EMA ACUPUNCTURE, P.C. v. PROG. INS. CO.

Full title: EMA ACUPUNCTURE, P.C. a/a/o KEVIN ALTMAN, Plaintiff, v. PROGRESSIVE…

Court: Civil Court of the City of New York, Kings County

Date published: Mar 15, 2011

2011 N.Y. Slip Op. 50396 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 2011)

Opinion

161737/07.

Decided March 15, 2011.

[EDITOR'S NOTE: This case is unpublished as indicated by the issuing court.] INGRID JOSEPH, J.

Recitation, as required by CPLR § 2219 (a), of the papers considered in the review of this Motion

PapersNumbered 1 2

Notice of Motion Affidavits Annexed .... Opposition/Answering Affidavits .. .. Replying Affidavits . In this action to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, plaintiff filed a motion for summary judgment on or about September 16, 2009, which was returnable on October 6, 2009. The parties signed a written adjournment stipulation on the return date since the defendant failed to submit opposition. In the stipulation, the litigants agreed that the defendant would serve responsive papers upon plaintiff on or before January 29, 2010 and that any cross-motion served beyond the extended date would be denied as untimely. The defendant breached the agreement by serving the cross-motion and opposition on March 5, 2010, approximately one month after the due date. Consequently, the court rejected the defendant's submissions when the parties appeared on March 29, 2010. The defendant now seeks an order pursuant to CPLR § 2221(e)(2) (e)(3), granting leave to renew plaintiff's prior motion for summary judgment and upon renewal, an order denying plaintiff's motion and granting defendant's cross-motion for summary judgment.

The issue before the court is whether the defendant can move for leave to renew its adversary's motion on the basis that its cross-motion and opposition, which was rejected and not entertained, constitutes new facts?

The defendant's untimely responsive papers, once rejected, constituted a default on the part of the defendant in opposing plaintiff's motion ( Lumbermen's Mut. Cas. Co. v Fireman's Fund American Ins. Co., 117 AD2d 588 [2d Dept 1986]; and see Omega Diagnostic Imaging, P.C. v MVAIC, 2011 WL 817397 [Sup. Ct, App Term 2nd, 11th and 13th Jud Dists 2011]; Manhattan Medical Imaging, P.C. v Nationwide Ins. Co., 27 Misc 3d 127(A)[Sup. Ct, App Term 2nd, 11th and 13th Jud Dists 2010]; Acupuncture Healthcare Plaza, P.C. v Zurich Ins. Co., 22 Misc 3d 126(A) [Sup. Ct, App Term 2nd, 11th and 13th Jud Dists 2008][the court's grant of relief requested in an unopposed motion is considered a default judgment]). Even though the court allowed the defendant to orally address the issue of whether plaintiff met its prima facie burden, the resulting judgment in plaintiff's favor was a default judgment. The court is cognizant that CPLR § 2221 is silent as to who may bring a motion to renew, but the Appellate Term has held that a party cannot renew a motion upon which it defaulted ( Manhattan Medical Imaging, P.C., 27 Misc 3d 127(A)[Sup. Ct, App Term 2nd, 11th, 13th Jud. Dists 2010]). The appropriate procedural device for obtaining relief from a default judgment is a motion to vacate pursuant to CPLR § 5015(a)(1)( Eugene Di Lorenzo, Inc. v A.C. Dutton Lumber Co., Inc., 67 NY2d 138, 141).

Even assuming arguendo that a motion for leave to renew was appropriate in this context or the court converted the motion into one to vacate the default judgment, the defendant has failed to meet the criteria for relief under either theory.

A motion for leave to renew, pursuant CPLR § 2221, creates an avenue for a party to provide the court with pertinent facts that it failed to include in the previous motion when such motion was before the court (8 NY Prac., Civil Appellate Practice § 5:2). The motion must be based upon new facts not offered on the prior motion that would change the prior determination or shall demonstrate that there has been a change in the law that would change the prior determination and shall contain reasonable justification for the failure to present such facts on the prior motion (CPLR § 2221(e)(2) (e)(3); Rizzotto v Allstate Ins. Co., 300 AD2d 562 [2d Dept 2002]). In order to garner relief under CPLR § 5015, the defendant must show a reasonable excuse for the default and a meritorious defense.

The defendant's cross-motion and opposition do not constitute new facts within the contemplation of CPLR § 2221, because the information contained therein is not newly discovered and would have been available when plaintiff's motion was before the court but for the defendant's untimeliness. Additionally, the defendant's excuse of law office failure is untenable for purposes of CPLR §§ 2221 and 5015. Law office failure can be accepted as a reasonable excuse in the exercise of the court's sound discretion, but the movant must submit supporting facts to explain and justify the default and mere neglect is not acceptable as a reasonable excuse ( Cole-Hatchard v Grand Union, 270 AD2d 447 [2d Dept 2000] quoting Bravo v New York City Hous. Auth., 253 AD2d 510 [2d Dept 1998] and Davito v Marine Midland Bank, 100 AD2d 510 [2d Dept 1984]). The defendant's excuse, that the task of responding to plaintiff's motion was assigned to an attorney who left the firm, and the opposition due date had lapsed before the law office could "sort through" the former attorney's caseload, represents nothing more than the law office's neglect in managing its active cases. Furthermore, the defendant failed to provide details or submit any evidence in support of its explanation. Thus, the court finds that the excuse is conclusory and insufficient.

Accordingly, the defendant's motion is denied.

This constitutes the decision and order of the court.