Garzot v. De Rubio, 209 U.S. 283; Gonzales v. Buist, 224 U.S. 126; Rosaly v. Graham, 227 U.S. 584; Ochoa v. Hernandez, 230 U.S. 139; Porto Rico v. Emmanuel, 235 U.S. 251. When that act was superseded by § 244 of the Judicial Code, writs of error and appeals from the insular Supreme Court became subject to the same regulations which governed appeals from the district courts of the United States. Thereby this court acquired power to review questions of fact in cases coming to it on appeal in equity or admiralty, Elzaburu v. Chaves, 239 U.S. 283, 285; but in actions at law which are reviewable on writ of error, there was no right in this court to review the facts, although the case was tried without a jury. Behn v. Campbell, 205 U.S. 403, 407.

United States v. Vigil, 10 Wall. 423, 427. Obviously upon the theory that our power to review was controlled by the rule obtaining as to territorial courts of the United States this record, as was the case in Elzaburu v. Chavez, 239 U.S. 283, contains a statement of facts prepared by the lower court for the purposes of this appeal. As there is an entire absence from the record of the oral and documentary evidence upon which the court below acted except so far as the same may be shown by the opinion of the court or may be contained in the statement of facts, it follows that the record does not enable us to review the facts and we proceed to dispose of the legal propositions urged for reversal in the light of the facts as stated and as elucidated in the opinion of the court. Abbreviating and somewhat changing the order in which they are stated below, we recapitulate the essential facts as follows:

Minnesota Min. Co. v. National Min. Co., 3 Wall. 332, 334, 18 L.Ed. 42; De Elzaburu v. Chaves, 239 U.S. 283, 292, 36 S.Ct. 47, 60 L.Ed. 290; Weston v. Poland, 10 Cir., 48 F.2d 738, 740;

When that act was superseded by section 244 of the Judicial Code [ 48 U.S.C.A. § 864 note] writs of error and appeals from the insular Supreme Court became subject to the same regulations which governed appeals from the district courts of the United States. Thereby this court acquired power to review questions of fact in cases coming to it on appeal in equity or admiralty (De Elzaburu v. Chaves, 239 U.S. 283, 285, 36 S.Ct. 47, 60 L.Ed. 290); but in actions at law which are reviewable on writ of error, there was no right in this court to review the facts, although the case was tried without a jury (Behn v. Campbell, 205 U.S. 403, 407, 27 S.Ct. 502, 51 L.Ed. 857). The jurisdiction to review judgments and decrees of the Porto Rico courts conferred upon the Circuit Court of Appeals by Act of January 28, 1915, c. 22, 38 Stat. 803 [28 U.S.C.A. § 225 note], is subject to the same limitation.

"2. It is the settled doctrine of this court that rights accruing under one construction [of a statute] will not be lost merely by a change of opinion in the local court." In De Elzaburu v. Chaves, 239 U.S. 283, 36 S.Ct. 47, 50, 60 L.Ed. 290, appealed from the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico, the court, referring to a previous construction of a certain "mortgage law," said: "This view, to say the least, is a reasonable one; and since it is plain that the decisions, having stood so long unchallenged, have established a rule of property, it seems to us that they ought not now to be overruled."

In that respect it appears to me that the court has established a rule of property which ought to be adhered to. On the importance of a court's adhering to its decisions establishing a rule of property, I respectfully refer to the following decisions: Levy v. Hitsche, 40 La.Ann. 500, 4 So. 472; Wetherbee v. Railroad Lands Company, 153 La. 1059, 97 So. 40; Straus v. City of New Orleans, 166 La. 1035, 118 So. 125; Roberson v. Pioneer Gas Co., 173 La. 313, 137 So. 46, 82 A.L.R. 1264; Douglass v. Pike County, 101 U.S. 677, 25 L.Ed. 968; Anderson v. Santa Anna Township, 116 U.S. 356, 6 S.Ct. 413, 29 L.Ed. 633; Bolles v. Town of Brimfield, 120 U.S. 759, 7 S.Ct. 736, 30 L.Ed. 786; De Elzaburu v. Chaves, 239 U.S. 283, 36 S.Ct. 47, 60 L.Ed. 290. See, also, 15 C.J. 949, and Sutherland on Statutory Construction (2d Ed.) vol. 2, § 485, p. 906.

On appeal the court will not revise the commission's findings unless clearly erroneous. ( Jacobson v. Wisconsin Cent. Ry. Co., 71 Minn. 519, 70 Am. St. 358, 74 N.W. 893, 40 L.R.A. 389; Interstate Commerce Com. v. Chicago, B. Q. Ry. Co., 186 U.S. 320, 22 Sup. Ct. 824, 46 L. ed. 1182; Louisville Nashville Ry. Co. v. Behlmer, 175 U.S. 648, 20 Sup. Ct. 209, 44 L. ed. 309; Louisville N. Ry. v. United States, 238 U.S. 1, 35 Sup. Ct. 696; Elzaburu v. Chaves, 239 U.S. 283, 284, 36 Sup. Ct. 47, 60 L. ed. 290; Great Northern Ry. Co. v. Merchants Elevator Co., 259 U.S. 285, 42 Sup. Ct. 477, 66 L. ed. 943.) The burden of proof rested upon the carriers to show that the existing log rates are just and reasonable, and they have failed to do so. (10 C. J., sec. 686, p. 438; Steenerson v. Great Northern Ry. Co., 69 Minn. 353, 72 N.W. 713; Washington Southern Ry. Co. v. Commission, 112 Va. 515, 71 S.E. 539; Southern Ry. Co. v. Commission, 42 Ind. App. 90, 83 N.E. 721; Chicago etc. Ry. Co. v. State, 35 Okl. 233, 128 P. 908.)