Opinion
06-19-00214-CR
07-28-2020
MARK EUGENE ENGLE, Appellant v. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
On Appeal from the 196th District Court Hunt County, Texas
Trial Court No. 29,110 Before Morriss, C.J., Burgess and Stevens, JJ.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
While executing a search warrant on a charge for sexual assault, Greenville Police discovered a large amount of methamphetamine in Mark Eugene Engle's car. Engle v. State, No. 06-14-00239-CR, 2015 WL 6689258, at *1 n.6 (Tex. App.—Texarkana Nov. 3, 2015, pet. ref'd) (mem. op., not designated for publication). As a result, in 2014, Engle pled guilty to manufacture or delivery of more than four grams, but less than 200 grams, of methamphetamine and was sentenced to life imprisonment. Id. at *1. In 2015, after we found that the trial court properly denied Engle's suppression motion, we affirmed Engle's conviction. Id.
In 2019, Engle filed a motion for DNA testing of the sample he provided in the sexual assault case, even though he was never convicted of sexual assault. Because Engle's motion for DNA testing was unrelated to his conviction for manufacture or delivery of methamphetamine, the trial court denied Engle's motion. On appeal, Engle argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion without first granting his request for appointment of counsel or requiring the State to respond. Because we find that the trial court correctly determined that Engle had no reasonable grounds for his motion, we overrule Engle's complaints and affirm the denial of post-conviction DNA testing.
An examining trial found an absence of probable cause to arrest Engle on the sexual assault charge.
"To be entitled to post-conviction DNA testing, a convicted person must satisfy the requirements of Chapter 64 of the Code of Criminal Procedure." Hall v. State, 569 S.W.3d 646, 655 (Tex. Crim. App. 2019). "One of those requirements is that 'the convicted person establishes by a preponderance of the evidence that . . . the person would not have been convicted if exculpatory results had been obtained through DNA testing.'" Id. (quoting TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 64.03(a)(2)(A)). The trial court is also required to find that "identity was or is an issue in the case." TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 64.03(a)(1)(C). "This means that a convicted person must show a greater than 50% chance that he would not have been convicted if exculpatory results from the requested DNA testing had been available at trial." Hall, 569 S.W.3d at 655.
In reviewing the trial court's denial of Engle's motion, "we give almost total deference to the judge's resolution of historical fact issues supported by the record and applications-of-law-to-fact issues turning on witness credibility and demeanor." Reed v. State, 541 S.W.3d 759, 768 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017). Yet, "we review de novo all other application-of-law-to-fact questions." Id. at 768-69.
Engle's brief on appeal does not argue that the threshold requirements of Chapter 64 were met. Engle failed to show that identity was an issue in this case or that a favorable DNA test result of samples obtained in connection with the sexual assault would somehow "affirmatively cast doubt upon the validity of the inmate's conviction" for manufacture or delivery of methamphetamine. Ex parte Gutierrez, 337 S.W.3d 883, 892 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011) (citing Rivera v. State, 89 S.W.3d 55, 59 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002)).
"Chapter 64 motions are also subject to the 'law of the case' doctrine." State v. Swearingen, 478 S.W.3d 716, 720 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015). "According to that doctrine, 'an appellate court's resolution of questions of law in a previous appeal are binding in subsequent appeals concerning the same issue.'" Id. (quoting State v. Swearingen, 424 S.W.3d 32, 36 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014)). The trial court found that Engle's motion for post-conviction DNA testing was an attempt to cast doubt on the trial court's denial of his suppression motion, an issue that we previously decided in Engle's direct appeal.
Instead, Engle argues that the trial court should have appointed counsel and required a response from the State before denying the motion for DNA testing. First, appointment of counsel is only required under Chapter 64 if "the court finds reasonable grounds for a motion to be filed." TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 64.01(c). Second, because Engle "did not clear the first hurdle" of meeting the threshold requirements of DNA testing, nothing shows that he was harmed by the trial court's failure to require the State to respond to his motion before denying it. Sepeda v. State, 301 S.W.3d 372, 376 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2009, pet. struck); see Peyravi v. State, 440 S.W.3d 248, 250 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2013, no pet.). As a result, we overrule Engle's complaints on appeal.
We affirm the trial court's decision to deny Engle's motion for post-conviction DNA testing.
Scott E. Stevens
Justice Date Submitted: July 22, 2020
Date Decided: July 28, 2020 Do Not Publish