To remedy these alleged violations, Plaintiff seeks, via ERISA § 102 and 29 C.F.R § 2520.102-2, full reimbursement and equitable relief. Defendant cites to Engers v. AT&T, 428 F. Supp. 2d 213, 234 (D.N.J. 2006) as support for the proposition that ERISA § 102 does not provide a cause of action for its violation. Plaintiff argues that the court in Engers did not foreclose recovery for furnishing a misleading SPD, but rather addressed whether the proper avenue for such recovery was through ERISA § 102 or ERISA § 502, the general ERISA enforcement mechanism.
Summary judgment on the Fourth and Fifth Claims AT T moves for summary judgment on the Fourth and Fifth Claims in the Fourth Amended Complaint. Although these claims assert violation of ERISA sections 402, pertaining to the written instrument requirement, and 404, pertaining to fiduciary duties, this Court has construed them as claims for benefits under the Plan. Engers v. AT T, 428 F. Supp. 2d 213, 226 (D.N.J. 2006) ("Plaintiffs' Fourth and Fifth Claims actually arise under § 502(a)(1)(B).") This recasts these claims as claims for benefits that have been denied by the Plan, with the Court serving to review the decision by the AT T Employee Benefits Committee ("Committee") to deny benefits. Defendants contend that the Committee's decision should be reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard, pursuant toFirestone Tire Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 115 (1989), because the Plan gave the Committee the discretionary authority determine eligibility and interpret Plan provisions. Defendants argue that the Committee did not abuse its discretion in denying benefits.
” Engers v. AT&T, 428 F.Supp.2d 213, 235 (D.N.J. 2006) (citing Varity Corp., 516 U.S. at 515). A. 502(a)(1)(B) Claim
Count Five Must Be Dismissed Because It Is Not A Recognized Cause Of Action.ERISA § 102 does not provide a cause of action for a party's failure to establish a Summary Plan Description. 29 U.S.C. § 1022; Engers v. AT&T, 428 F. Supp. 2d 213, 234 (D.N.J. 2006). Nevertheless, Plaintiff demands monetary relief for Defendant's alleged failure to establish a Summary Plan Description under ERISA § 102.
Id. at 468 (quoting Eddy v. V.I. Water Power Auth., 256 F.3d 204, 209-10 (3d Cir. 2001)). See also Engers v. AT T, 428 F.Supp.2d 213, 227 (D.N.J. 2006) (exhaustion defense not waived, though raised for the first time at summary judgment, where plaintiff suffered no prejudice and public policy was best served by applying the requirement). While it is true that the Plan failed to plead exhaustion as a defense, nothing in the record suggests that the delay in raising this issue until the summary judgment stage was for tactical or other improper reasons.
Plaintiff alleges that Defendant breached its fiduciary duty by disseminating an allegedly misleading SPD. A successful claim of breach of fiduciary duty under ERISA for misrepresentation must demonstrate that: (1) the defendant company was acting as a fiduciary; (2) the defendant made affirmative misrepresentations or failed to adequately inform plan beneficiaries; (3) the information misrepresented or not disclosed was material; and (4) the plaintiff relied on the misrepresentation to its detriment. Engers v. Am. Tel. Tel. Co., 428 F.Supp. 2d 213, 239 (D.N.J. 2006). An affirmative misrepresentation is established if the SPD and the Plan conflict.
Ackerman, 55 F.3d at 125. The court inEngers v. AT T, 428 F. Supp. 2d 213, 239 (D.N.J. 2006) likened a showing of extraordinary circumstances to "an equitable estoppel claim under § 502(a)(3)(B) of ERISA, 29 U.S.C.S. § 1132(a)(3)(B)," which requires a showing of "(1) the existence of a material representation; (2) reasonable and detrimental reliance on the misrepresentation, and (3) extraordinary circumstances." Id. As a matter of law, Plaintiffs have not demonstrated extraordinary circumstances under Ackerman.
29 U.S.C. § 1054(b)(1)(H)(i) (emphasis added).See, e.g., Tootle v. ARINC, Inc., 222 F.R.D. 88, 92-93 (D. Md. 2004); Engers v. AT T Corp., 428 F. Supp. 2d 213, 221-22 (D. N.J. 2001); Eaton, 117 F. Supp. 2d at 825-29; see also Campbell v. BankBoston, N.A., 327 F.3d 1, 9 (1st Cir. 2003) (ruling in dicta that "the ERISA age discrimination provision may not even apply to workers younger than the age of normal retirement").See Richards, 427 F. Supp. 2d at 158-59 ("The inclusion of the word 'any,' when given its ordinary, common meaning . . . renders this language unambiguous with respect to the question of whether it protects only employees who have reached age 65.") (quotation marks and citation omitted); Register, 2005 WL 3120268, at *7 ("The [IRS 2002] proposed regulations emphatically reject the first holding in Eaton, that the age discrimination provisions only apply after normal retirement age.").
In Engers v. ATT, however, the District of New Jersey held that notice of a conversion to a cash balance plan is required only if the amount of benefit is reduced, not whenever the rate of accrual is reduced. 428 F. Supp. 2d 213, 222 (D.N.J. 2006) (relying on 1995 Temporary Regulations). Companies are free to change from traditional defined benefit plans to cash balance plans, notwithstanding that a significant reduction in future benefit accruals will result.
Further, in determining whether a party can raise a post-answer exhaustion defense, courts look to whether the opposing party had notice of the defense sufficient to avoid prejudice. Conrad v. Wachovia Grp. Long Term Disability Plan, Civil No. 08-5416 (D.N.J. filed September 21, 2010), 2010 WL 3810198 (citing Eddy v. V.I. Water & Power Auth., 256 F.3d 204 (3d Cir. 2001)); see also Engers v. AT&T, 428 F.Supp.2d 213 (D.N.J. 2006) (exhaustion defense raised for first time at summary judgment stage is not waived where plaintiff suffered no prejudice and public policy was best served by applying the requirement). 2.