Opinion
NUMBER 13-16-00270-CR
01-19-2017
KIRK ROSS ENGLE, Appellant, v. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee.
On appeal from the 24th District Court of DeWitt County, Texas.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before Justices Rodriguez, Contreras, and Longoria
Memorandum Opinion by Justice Rodriguez
Justice Dori Contreras, formerly Dori Contreras Garza. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 45.101 et seq (West, Westlaw through 2015 R.S.).
Appellant Kirk Ross Engle appeals from his conviction for aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, a first-degree felony, see TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.02(a)(2) (West, Westlaw through 2015 R.S.), with a finding of habitual offender status. See id. § 12.42 (West, Westlaw through 2015 R.S.). By one issue, Engle contends that the trial court erred when it limited his expert's testimony. We affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
Engle was charged with aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, with enhancement paragraphs alleging habitual offender status. Throughout his jury trial, Engle did not dispute his role in the aggravated assault with a deadly weapon. He based his trial strategy on the affirmative defense of involuntary intoxication.
It is undisputed that Engle notified the State of his intent to raise an insanity defense.
Although the jury charge included a definition of involuntary intoxication and an option of finding Engle not guilty by reason of insanity, the jury found Engle guilty of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon. The trial court conducted the punishment hearing and found all three enhancement paragraphs to be true. The court assessed Engle's punishment at forty years in the Institutional Division of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice. Engle appeals from this judgment.
II. LIMITATION OF DEFENSE EXPERT'S TESTIMONY
In his sole issue, Engle generally complains that the trial court abused its discretion when it limited the testimony of his expert, Thomas Demoor, M.D., by not allowing him to testify fully and completely about an element of the involuntary intoxication defense—specifically whether Engle knew that his conduct was wrong. Engle contends that by limiting Dr. Demoor's testimony, the trial court stopped him from proving his affirmative defense. He claims that his constitutional right to due process was violated because Dr. Demoor's testimony was "critical to the heart of [his] trial defense."
A. Standard of Review
We review a trial court's evidentiary rulings to admit or exclude evidence for an abuse of discretion. See Shuffield v. State, 189 S.W.3d 782, 793 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). A trial court abuses its discretion when its decision is arbitrary, unreasonable, or without reference to guiding rules or principles. See State v. Mechler, 153 S.W.3d 435, 439 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). This Court examines the trial court's decision in light of what was before the trial court at the time the decision was made. See Weatherred v. State, 15 S.W.3d 540, 542 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). We will uphold that decision if it is reasonably supported by the record and correct under any theory of law applicable to the case. See Willover v. State, 70 S.W.3d 841, 845 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002).
B. Applicable Law
Section 8.01 of the Texas Penal Code, which encompasses the defense of insanity due to involuntary intoxication, provides that "it is an affirmative defense to prosecution that, at the time of the conduct charged, the actor, as a result of severe mental disease or defect, did not know that his conduct was wrong." TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 8.01(a) (West, Westlaw through R.S. 2015); Mendenhall v. State, 77 S.W.3d 815, 818 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002). The elements needed to establish an involuntary intoxication affirmative defense include: (1) the accused exercised no independent judgment or volition in taking the intoxicant; and (2) as a result of a severe mental disease or defect caused by the involuntary intoxicant, the accused did not know that his conduct was wrong. Mendenhall, 77 S.W.3d at 818; see Farmer v. State, 411 S.W.3d 901, 911-12 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013) (Cochran, J., concurring); Torres v. State, 585 S.W.2d 746, 749 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979); see also TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 8.01(a). "Involuntary intoxication by prescription medicine occurs only when the person has no knowledge that the medicine has possibly intoxicating side effects." Woodman v. State, 491 S.W.3d 424, 429 (Tex. App.—Houston [14 Dist.], 2016, pet. ref'd) (citing Mendenhall v. State, 15 S.W.3d 560, 565-66 (Tex. App.—Waco 2000), aff'd, 77 S.W.3d 815 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002)); Nelson v. State, 140 S.W.3d 206, 210 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2004, no pet.).
