Opinion
Case No. EDCV00-00914 — VAP (SGLx).
February 8, 2001.
ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS TO DISMISS
The Court has received and considered all papers filed in support of, and in opposition to, the Motions to Dismiss filed by Defendants Willie Williams, Richard Perez, Anthony Manente, City of Los Angeles and Daryl Gates. The Motion filed by Defendants Willie Williams, Richard Perez, Anthony Manente and the City of Los Angeles was originally noticed for hearing on January 22, 2001. The Motion filed by Defendant Daryl Gates was originally noticed for hearing on February 12, 2001. The Motions are appropriate for resolution without oral argument. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 78; Local Rule 7.11. For the reasons set forth below, the Motions are GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.
I. Background
The Court, in assessing the merits of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, must accept as true all material allegations in the complaint, as well as reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom. NL Indus., Inc. v. Kaplan, 792 F.2d 896, 898 (9th Cir. 1986). The following facts are assumed to be true for purposes of deciding Defendants' motions.
On May 31, 1996, Defendants, Officers of Los Angeles Police Department ("LAPD"), entered and searched the residence of the minor Plaintiff and his parents in North Hollywood. [See Plaintiff's Complaint ("Compl.") at 4.] Defendants procured a search warrant not based on probable cause, illegally arrested and obtained a confession from Plaintiff's father, and caused "baseless" charges to be filed against him, resulting in a wrongful conviction. [Compl. at 5-6.] Plaintiff's father was released from prison in November, 1998. [Compl. at 5]
As a result of his father's two-year incarceration, Plaintiff was "deprived of the familial right of the companionship, comfort, and benefit of having his father with him and live with him." [Compl. at 5.]
Although Plaintiff does not allege the precise length of his father's incarceration, his father was arrested in September, 1996, and was released from prison in November, 1998. [See Compl. at 4-5.]
Plaintiff alleges Defendants conspired to and did violate his Fourteenth Amendment rights for interference with familial relations (counts one and two) and violated his father's Fourth Amendment rights (counts three and four). Plaintiff also seeks Monell damages (count five). [Compl. at 6-8.]
II. Proceedings
Plaintiff filed his Complaint on October 30, 2000. On December 26, 2000, Defendants Willie Williams, Richard Perez, Anthony Manente, and the City of Los Angeles filed a Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim Upon Which Relief May be Granted. On January 16, 2001, Defendant Daryl Gates filed a Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim Upon Which Relief May be Granted. Plaintiff filed Opposition to the first Motion on January 9, 2001 and to the second Motion on January 26, 2001. Defendants Williams, Perez, Manente and the City of Los Angeles filed a Reply on January 12, 2000. As the Motions to Dismiss are identical, one discussion suffices for both.
This case is related to EDCV 00-483, Elwell v. Gates.
On January 19, 2001 Defendant David Nila filed a Notice of Joinder in Defendants' Motion to Dismiss. On January 19, 2001 Mr. Nila filed a Notice of Joinder in Defendant Gates' Motion to Dismiss. A notice of joinder has the limited purpose of joining a defendant in an existing motion to dismiss, which only seeks the dismissal of the named moving Defendants.
III. Discussion
A. Legal Standard
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) permits dismissal where there is either a "lack of a cognizable legal theory" or "the absence of sufficient facts alleged under a cognizable legal theory." Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep't., 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990). Nevertheless, "nothing in rule 12(b)(6) confines its sweep to claims which are obviously insupportable;" rather, if it is clear that no relief could be granted under any set of facts that could be proven consistent with the allegations at hand, "a claim must be dismissed without regard to whether it is based on an outlandish legal theory or on a close but ultimately unavailing one." Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 326, 109 S.Ct. 1827, 1832, 104 L.Ed.2d 338 (1989).
B. Plaintiff's Substantive Due Process Claim
Defendants first argue Plaintiff cannot state a substantive due process loss of familial rights claim because his father was temporarily incarcerated, and such a claim only applies to instances of death of a parent. [Defendants' Motion to Dismiss ("Defs.' Mot. to Dismiss") at 2; Defendant Gates' Motion to Dismiss ("Gates' Mot. to Dismiss") at 2.)
Whether a particular interference with a liberty interest constitutes a due process violation depends on whet-her the interference was "for purposes of oppression," rather than for the purpose of furthering legitimate state interests. Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 106 S.Ct. 662, 88 L.Ed.2d 662 (1986).
