (1979), 76 Ill. App.3d 99, 101, 394 N.E.2d 878, 880; Kessler, at 904.) While doubts and ambiguities in the covenants should be resolved in favor of natural rights and against restrictions ( Engler v. Tenhaaf (1979), 74 Ill. App.3d 799, 803, 393 N.E.2d 1266, 1269; Kessler, at 905), this generalization cannot be used to ignore or override the specific language of a covenant. Cordogan v. Union National Bank (1978), 64 Ill. App.3d 248, 251, 380 N.E.2d 1194, 1197.