Opinion
LINER YANKELEVITZ SUNSHINE & REGENSTREIF LLP, Robert M. Shore, Attorneys for Plaintiffs and Counterdefendants EMCO, INC., and MARED INDUSTRIES, INCORPORATED.
ORDER GRANTING THE MOTION OF MARED INDUSTRIES INCORPORATED FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON THE FIRST COUNTERCLAIM FOR RELIEF OF DIAMOND BLADE WAREHOUSE, INC.
MANUEL REAL, District Judge.
The Motion of Plaintiff and Counterdefendant Mared Industries Incorporated ("Mared") for Partial Summary Judgment on the First Counterclaim for Relief of Diamond Blade Warehouse, Inc. ("DBW"), came on regularly for hearing on May 3, 2004. Mared was represented by Deborah A. Klar, Esq., and Robert M. Shore, Esq., of Liner Yankelevitz Sunshine & Regenstreif LLP, and DBW was represented by James S. Cooper, Esq., of Levinson Kaplan Arshonsky & Kurtz, A P.C. After considering the papers supporting and opposing the Motion and the arguments of counsel, the Court finds and holds as follows:
DBW's First Counterclaim for Relief seeks various forms of relief against Mared based on section 17200 of the California Business and Professions Code. This action, though, was originally and properly filed in Nevada, and transferred to the Central District of California for the convenience of the parties. See 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). Accordingly, state law claims in this action are governed by Nevada choice-of-law principles. Van Dusen v. Barrack , 376 U.S. 612, 639 (1964); Ferens v. John Deere Co. , 494 U.S. 516, 523 (1990).
The parties agree, and the Court holds, that Nevada's choice-of-law principles for tort claims are set forth in Motenko v. MGM Dist., Inc. , 921 P.2d 933, 935 (Nev. 1996) (plurality opinion). In Motenko, the Nevada Supreme Court set forth a mechanical four-factor test to decide choice-of-law issues in tort cases. In Nevada, "the law of the forum (the place where the action is brought) governs in a tort case, unless another state has an overwhelming interest." Id . "Another state has an overwhelming interest if two or more of the following factors are met: (a) it is the place where the conduct giving rise to the injury occurred; (b) it is the place where the injury is suffered; (c) the parties have the same domicile, residence, nationality, place of incorporation, or place of business and it is different from the forum state; (d) it is the place where the relationship, if any, between the parties is centered." Id.
Thus, DBW is entitled to invoke California law only if it can satisfy at least two of the Motenko factors. For purposes of this Motion, Mared, a California corporation with its principal place of business in California concedes that factor (a) supports California jurisdiction, because its conduct, to the extent it was actionable, occurred in California. DBW, on the other hand, concedes that factor (d) is not applicable because the parties are commercial competitors and therefore there is no place where their relationship is centered.
The parties disagree over the correct application of factors (b) and (c). It is undisputed that DBW is an Illinois corporation with its principal place of business in Illinois. See, e.g., DBW First Amended Counterclaims, ¶ 4. It is also undisputed that DBW has no offices in California and owns no real estate in California. DBW's Response to Interrogatory No. 7. For its part, DBW contends that it does business with customers located in California. However, Mared's evidentiary objections are well taken and are sustained - DBW, which as the Counterclaimant bears the burden of proof at trial, has not provided the Court with admissible evidence to that effect.
Even if DBW's evidence were admissible, though, it would be insufficient to defeat partial summary judgment because the Court agrees with Mared's analysis of factors (b) and (c). Turning first to factor (c), we must consider the parties' domicile, residence, nationality, place of incorporation, or place of business. The location of the parties' customers is irrelevant to this inquiry. See Northwest Pipe Co. v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court , 42 P.3d 242, 245 (Nev. 2002) (plurality opinion) (holding that the home of a corporation with business interests throughout the United States, for choice-of-law purposes, was Oregon, because that was its state of incorporation and the location of its principal place of business). Under this test, Mared is located in California, but DBW is located in Illinois. For factor (c) to support the application of California law, DBW, as well as Mared, must be located in California. That is not the case, so factor (c) cannot support the application of California law.
Factor (b) requires the Court to determine the place where the alleged injury is suffered. DBW contends that it suffered injury in California because it has customers in California. This position suffers from two flaws - one logical, and one precedential. The logical flaw is that DBW's argument proves too much. Under DBW's analysis, a corporation suffers injury in any state in which it does business. But this conclusion would render it impossible for a Court to decide choice-of-law questions, because many businesses have customers in numerous states.
In any event, Motenko itself mandates a different result. In Motenko, plaintiff sued for loss of parental consortium when his mother, who was staying in Nevada along with plaintiff, slipped on a loose tile. Motenko , 921 P.2d at 934. Even though the wrongful conduct occurred in Nevada at a time when both plaintiff and his injured mother were physically present in Nevada, the Nevada Supreme Court concluded that plaintiff's home, Massachusetts, was the place where the injury was felt. Id. at 935. In the corporate setting, the injury is felt at the corporation's headquarters. Custom Teleconnect, Inc. v. International Tele-Servs., Inc. , 254 F.Supp.2d 1173, 1178 (D. Nev. 2003). In this case, DBW's home is Illinois, so that is where the injury was suffered. Thus, factor (b) cannot support the use of California law.
In summary, it is undisputed that DBW's state of incorporation and principal place of business are in Illinois, that DBW has no offices in California, and that Mared and DBW have no relationship, and therefore no state in which their relationship is centered. These undisputed facts establish, as a matter of law, that DBW cannot show that California has an "overwhelming interest" in its dispute with Mared. DBW's First Counterclaim for Relief depends on California law, so Mared is entitled to judgment in its favor.
Accordingly, it is ORDERED that Mared's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on DBW's First Counterclaim for Relief is GRANTED. The final judgment in this action shall grant judgment in Mared's favor on DBW's claim pursuant to section 17200 of the California Business and Professions Code. DBW's First Counterclaim for Relief is dismissed with prejudice.
IT IS SO ORDERED.