Opinion
2:20-CV-01679-TL
02-14-2023
JAMES ENCINAS, Plaintiffs, v. UNIVERSITY OF WASHINGTON, Defendants.
ORDER
Tana Lin, United States District Judge.
This action arises from Plaintiff James Encinas's Title VII claims of employment discrimination by his former employer the Harborview Medical Center, which operates under the umbrella of the University of Washington, the Defendant in this action. Dkt. No. 5 at 3-4. This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff's request for court-appointed counsel (the “Motion for Counsel”). Dkt. Nos. 6, 23.
Plaintiff first sought appointment of counsel in November 2020 (Dkt. No. 6), which was denied (Dkt. No. 9). Plaintiff then moved for reconsideration of his motion. Dkt. No. 23. On September 30, 2022, the Court found that the prior denial had been predicated on an incorrect legal standard and directed Plaintiff to file a renewed and corrected request form for the appointment of counsel to be forwarded to the Screening Committee of the Pro Bono Panel of this District. Dkt. No. 29 at 16-21. In its order, the Court cautioned Plaintiff that “there is no guarantee that an attorney or law firm will volunteer to work on this case.” Id. at 21.
Plaintiff submitted a corrected request for counsel (Dkt. No. 30), which was forwarded to the Screening Committee for its consideration (Dkt. No. 32 at 3). On November 7, 2022, having received the Screening Committee's recommendation to appoint counsel, the Court granted Plaintiff's Motion for Counsel and directed that counsel be identified from the Pro Bono Panel to represent Plaintiff. Dkt. No. 34 at 3.
Unfortunately, despite the Court's November 7 order and the diligent efforts of the Pro Bono Panel in the last three months, pro bono counsel could not be secured for Plaintiff.
The Court has the authority and discretion to appoint pro bono counsel for Plaintiff, who brings a Title VII claim of employment discrimination, under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1). See Johnson v. U.S. Dep't of Treasury, 939 F.2d 820, 824 (9th Cir. 1991) (“It is undisputed that the district court had the authority to appoint counsel [under § 2000e-5(f)(1)].... [T]he determination is left to the sound discretion of the district court.”). While almost any litigant would likely benefit from counsel, “[t]here is no constitutional right to appointed counsel for employment discrimination claims ....” Ivey v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 269 (9th Cir. 1982); see also Palmer v. Valdez, 560 F.3d 965, 970 (9th Cir. 2009) (“Generally, a person has no right to counsel in civil actions.”).
The Court has exhausted all avenues available to it to secure counsel for Plaintiff, and Plaintiff must continue to represent himself. See, e.g., Mayo v. United States, No. C11-1115, slip op. at 2 (W.D. Wash. Jan. 16, 2013), ECF No. 102 (denying motion to appoint counsel where no pro bono volunteer was found); see also Cooper v. City of Ashland, No. 97-36108, 1999 WL 439427, at *4 (9th Cir. June 22, 1999) (unpublished opinion) (“[T]he selected counsel declined to represent [Plaintiff] and no other pro bono counsel was located .... The district court . . . lacked the authority to require counsel to represent [Plaintiff].” (citation omitted)).
Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED:
(1) The Court's prior order granting Plaintiff's Motion for Counsel (Dkt. No. 34) is VACATED, and Plaintiff's Motion for Counsel (Dkt. Nos. 6, 23) is DENIED.
(2) Plaintiff must proceed pro se, unless he is able to separately obtain counsel.
Plaintiff may seek court-appointed counsel at a later date upon a change in material circumstances in this case or to seek a limited-scope representation of pro bono counsel. Plaintiff is again cautioned that pro bono counsel cannot be guaranteed.
(3) The stay in this matter is LIFTED. An order for initial case scheduling deadlines will issue separately.