Opinion
Case No. 00-4103-DES
June 15, 2001
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
This matter is before the court on defendant Brown County District Court Judge James A. Patton's Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 14) and defendant Brown County Attorney Kevin Hill's Motion to Dismiss, or Alternatively, Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 30) for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Plaintiff filed this action pro se. Defendants argue this court lacks jurisdiction to grant the requested relief due to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, Younger abstention doctrine, judicial immunity, and qualified immunity. All parties have filed briefs in this matter. For the following reasons, the court grants defendants' motions to dismiss.
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Plaintiff's wife brought two actions against plaintiff in the District Court of Brown County, Kansas. The first action was for divorce, case number 00-D-22. The second action was for a protection from abuse ("PFA") order pursuant to the Kansas Protection from Abuse Act, Kan. Stat. Ann. § 60-3107, case number 00-D-03. Plaintiff claims that Brown County Attorney Kevin Hill ("Hill") and Brown County District Court Judge James A. Patton ("Judge Patton") conspired with sheriff Lamar Shoemaker to deny plaintiff's right to due process by failing to serve plaintiff with the notice of the PFA hearing, held on January 10, 2000. Plaintiff claims his wife's allegations of abuse were false and that defendants failed to investigate these false claims and refused to give plaintiff and his wife a polygraph test. Plaintiff also claims Judge Patton refused to allow plaintiff to take the stand and respond to plaintiff's wife's false allegations. Since the state cases began, plaintiff has been unable to see his daughter or live in his house and his wife has taken all his property. Plaintiff claims the defendants conspired against him in response to two articles plaintiff published in the local paper in 1997.
Plaintiff labeled Kevin Hill's title as "Brown County District Attorney." The court will use the correct title of "Brown County Attorney."
Plaintiff requests that this court grant the following relief: (1) set aside the two state court domestic cases which were assigned to Judge Patton: case numbers 00-D-03 and 00-D-22; (2) set aside the pending PFA order entered by Judge Patton; (3) declare the Kansas Protection from Abuse Act unconstitutional; (4) order defendants to pay the cost of an attorney, actual damages in the amount $2.2 million dollars each, and punitive damages in the amount of $2.2 million dollars each. Since the filing of the complaint, case number 00-D-22 has been dismissed. It also appears that the PFA order entered in case number 00-D-03 expired on January 10, 2001. However, neither party has informed the court whether this order remains in effect. Therefore, the court will treat case number 00-D-03 and the PFA order as if they are active.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
The court may not dismiss a cause of action for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure unless it appears beyond doubt that the claimant can prove no set of facts supporting its claim which would entitle it to relief. H. J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 229, 249-50 (1989). In considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the court must assume as true all well-pleaded facts, as distinguished from conclusory allegations, and must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmovant. Housing Auth. of the Kaw Tribe v. City of Ponca City, 952 F.2d 1183, 1187 (10th Cir. 1991); Swanson v. Bixler, 750 F.2d 810, 813 (10th Cir. 1984). The issue in reviewing the sufficiency of a complaint is not whether the plaintiff will ultimately prevail, but whether the claimant is entitled to offer evidence to support its claim. Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974), overruled on other grounds, Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. 183 (1984).
Because the plaintiff appears pro se, the court must also review the pleadings with additional considerations. A pro se litigant's pleadings are construed liberally. Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991). The court is to determine whether the plaintiff's complaint can reasonably read to state a valid claim "despite the plaintiff's failure to cite proper legal authority, his confusion of various legal theories, his poor syntax and sentence construction, or his unfamiliarity with pleading requirements." Id. However, the court is not to assume the role of advocate for the pro se litigant. Id.
III. DISCUSSION
A. Claims for Relief from State Court Judgments 1. Rooker-Feldman Doctrine
Plaintiff requests that this court set aside the proceedings in Brown County case numbers 00-D-03 and 00-D-22, set aside the PFA order, and declare the Kansas Protection from Abuse Act unconstitutional. Defendants argue that because case number 00-D-22 has been dismissed, plaintiff's argument to set aside this case is moot. The court agrees and finds plaintiff's argument to set aside case number 00-D-22 is moot. Defendants argue plaintiff's remaining requests for relief are prohibited by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.
