Opinion
Argued February 2, 1983
May 4, 1983.
Class Actions — Failure to respond to petition — Burden of proof — Class certification.
1. Merely because a defendant fails to respond to a petition for class certification filed by plaintiffs such petition is not automatically granted, as the burden is upon the petitioner to establish the propriety of such class certification, which burden is not sustained by bare conclusory allegations. [107-8]
Argued February 2, 1983, before President Judge CRUMLISH, JR., and Judges MacPHAIL and DOYLE, sitting as a panel of three.
Appeal No. 1414 C. D. 1981, from the Order of the Court of Common Pleas of Dauphin County in case of Appeal of Charles and Genevieve Emerick, Carl M. Peffley, Dan Peffley, George Lauer, and Robert and Joan Smith, and Frank Twardzik, on behalf of themselves and all other Dauphin County Residential Property Owners from the Decision of the Dauphin County Board of Assessment Appeals, No. 5644-S-1979.
Appeals from real property assessments filed with Dauphin County Board of Assessment Appeals seeking class wide relief. Appeals denied. Property owners appealed to the Court of Common Pleas of Dauphin County. Preliminary objections filed. Class certification denied. CALDWELL, J. Property owners appealed to the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania. Held: Affirmed.
David L. Kurtz, for appellants.
Herbert A. Schaffner, Reynolds, Bihl Schaffner, for appellee.
Charles and Genevieve Emerick appeal a Dauphin County Common Pleas order which denied their petition for class certification. We affirm.
The Emericks seek to certify a class action challenge to the Dauphin County Board of Assessment's method of valuing real property and the assessment ratio used to compute real estate taxes. They contend that the County's failure to answer their petition entitles them to certification. We find this contention without merit.
Appellants' other arguments essentially are that they satisfied all of the requirements of Pa. R.C.P. Nos. 1702, 1708 and 1709. We believe these arguments have been amply dealt with by the trial court, so we find no need to address them here.
Well-pleaded class action allegations, if admitted by the class opponent, may be considered as evidence at the class certification hearing . . . . The prima facie showing shifts to the class opponent the burden of coming forward with contrary evidence . . . . If there is an actual conflict on an essential fact, the class proponent bears the risk of non-persuasion.
Janicik v. Prudential Insurance Co. of America, Pa. Superior Ct. ___, ___, 451 A.2d 451, 455-56 (1982) (citations omitted).
We affirm on the basis of the opinion of CALDWELL, J., ___ Pa. D. C.3rd ___ (1981).
We note that, although Judge Caldwell's opinion does not set forth specific fact findings and conclusions of law, the opinion meets with the requirements of Pa. R.C.P. No. 1517(a), which allows a narrative form so long as there are enough facts and discussion for the appellate court to exercise its review function. We conclude that the able opinion of the trial court meets this requirement. See Janicik, ___ Pa. Superior Ct. at ___ n. 2, 451 A.2d at 454 n. 2 (the applicability of the elements of Pa. R.C.P. No. 1517(a) to class actions).
Affirmed.
ORDER
The order of the Dauphin County Court of Common Pleas, No. 5644 S 1979, dated May 7, 1981, is hereby affirmed.