Opinion
CIVIL 3:23-CV-79
01-18-2023
RONALD SATISH EMRIT, Plaintiff v. CHARLES BARKLEY, et al., Defendants
Mariani Judge
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Martin C. Carlson United States Magistrate Judge
I. Factual Background
This pro se complaint, which comes before us for a legally mandated screening review, demands a great deal of the reader. Ronald Satish Emrit is by his own admission an indigent, disabled, and unemployed resident of Florida. (Doc. 1, ¶ 5). Emrit's complaint sues the former NBA star, Charles Barkley, Subway, a corporate purveyor of sandwiches, and the gambling site, FanDuel. (Id.) While the basis for Emrit's claims against this curious array of defendants is unclear, it seems that Emrit is upset, distracted, and offended by internet ads which he encounters involving the defendants while he is trolling the web using his Hotmail account. (Id.) Indeed, Emrit alleges that these advertisements give rise to no less than eight claims against the defendants including claims for invasion of privacy, violations of federal consumer protection statutes, public nuisance, products liability, and breach of various implied warranties. (Id., Counts I -VIII).
Having advanced these wide-ranging legal claims in a cryptic fashion, Emrit then demands injunctive relief, as well as damages totaling $45,000,000 from the defendants. (Id., at 10). However, even as he files his complaint in this court, Emrit seems to concede that the claim is filed in the wrong court since his complaint contains an extended exegesis explaining why venue lies over these allegations in federal court in Alabama. (Id., ¶¶ 9-12). Notably missing from this discussion is any explanation regarding why Emrit has filed a case which he concedes is properly venued in Alabama in federal court in Pennsylvania.
Along with his complaint, Emrit has filed a motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis. (Doc. 2). We will provisionally grant the plaintiff leave to proceed in forma pauperis, but for the reasons set forth below recommend that this complaint be dismissed.
II. Discussion
A. Screening of Pro Se Complaints-Standard of Review
This Court has an on-going statutory obligation to conduct a preliminary review of pro se complaints brought by plaintiffs given leave to proceed in forma pauperis in cases which seek redress against government officials. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). Thus, in this case we are obliged to review the complaint to determine whether any claims are frivolous, malicious, or fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. This statutory text mirrors the language of Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides that a complaint should be dismissed for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6).
With respect to this benchmark standard for legal sufficiency of a complaint, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has aptly noted the evolving standards governing pleading practice in federal court, stating that:
Standards of pleading have been in the forefront of jurisprudence in recent years. Beginning with the Supreme Court's opinion in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) continuing with our opinion in Phillips [v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 230 (3d Cir. 2008)], and culminating recently with the Supreme Court's decision in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, -U.S.-, 129 S.Ct. 1937 (2009), pleading standards have seemingly shifted from simple notice pleading to a more heightened form of pleading, requiring a plaintiff to plead more than the possibility of relief to survive a motion to dismiss.Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 209-10 (3d Cir. 2009).
In considering whether a complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, the Court must accept as true all allegations in the complaint and all reasonable inferences that can be drawn therefrom are to be construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Jordan v. Fox Rothschild, O'Brien & Frankel, Inc., 20 F.3d 1250, 1261 (3d Cir. 1994). However, a court “need not credit a complaint's bald assertions or legal conclusions when deciding a motion to dismiss.” Morse v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 132 F.3d 902, 906 (3d Cir. 1997). Additionally a court need not “assume that a . . . plaintiff can prove facts that the . . . plaintiff has not alleged.” Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal. v. California State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 526 (1983). As the Supreme Court held in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), in order to state a valid cause of action, a plaintiff must provide some factual grounds for relief which “requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of actions will not do.” Id. at 555. “Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Id.
In keeping with the principles of Twombly, the Supreme Court has underscored that a trial court must assess whether a complaint states facts upon which relief can be granted when ruling on a motion to dismiss. In Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009), the Supreme Court held that, when considering a motion to dismiss, “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id. at 678. Rather, in conducting a review of the adequacy of complaint, the Supreme Court has advised trial courts that they must:
[B]egin by identifying pleadings that because they are no more than conclusions are not entitled to the assumption of truth. While legal conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they must be supported by factual allegations. When there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.Id. at 679.
