Energy Ser. v. Minyard

6 Citing cases

  1. McClish v. Woodarts Inc.

    2014 OK Civ. App. 41 (Okla. Civ. App. 2014)

    ¶17 The purpose of § 43(B) is to prevent a party from "sle[eping] on his rights" after a claim has been filed and to ensure that only those claimants prevail who, "in good faith, actively pursue[] resolution" of their claims. Key Energy Servs., Inc. v. Minyard, 2007 OK 99, ¶ 18, 173 P.3d 1198, 1203. "The time restriction in § 43(B) fixes the time period for requesting a hearing on a timely-filed claim. It is a time restriction designed to protect both the employer and the claimant.

  2. McClish v. Woodarts Inc.

    324 P.3d 409 (Okla. Civ. App. 2014)

    ¶ 17 The purpose of § 43(B) is to prevent a party from “sle[eping] on his rights” after a claim has been filed and to ensure that only those claimants prevail who, “in good faith, actively pursue[ ] resolution” of their claims. Key Energy Servs., Inc. v. Minyard, 2007 OK 99, ¶ 18, 173 P.3d 1198, 1203. “The time restriction in § 43(B) fixes the time period for requesting a hearing on a timely-filed claim. It is a time restriction designed to protect both the employer and the claimant.

  3. Tyson Foods Inc. v. Watson

    263 P.3d 332 (Okla. Civ. App. 2011)   Cited 2 times

    Claimant's only effort “to request a hearing and final determination” as required by § 43(B) after the May 2, 2007, order was the Form 9 motion to set for trial filed on May 10, 2010, more than three years after the May 2, 2007, order that all parties agree tolled the three-year statute of limitations. ¶ 11 We are not persuaded that the holding in Key Energy Services, Inc. v. Minyard, 2007 OK 99, 173 P.3d 1198, is applicable as urged by Claimant. In Key Energy Services, the Supreme Court found that an uncontested order of the Workers' Compensation Court appointing an independent medical examiner before the statute of limitations ran tolled the statutory bar set forth in § 43(B).

  4. Lang v. Erlanger Tubular Corp.

    2009 OK 17 (Okla. 2009)   Cited 13 times
    Holding the three-year bar of § 43(C) was not subject to tolling by an employer's provision of medical treatment

    Thompson v. Anchor Glass Container Corp., supra note 6, at ¶ 10 n. 16, 73 P.3d at 838 (emphasis added). See also Key Energy Services, Inc. v. Minyard, 2007 OK 99, ¶ 12, 173 P.3d 1198, 1201-1202. Conscious recognition of liability by employer's conduct operates to waive the protection of the limitations bar after the statutory time period has expired.

  5. Trust Fund v. Wade

    2008 OK 15 (Okla. 2008)   Cited 15 times

    Id., It is a time restriction designed to protect both the employer and the claimant. Key Energy Services v. Minyard, 2007 OK 99, ¶ 18, 173 P.3d 1198, 1203. It is not a statute of repose to be strictly construed despite a claimant's efforts. Cole v. Silverado Foods, Inc., 2003 OK 81, ¶ 9, n. 22, 78 P.3d 542, 547, n. 23.

  6. White v. 918 Constr.

    524 P.3d 502 (Okla. Civ. App. 2022)

    The Court held the purpose of the statute was "to prevent a party from ‘sle[eping] on his rights’ after a claim has been filed and to ensure that only those claimants prevail who, ‘in good faith, actively pursue[ ] resolution’ of their claims." Id. at ¶17, quotingKey Energy Servs., Inc. v. Minyard , 2007 OK 99, ¶18, 173 P.3d 1198. Section 69(A)(4) has the same purpose as the statute analyzed in McClish : to prevent a party from sleeping on their rights after a claim has been filed and to ensure that only those claimants prevail who, in good faith, actively pursue resolution of their claims.