The Rooker-Feldman doctrine provides that federal district courts can exercise only original jurisdiction and lack appellate jurisdiction to review state court decisions reached in state judicial proceedings. Mounkes v. Conklin, 922 F. Supp. 1501, 1508 (D.Kan. 1996) (citing District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 476 (1983) and Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 415-16 (1923)). The Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars "a party losing in state court . . . from seeking what in substance would be appellate review of the state judgment in a United States district court, based on the losing party's claim that the state judgment itself violates the loser's federal rights." Kiowa Indian Tribe of Oklahoma v. Hoover, 150 F.3d 1163, 1169 (10th Cir. 1998) (citing Johnson v. De Grandy, 512 U.S. 997, 1005-06 (1994)). The reach of this doctrine is substantial. It is not limited to the decisions from the state's highest court. Dubinka v. Judges of Superior Court, 23 F.3d 218, 221 (9th Cir. 1994). It applies to state court decisions whether final or interlocutory. Gentner v. Shulman, 55 F.3d 87, 89 (2d Cir. 1995). It also applies to bar not only those claims which were actually decided by a state court but also those claims which are "inextricably intertwined" with the claims which were decided. Mounkes, 922 F. Supp. at 1509.
The Rooker-Feldman doctrine prohibits this court from granting plaintiff's requests. Case number 00-D-03 is final, and the final order in that case was appealable. Plaintiff had standing to challenge the merits of the state court decision and to raise the constitutional issues raised in plaintiff's complaint. Plaintiff requests that this court serve as an appellate court to review the state court judgment. Under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, this court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to grant the requested relief. Plaintiff's only remedy, to the extent such remedy exists, is to seek review of the state court decision through the Kansas appellate courts.
Because this court lacks jurisdiction to grant plaintiff's requested relief under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, plaintiff's requests for relief are denied and plaintiff's claims dismissed.
2. Younger Abstention Doctrine
Even if the court determined the constitutional issues raised by plaintiff were not barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, this court would deny plaintiff's request under the Younger abstention doctrine. In Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), the Supreme Court held that federal courts are not to enjoin pending state court criminal proceedings except in certain, narrow circumstances. 401 U.S. at 45. The Supreme Court later extended the Younger abstention doctrine to actions for declaratory judgment on the constitutionality of state law, Samuels v. Mackell, 401 U.S. 66, 72 (1971), and state civil proceedings, Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592 (1975). Younger abstention is appropriate when (1) there are ongoing state judicial proceedings, (2) the proceedings implicate important state interests, and (3) there is an adequate opportunity in the state proceedings to raise federal questions. Mounkes, 922 F. Supp. at 1511.
The first requirement is met if the state court case is considered pending as of the time the federal complaint was filed. Id. Case number 00-D-03 had an active PFA order at the time the complaint was filed in federal court. This order may be modified at any time, rendering the state case a pending action. Therefore, the first requirement is met. The second requirement is that an important state interest is involved. Family relations are traditionally an area of state concern. Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S. 415, 435 (1979). A PFA order requires the state court to determine important domestic relations issues, specifically whether a parent and child should be protected from the alleged abuse of the other parent. Therefore, the second requirement is met. Finally, the state court must be competent to determine federal constitutional questions. Plaintiff could certainly have raised his constitutional claims attacking the PFA order in state court. "Except in the most extraordinary cases, a federal court must presume that state courts, consistent with the imperatives of the Supremacy Clause . . . are fully competent to adjudicate federal constitutional and statutory claims properly presented by the parties." Phelps v. Hamilton, 840 F. Supp. 1442, 1451 (D.Kan. 1993) (citing Casa Marie, Inc. v. Superior Court of Puerto Rico, 988 F.2d 252, 262 (1st Cir. 1993), reversed in part on other grounds, 122 F.3d 1309 (10th Cir. 1997)). The court finds the state court was competent to address plaintiff's constitutional claims. Thus, the third requirement is met.
Because the three requirements for Younger abstention are present, the court declines to exercise jurisdiction and plaintiff's claims are dismissed.
B. Claims against Judge Patton
Plaintiff requests that this court order Judge Patton to pay monetary damages for his role in Brown County case numbers 00-D-03 and 00-D-22. Judge Patton argues he is immune from suit.
It is well-established that judges are absolutely immune from civil damages liability for acts performed in their judicial capacities. Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356-57 (1978); Hunt v. Bennett, 17 F.3d 1263, 1266 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 832 (1994). Judicial immunity extends to judicial acts done in error, maliciously, or in excess of authority. Stump, 435 U.S. at 356. A judge is subject to liability only for those judicial acts taken in the clear absence of all jurisdiction. Id.