Thus, following Twombly and Iqbal, a well-pleaded complaint must contain more than mere legal labels and conclusions. Rather, a complaint must recite factual allegations sufficient to raise the plaintiff's claimed right to relief beyond the level of mere speculation. As the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has stated:
[After Iqbal, when presented with a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, district courts should conduct a two-part analysis. First, the factual and legal elements of a claim should be separated. The District Court must accept all of the complaint's well-pleaded facts as true, but may disregard any legal conclusions. Second, a District Court must then determine whether the facts alleged in the complaint are sufficient to show that the plaintiff has a “plausible claim for relief.” In other words, a complaint must do more than allege the plaintiff's entitlement to relief. A complaint has to “show” such an entitlement with its facts.Fowler, 578 F.3d at 210-11.
As the court of appeals has observed:
The Supreme Court in Twombly set forth the “plausibility” standard for overcoming a motion to dismiss and refined this approach in Iqbal. The plausibility standard requires the complaint to allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955. A complaint satisfies the plausibility standard when the factual pleadings “allow[ ] the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556, 127 S.Ct. 1955). This standard requires showing “more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. A complaint which pleads facts “merely consistent with” a defendant's liability, [ ] “stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of ‘entitlement of relief.' ”Burtch v. Milberg Factors, Inc., 662 F.3d 212, 220-21 (3d Cir. 2011) cert. denied, 132 S.Ct. 1861, 182 L.Ed.2d 644 (U.S. 2012).
In practice, consideration of the legal sufficiency of a complaint entails a three-step analysis:
First, the court must “tak[e] note of the elements a plaintiff must plead to state a claim.” Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1947. Second, the court should identify allegations that, “because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth.” Id. at 1950. Finally, “where there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement for relief.” Id.Santiago v. Warminster Tp., 629 F.3d 121, 130 (3d Cir. 2010).
Thus, a well-pleaded complaint must contain more than mere legal labels and conclusions. Rather, a pro se plaintiff's complaint must recite factual allegations which are sufficient to raise the plaintiff's claimed right to relief beyond the level of mere speculation, set forth in a “short and plain” statement of a cause of action.
Judged against these legal guideposts, for the reasons set forth below it is recommended that this complaint now be dismissed.
B. This Complaint Fails to State a Claim Upon Which Relief May Be Granted.
In this case, as discussed below, this complaint runs afoul of a series of insurmountable legal obstacles, which combine to defeat any right to relief for the plaintiff.
1. The Complaint Violates Rule 8.
At the outset, the complaint is subject to dismissal because it fails to comply with Rule 8's basic injunction that: “A pleading that states a claim for relief must contain . . . a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Dismissal of this complaint is appropriate since it is well settled that: “[t]he Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require that a complaint contain ‘a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,' Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2), and that each averment be ‘concise, and direct,' Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(e)(1).” Scibelli v. Lebanon County, 219 Fed.Appx. 221, 222 (3d Cir. 2007). Thus, when a complaint is “illegible or incomprehensible,” id., or when a complaint “is also largely unintelligible,” Stephanatos v. Cohen, 236 Fed.Appx. 785, 787 (3d Cir. 2007), an order dismissing a complaint under Rule 8 is clearly appropriate. See, e.g., Mincy v. Klem, 303 Fed.Appx. 106 (3d Cir. 2008); Rhett v. New Jersey State Superior Court, 260 Fed.Appx. 513 (3d Cir. 2008); Stephanatos, 236 Fed.Appx. 785; Scibelli, 219 Fed.Appx. 221; Bennett-Nelson v. La. Bd. of Regents, 431 F.3d 448, 450 n.1 (5th Cir. 2005). Furthermore, dismissal under Rule 8 is proper when a complaint “left the defendants having to guess what of the many things discussed constituted [a cause of action];” Binsack v. Lackawanna County Prison, 438 Fed.Appx. 158, 160 (3d Cir. 2011), or when the complaint is so “rambling and unclear” as to defy response. Tillio v. Spiess, 441 Fed.Appx. 109, 110 (3d Cir. 2011). Finally, a complaint may be dismissed under Rule 8 when the pleading is simply illegible and cannot be understood. See, e.g., Moss v. United States, 329 Fed.Appx. 335 (3d Cir. 2009) (dismissing illegible complaint); Radin v. Jersey City Medical Center, 375 Fed.Appx. 205 (3d Cir. 2010); Earnest v. Ling, 140 Fed.Appx. 431 (3d Cir. 2005) (dismissing complaint where “complaint fails to clearly identify which parties [the plaintiff] seeks to sue”); Oneal v. U.S. Fed. Prob., CIV.A. 05-5509 (MLC), 2006 WL 758301 (D.N.J. Mar. 22, 2006) (dismissing complaint consisting of approximately 50 pages of mostly-illegible handwriting); Gearhart v. City of Philadelphia Police, CIV.A.06-0130, 2006 WL 446071 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 21, 2006) (dismissing illegible complaint).