C. Analysis
1. The Trial Court Properly Sustained the State's State-of-Mind Objection
Engle first contends that the trial court abused its discretion when it did not allow Dr. Demoor to opine that Engle "was not able to appreciate right from wrong because of involuntary intoxication." On direct examination, Dr. Demoor provided the following testimony relevant to the State's objection that Dr. Demoor disqualified himself from testifying regarding Engle's state of mind:
Q. Can you tell this jury what procedures you go through in examining someone to determine their legal sanity at the time they committed a crime.
A. Well, legal sanity is a very narrowly defined topic and what some people are used to hearing is called not guilty by reason of insanity, that might be more familiar to what you've heard. And for somebody to be not guilty by reason of insanity they have to have such severe mental illness that they can no longer tell right from wrong. And it's very few people that are so severely mentally ill that they can't tell right from wrong. To evaluate for that you're trying to assess what actions they did and whether a mental illness caused them to not realize that the actions they did were wrong.
Q. Did you conduct such an examination on Mr. Engle?
A. You know, technically I did not because we were not looking at
criminal insanity. I didn't see any evidence to support not guilty by reason of insanity. I wasn't looking for that. I was looking for what we thought of as involuntary intoxication.
. . . .
Q. Okay. You had mentioned that you didn't know the straight insanity but then you started to mention involuntary intoxication.
A. Well, that was the question that I was evaluating, yes.
Q. And I think when you reported was insanity, too, for voluntary intoxication?
THE REPORTER: I'm sorry. Would you start again.
Q. Was it your understanding through to involuntary intoxication?
A. I didn't use the term insanity, I did believe he suffered from involuntary intoxication due to his medication and that led to a manic state that caused his aggressive outburst.
Q. And did it lead to a state where he didn't know what he was doing was wrong?
[THE STATE]: I object, Your Honor. The witness has already testified he did not evaluate for that.
THE COURT: Sustained.
A. Can I revise? I mean . . . I looked at the records, I talked to the individual. I didn't know—I didn't notice that he didn't know it was wrong or whether it was wrong or right, I didn't—I didn't ask that question. He had amnesia for the event so I couldn't really ask what his state of mind was at the time of the event.
. . . .
THE COURT: We're going to break for lunch. I'm going to ask that you be back in the jury room, ready to proceed, at 1:25. We'll be in recess until then.
(Jury recessed.)
THE COURT: My understanding . . . is this is a two-prong test. One is was he involuntarily intoxicated and as a result of that involuntary intoxication did he lose an awareness of right and wrong, so this doctor has testified that he didn't evaluate him for losing an awareness of right and wrong. So he can talk about involuntary intoxication but he has very eloquently and honestly said I didn't evaluate him for whether he knew what he was doing was right or wrong. So I can't—we can't go off into that. I want to make sure you understand that. He can no longer testify about whether or not Mr. Engle knew what he was doing and knew whether it was right or wrong. He can talk about whether he was involuntarily intoxicated. . . . But that's where I think we are in the evidence at this point, so I just want to make sure that everybody understood where I think we are and that my rulings are going to be based on that understanding of what the doctor has told me, that he didn't evaluate him for whether or not he was aware of the right or wrong nature of his actions.
. . . .
(Open court, defendant and jury present.)
THE COURT: You may be seated. . . .
Q. Doctor, do you remember when we left off you had mentioned involuntary intoxication; is that correct?
A. Yes.
Q. What exactly is involuntary intoxication?
A. In this context involuntary means that he didn't have a choice to refuse to take a substance. Intoxication means that a substance altered his emotional and mental well-being.
Q. And did you see evidence of that in this situation with Mr. Engle?
A. Yes.
Q. Now, back to—you said that you didn't see any evidence of insanity in this case, correct?
A. Well, that I didn't evaluate him specifically.
Q. Okay. And why was that?
A. Because he told me he didn't remember the event and I couldn't evaluate his state of mind at the time of the event.
Q. So because he had amnesiatic [sic] about it . . . .
A. He testified—he said he had blackouts, which we use the term amnesia.
Q. So you reviewed other things in relation to this case, though?
A. Yes.
Q. What all did you review? Offense reports?
A. I reviewed his medical records from the MHMR in Victoria. I reviewed the witness statements from the assault, I guess offense reports. I did review [the State's expert's] reports. There might be a few other things.