To determine whether the conduct qualifies as a judicial act, the court looks to two factors: whether the act is a function normally performed by a judge and whether the parties dealt with the judge in the judge's judicial capacity. Id. at 362. Both factors are present here. The defendant's acts that plaintiff alleges violated his constitutional rights are acts normally performed by a judge during a judicial proceeding, i.e., processing and deciding the protective order and divorce. The plaintiff exclusively dealt with Judge Patton in his judicial capacity. The plaintiff does not present any facts to demonstrate that Judge Patton lacked jurisdiction over case numbers 00-D-03 and 00-D-22.
"[J]udicial immunity is an immunity from suit, not just from ultimate assessment of damages." Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11-12 (1991) (citations omitted). The court finds defendant Judge Patton is entitled to judicial immunity on the plaintiff's civil damages suit. Therefore, plaintiff's claims against Judge Patton are dismissed.
B. Claims Against Brown County Attorney
Plaintiff requests that this court order the Brown County Attorney, Kevin Hill, to pay monetary damages for his role in Brown County case numbers 00-D-03 and 00-D-22. Specifically, plaintiff claims Hill conspired to violate his due process rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Hill argues he is entitled to qualified immunity and plaintiff has failed to plead with specificity his claims. Hill further argues he is entitled to summary judgement because there is no evidence that he had a role in the civil cases, that he had a duty to participate in the civil cases, and even if there was such a duty, he is entitled to prosecutorial immunity.
When a defendant asserts the qualified immunity defense, the plaintiff is held to a heightened standard of pleading. Breidenbach v. Bolish, 126 F.3d 1288, 1292 (10th Cir. 1997). "The plaintiff initially bears a heavy two-part burden." Albright v. Rodriquez, 51 F.3d 1531, 1534 (10th Cir. 1995). "[P]laintiff must articulate the clearly established constitutional right and the defendant's conduct which violated the right with specificity." Id. at 1535 (quoting Romero v. Fay, 45 F.3d 1472, 1475 (10th Cir. 1995)). To survive a motion to dismiss, the plaintiff must do more than assert bare allegations of a constitutional violation. Breidenbach, 126 F.3d at 1293. The complaint must include all the factual allegations necessary to sustain a conclusion that the defendant violated clearly established federal law. Id.
Plaintiff alleges that Hill interfered or set up plaintiff so plaintiff would not receive notice of the PFA hearing. Plaintiff's allegation constitutes a violation of a clearly established constitutional right. However, plaintiff does not allege any facts to support his allegation that Hill committed a constitutional violation, due process or otherwise. Plaintiff's claims against Hill are based upon Hill having some involvement in Brown County case numbers 00-D-03 and 00-D-22. It appears from the complaint that plaintiff believes that the Brown County Attorney is employed by the District Court of Brown County. Plaintiff concludes that because Hill is employed by the court, he must have been involved in the two cases. However, plaintiff does not establish a factual basis that Hill participated in the two cases. There is no allegation that Hill entered his appearance or signed any documents in the cases. Plaintiff does not establish a factual basis of agreement between Hill and any one else to deny plaintiff's constitutional rights.
There is also no factual basis to find that Hill had a duty to participate in the cases. Even if Hill did have a duty, state prosecutors are entitled to qualified immunity for investigative functions, Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 274 (1993), and absolute immunity for activities "intimately associated with the judicial process," Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 430 (1976). Therefore, Hill's decisions regarding his participation in the case would be entitled to immunity.
Plaintiff's allegation that Hill committed a constitutional violation is conclusory with no foundation in specific facts. The court "cannot subject a government official to discovery based on a complaint which is supported only by conclusory allegations and speculation of a constitutional violation." Breidenbach, 126 F.3d at 1293. Therefore, the claims against Brown County Attorney Kevin Hill are dismissed.
IV. CONCLUSION
The court finds it proper to dismiss plaintiff's claims for the grounds stated above. Defendants raise additional arguments in support of their motions to dismiss which also appear to have merit. However, the court need not address these arguments as the court finds the above grounds are sufficient to dismiss this case. Plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted in federal court district court. The court understands the frustration plaintiff has experienced, as relayed by the plaintiff in the complaint and the many letters plaintiff has written to the court. However, the federal district court is not able to provide relief for the alleged constitutional violations. The proper forum to address the issues raised by plaintiff is state court.
Defendants raise the following arguments: failure to meet the conspiracy pleading requirements, Eleventh Amendment immunity, federal anti-injunction statute, and frivolous action under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
IT IS THEREFORE BY THE COURT ORDERED that defendant Brown County District Judge James A. Patton's Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 14) and defendant Brown County Attorney Kevin Hill's Motion to Dismiss, or Alternatively, Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 30) are granted.
This case is dismissed with prejudice.