Here, Emrit's complaint simply cannot be understood. Since intelligibility is a prerequisite for any pleading, this complaint fails as a matter of law on these grounds. Furthermore, the complaint does not “contain ‘a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,' Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2), and [fails to meet Rule 8's requirement] that each averment be ‘concise, and direct,' Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(e)(1).” Scibelli, 219 Fed.Appx. at 222. Simply put, the absence of well-pleaded facts makes it virtually impossible to ascertain the legal and actual significance of Emrit's allegations. In addition, we find ourselves entirely at sea trying to understand why this claim is brought before us since Emrit plainly states that it should be filed in Alabama. Thus, we are “left . . . having to guess what of the many things discussed constituted [a cause of action].” Binsack, 438 Fed.Appx. at 160. In these circumstances, dismissal of this facially deficient claim is entirely appropriate.
2. Venue Does Not Lie Here.
Further, to the extent that this complaint can be understood, it is apparent that venue does not lie in this court over the matters raised by Emrit in his complaint. Indeed, Emrit admits as much since he insists that venue lies over these allegations in federal court in Alabama, and Emrit has provided no explanation concerning why he filed a case which he concedes is properly venued in Alabama in federal court in Pennsylvania. (Doc. 1, ¶¶ 9-12).
28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) defines the proper venue for a federal civil lawsuit and provides that an action should:
[B]e brought only in (1) a judicial district where any defendant resides, if all defendants reside in the same State, (2) a judicial district in which a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred, or a substantial part of property that is the subject of the action is situated, or (3) a judicial district in which any defendant may be found, if there is no district in which the action may otherwise be brought.28 U.S.C. § 1391(b).
In this case, there simply are no facts alleged which would give rise to venue in Pennsylvania over this dispute between an indigent Floridian, and the defendants, all of whom Emrit alleges have ties to Alabama. This court is permitted sua sponte to raise the issue of an apparent lack of venue, provided the court gives the plaintiff notice of its concerns and an opportunity to be heard on the issue. See e.g., Stjernholm v. Peterson, 83 F.3d 347, 349 (10th Cir. 1996) (“[A] district court may raise on its own motion an issue of defective venue or lack of personal jurisdiction; but the court may not dismiss without first giving the parties an opportunity to present their views on the issue”); Costlow v. Weeks, 790 F.2d 1486, 1488 (9th Cir. 1986). In this case, through the filing of the Report and Recommendation, we are placing the plaintiff on notice that with respect to these claims, this complaint does not allege facts that would give rise to venue over this action in this court. When it appears that a case has been brought in the wrong venue, the court may dismiss the action for lack of venue pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1406 and Rule 12(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Therefore, aside from the complaint's other flaws, the lack of venue over these claims also justifies dismissal of this lawsuit.
We are mindful of the fact that in civil rights cases pro se plaintiffs often should be afforded an opportunity to amend a complaint before the complaint is dismissed in its entirety, see Fletcher-Hardee Corp. v. Pote Concrete Contractors, 482 F.3d 247, 253 (3d Cir. 2007), unless granting further leave to amend is not necessary because amendment would be futile or result in undue delay. Alston v. Parker, 363 F.3d 229, 235 (3d Cir. 2004). In this case, however, Emrit's allegations are unintelligible and the plaintiff's complaint states that venue does not lie here. On these facts, we conclude that further amendment of the complaint would be futile and would result in undue delay. Therefore, the complaint should be dismissed without leave to amend.
III. Recommendation
Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, the plaintiff is granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis but IT IS RECOMMENDED that the plaintiff's complaint be dismissed.
The Parties are further placed on notice that pursuant to Local Rule 72.3:
Any party may object to a magistrate judge's proposed findings, recommendations or report addressing a motion or matter described in 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(B) or making a recommendation for the disposition of a prisoner case or a habeas corpus petition within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy thereof. Such party shall file with the clerk of court, and serve on the magistrate judge and all parties, written objections which shall specifically identify the portions of the proposed findings, recommendations or report to which objection is made and the basis for such objections. The briefing requirements set forth in Local Rule 72.2 shall apply. A judge shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made and may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge. The judge, however, need conduct a new hearing only in his or her discretion or where required by law, and may consider the record developed before the magistrate judge, making his or her own determination on the basis of that record. The judge may also receive further evidence, recall witnesses or recommit the matter to the magistrate judge with instructions.