. . . .
[DEFENSE]: Pass the witness.
Examining the trial court's decision in light of what was before the trial court at the time the decision was made, see Weatherred, 15 S.W.3d at 542, we cannot conclude that the trial court's decision to sustain the State's objection regarding state-of-mind testimony was arbitrary, unreasonable, or without reference to guiding rules or principles. See Mechler, 153 S.W.3d at 439. Clearly, Dr. Demoor testified that he did not evaluate Engle's state of mind at the time of the event. Dr. Demoor explained that he could not testify regarding Engle's state of mind because Engle told him that he "didn't remember the event." It is apparent that the trial court understood that this testimony related to insanity due to a mental disease or defect or to insanity due to the involuntary intoxicant that caused the severe mental disease or defect. See Mendenhall, 77 S.W.3d at 818; see also TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 8.01(a). Based on Dr. Demoor's explicit testimony, the trial court sustained the State's objection that this expert had already testified he did not evaluate Engle for whether he knew that his conduct was wrong. See Mendenhall, 77 S.W.3d at 818. The trial court's decision to exclude any state-of-mind testimony from Dr. Demoor is reasonably supported by the record, especially in light of the expert's unequivocal testimony that Kyle "didn't remember the event" so he "couldn't evaluate his state of mind," and the trial court's reasoning as expressed to counsel outside the presence of the jury. See Willover, 70 S.W.3d at 845. The decision is correct based on a theory of law related to the admissibility of evidence. See id. We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding Dr. Demoor's opinion testimony regarding Engle's state of mind. See Shuffield, 189 S.W.3d at 793.
The State also objected to the following question Engle asked of Dr. Demoor: "And you said you didn't see any evidence of insanity because you couldn't talk to him directly about it. Were there other indications, though, that there's a possibility or probability that he could have been insane at the time of the alleged offense?" The trial court sustained the State's objection that Dr. Demoor had "already testified he did not evaluate for that." On appeal, Engle does not argue the appropriateness of the State's objection to his question regarding "other indications . . . that he could have been insane" and does not challenge the trial court's ruling on this objection. So we do not address it. See TEX. R. APP. P. 47.1.
2. The Trial Court Did Not Rule on the State's Relevancy Objection
Engle also asserts that the trial court erred in sustaining the State's relevancy objection to the following testimony provided by Dr. Demoor during his direct examination:
Q. Are you familiar with Lexapro?
A. Yes.
Q. What is Lexapro prescribed for?
A. It's prescribed for depression and anxiety.
Q. Was this a proper case to prescribe Lexapro for?
A. It's a debatable question. Lexapro is not approved for use in bipolar depression and in my opinion Mr. Engle suffers from bipolar disorder, as was the opinion of the doctor at MHMR, Dr. Dotter. Antidepressants are used at times in bipolar depression but they have to be [used] very cautiously, with very clear instructions to monitor for increasing agitation or irritability or aggression and to notify the doctor or to stop the medicine if that happens. That's my experience of using that type of medicine for bipolar depression.
Q. And so in using it for bipolar depression, in reviewing the—what all did you review in looking at . . . .
[THE STATE]: Your Honor, I'm going to object. I don't think it's relevant. The only relevance of this witness's testimony has to do with the analysis for the issue of insanity, not for bipolar depression.
Although Engle contends that the trial court sustained the State's relevancy objection, we find nowhere in the record where the court expressly or impliedly adversely ruled on this objection. See TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1; see also TEX. R. EVID. 401. After the State objected, the trial court excused the jury and addressed the State's challenge to Dr. Demoor state-of-mind testimony. Defense counsel simply chose not to continue questioning Dr. Demoor about the prescription medicine. So Engle has no basis for his complaint that "he was stopped from proving how Lexapro affects sufferers of bipolar disorder." See TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1(a).
3. Determination
Having concluded that the trial court properly sustained the State's state-of-mind objection and that Engle has no basis for a complaint about the State's relevancy objection, we overrule Engle's sole appellate issue.
III. CONCLUSION
We affirm.
NELDA V. RODRIGUEZ
Justice Do not publish.
TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b). Delivered and filed the 19th day of January, 2017.