A petitioner under Section 72 of the Civil Practice Act is required to show a meritorious claim. There are no allegations which, if established would create a duty on Idlewild, the employer of Lambotte, to defend him or indemnify him. Stawasz v. Aetna Ins. Co., 99 Ill. App.2d 131; 240 N.E.2d 702; Embree v. DeKalb Forge Co., 49 Ill. App.2d 85; 199 N.E.2d 250 and Holcomb v. Flavin, 37 Ill. App.2d 359; 185 N.E.2d 716. Finally, no amended complaint showing any claim which was not previously disposed of was presented to the trial court.

They would be doing this indirectly if they got judgments against Tjardes and Artic, either of whom turned around and got a judgment for indemnity against Bauman; and Fraker could reasonably believe that an awareness of this possibility might influence Walker in negotiating the issue of the general release, though in the end it did not. Moreover, weak as it appears to have been, Walker's claim against Tjardes was strong enough to induce Tjardes (actually his insurance company) to offer $10,000 to settle it. If the offer had been accepted Tjardes could have turned around and sued Bauman for indemnity, which is conventionally available where an employer is held liable for his employee's tort under the doctrine of respondeat superior (the ground for the action against Tjardes). See Stawasz v. Aetna Ins. Co., 99 Ill.App.2d 131, 240 N.E.2d 702 (1968); Embree v. Gormley, 49 Ill.App.2d 85, 199 N.E.2d 250 (1964); Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts § 51, at p. 341 and n. 6 (5th ed. 1984). Though not wealthy, Bauman might be good for $10,000, or a sufficient fraction of that amount to make suit worthwhile.

Indemnity derives from principles of contract, and may be express or implied. Implied indemnity traditionally requires a pre-tort relationship which gives rise to a duty to indemnify. See, e.g., Mierzejwski v. Stronczek, 100 Ill. App.2d 68, 241 N.E.2d 573 (1968) (lessor-lessee); Embree v. DeKalb Forge Co., 49 Ill. App.2d 85, 199 N.E.2d 250 (1964) (employer-employee); Blaszak v. Union Tank Car Co., 37 Ill. App.2d 12, 184 N.E.2d 808 (1962) (owner-lessee); Gulf, Mobile Ohio R.R. Co. v. Arthur Dixon Transfer Co., 343 Ill. App. 148, 98 N.E.2d 783 (1951) (master-servant). However, in response to the harshness of the no-contribution rule, the Illinois courts expanded the traditional doctrine of implied indemnity to "passive-active" negligence cases.

For example, an employer held liable for the torts of his employee under the doctrine of respondeat superior is generally allowed indemnification from the employee, assuming the employer did not participate in the wrongful conduct. ( Embree v. DeKalb Forge Co. (1964), 49 Ill. App.2d 85.) Too, a landowner held responsible for failure to perform the duty imposed by law to maintain his premises in a reasonably safe condition is allowed indemnity from the negligent party who created the dangerous condition. See Rovecamp v. Central Construction Co. (1964), 45 Ill. App.2d 441.

Van Jacobs v. Parikh (1981), 97 Ill. App.3d 610, 612. Classic pretort relationships which have given rise to a duty to indemnify include: lessor and lessee ( Mierzejwski v. Stronczek (1968), 100 Ill. App.2d 68); employer and employee ( Embree v. DeKalb Forge Co. (1964), 49 Ill. App.2d 85); owner and his lessee ( Blaszak v. Union Tank Car Co. (1962), 37 Ill. App.2d 12); master and servant ( Gulf Mobile Ohio R.R. Co. v. Arthur Dixon Transfer Co. (1951), 343 Ill. App. 148). In Reynolds v. Illinois Bell Telephone Co. (1964), 51 Ill. App.2d 334, and Sargent v. Interstate Bakeries, Inc. (1967), 86 Ill. App.2d 187, indemnity was permitted even though there was no pretort relationship alleged and/or proved between the third-party plaintiff and the third-party defendant.

Decisions further relied on by Argonaut have construed section 25(2) to permit a defendant other than a surety to bring a third-party action without requiring him to "wait until his liability has been determined, or until he has paid the plaintiff in whole or in part for the plaintiff's damages." ( Embree v. DeKalb Forge Co. (1964), 49 Ill. App.2d 85, 92, citing Blaszak v. Union Tank Car Co. (1962), 37 Ill. App.2d 12.) These cases, however, are inapposite since the third-party plaintiffs there seeking subrogation were not sureties. Third-party practice in Federal procedure has been similarly liberalized under Rule 14(a) (Fed.R.Civ.P. 14(a) (1966)), which, according to the following explanation, "creates no substantive rights.

Frazer v. A.F. Munsterman, Inc., 123 Ill.2d 245, 255, 527 N.E.2d 1248 (1988); Van Slambrouck v. Economy Baler Co., 105 Ill.2d 462, 475 N.E.2d 867 (1985). Classic pretort relationships which have given rise to a duty to indemnify include lessor and lessee ( Mierzejwski v. Stronczek, 100 Ill. App.2d 68, 241 N.E.2d 573 (1968)), employer and employee ( Embree v. DeKalb Forge Co., 49 Ill. App.2d 85, 199 N.E.2d 250 (1964)), owner and his lessee ( Blaszak v. Union Tank Car Co., 37 Ill. App.2d 12, 184 N.E.2d 808 (1962)), and master and servant ( Gulf Mobile Ohio R.R. Co. v. Arthur Dixon Transfer Co., 343 Ill. App. 148, 98 N.E.2d 783 (1951)). In the instant case, Kerschner and Karlin have clearly alleged a pretort relationship with Goodman. The third-party complaint alleged that KKS retained Goodman in the summer of 1989 to provide professional advice regarding their withdrawal from Weiss Company and regarding the formation of a new accounting partnership.

To state a cause of action for implied indemnity, a third-party complaint must allege: (1) a pretort relationship between the third-party plaintiff and the third-party defendant, and (2) a qualitative distinction between the conduct of the third-party plaintiff and the third-party defendant. ( Van Slambrouck v. Economy Baler Co. (1985), 105 Ill.2d 462, 475 N.E.2d 867; Brown v. Torin Corp. (1988), 175 Ill. App.3d 544, 529 N.E.2d 1077.) Classic pretort relationships which have given rise to a duty to indemnity include: lessor and lessee ( Mierzejwski v. Stronczek (1968), 100 Ill. App.2d 68, 241 N.E.2d 573); employer and employee ( Embree v. De Kalb Forge Co. (1964), 49 Ill. App.2d 85, 199 N.E.2d 250); owner and his lessee ( Blaszak v. Union Tank Car Co. (1962), 37 Ill. App.2d 12, 184 N.E.2d 808); and master and servant. Gulf Mobile Ohio R.R. Co. v. Arthur Dixon Transfer Co. (1951), 343 Ill. App. 148, 98 N.E.2d 783.

Thus, a defendant, in order to avoid a multiplicity of suits, may join as third-party defendants anyone against whom he may have a possibility of recovery on account of the plaintiff's claimed damages. ( Embree v. DeKalb Forge Co. (1964), 49 Ill. App.2d 85.) Additionally, it is well settled in Illinois that a defendant, as did the defendants-counterplaintiffs in the case at bar, may bring in additional parties to the lawsuit through filing a counterclaim, if the counterclaims arise out of the same transaction or series of transactions that are set out in the plaintiff's complaint.

(Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 110, pars. 2-406(a), (b); Embree v. DeKalb Forge Co. (1964), 49 Ill. App.2d 85.) The purpose of this section is to avoid a multiplicity of actions and a repetition of proof by permitting a determination of all claims in a single action.