In Smith v. City of Fontana, 818 F.2d 1411 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 935, 108 S.Ct. 311, 98 L.Ed.2d 269 (1987), overruled on other grounds by Hodgers-Durgin v. De La Vina, 199 F.3d 1037 (9th Cir. 1999), the Ninth Circuit addressed the issue of whether or not to extend the constitutional protection afforded parents for the loss of a child, to children for the loss of a parent. Prior to Smith, the court held that "a parent has a constitutionally protected liberty interest in the companionship and society of his or her child." 818 F.2d at 1417 (quotingKelson v. City of Springfield, 767 F.2d 651 (9th Cir. 1985) (holding parents who alleged school officials negligently allowed their son to commit suicide could maintain a section 1983 action to vindicate their fundamental parental rights guaranteed by the Ninth Amendment and their right to association with their son guaranteed by the First Amendment)).
In Smith, the Ninth Circuit noted that after Kelson, the Supreme Court in Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 106 S.Ct. 662, 663, 88 L.Ed.2d 662 (1986), ruled that the Due Process Clause "is not implicated by a negligent act of an official causing unintended loss of or injury to life, liberty or property." Smith, 818 F.2d at 1418. While Daniels overrules Kelson's holding that a section 1983 claim can be based on negligence, Kelson's holding that parents have a constitutionally protected liberty interest in their continued association with their children is still good law. Smith, 818 F.2d at 1418.
The court found the child in Smith did have a constitutionally protected liberty interest in the companionship and nurturing interest of his parent. 818 F.2d at 1418. ("We now hold that this constitutional interest in familial companionship and society logically extends to protect children from unwarranted state interference with their relationships with their parents. The companionship and nurturing interests of parent and child in maintaining a tight familial bond are reciprocal, and we see no reason to accord less constitutional value to the child-parent relationship than we accord to the parent-child relationship."). See Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 619-20, 104 S. Ct. 3244, 3250, 82 L.Ed.2d 462 (1984) ("Family relationships, by their nature, involve deep attachments and commitments to the necessarily few other individuals with whom one shares not only a special community of thoughts, experiences, and beliefs but also distinctively personal aspects of one's life.")
Defendants contend that due process protection requires such a permanent interference with a family relationship, and as Plaintiff's father was only "temporarily incarcerated," Plaintiff cannot be afforded such protection. [Defs.' Mot. to Dismiss at 2; Gates' Mot. to Dismiss at 2.]
Ovando v. City of Los Angeles, 92 F. Supp.2d 1011 (C.D. Cal. 2000) involved similar facts. There, defendants argued that the plaintiff, the daughter of a man beaten and-arrested by two police officers, could not be awarded due process protection because her father only was incarcerated temporarily. Id.
Defense Counsel's dismissive reference to this relevant, persuasive, and published (even if not controlling) authority disappoints the Court.
The court disagreed, explaining that Smith held that the liberty interest protected by the Fourteenth Amendment is the right to be free from state interference with the companionship and society of one's parent. Ovando, 92 F. Supp. 2d at 1018 (citing Smith, 818 F.2d at 1419). The Smith court did not indicate or suggest that "a deprivation of a duration shorter than the entirety of the child's life was not a `deprivation' cognizable under Section 1983." Ovando, 92 F. Supp. 2d at 1018. See also Morrison v. Jones, 607 F.2d 1269, 1276 (9th Cir. 1979) (recognizing mother's substantive familial right had been violated when her son was deported to Germany).
Similarly, this Court is unpersuaded that it must distinguish between a permanent deprivation and deprivation that was, for Plaintiff, a complete deprivation of the companionship and society of his father for the two-year term of his father's incarceration.
Defendants cite several cases in support of their contention. All are distinguishable. See Moreland v. Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Dept., 159 F.3d 365 (9th Cir. 1998) (refusing protection of substantive due process clause because defendants did not act with intent to cause harm);Claybrook v. Birchwell, 199 F.3d 350 (6th Cir. 2000) (holding plaintiff could not state due process claim because Defendants did not act maliciously or sadistically when they shot into her car not knowing she was inside). Although Defendants claim this case does not involve a deliberate deprivation, Plaintiff alleges Defendants acted with "deliberate indifference . . . and with evil motive and! or intent." [Compl. at 3.] Whether or not Defendants' conduct was intentional cannot be determined on a motion to dismiss.
Accordingly, Defendants' Motions to Dismiss Plaintiff's first and second claims for conspiracy to violate, and violation of, his Fourteenth Amendment rights are denied.
C. Plaintiff lacks standing to assert his father's Fourth Amendment rights.
Plaintiff alleges Defendants provided false and misleading information upon which his father's search warrant and arrest warrant were based. [Compl. at 7.]
Plaintiff was not unlawfully searched and arrested; rather, he claims his father was. [See Compl.] Plaintiff, however, lacks standing to assert his father's Fourth Amendment rights. Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 88 S.Ct. 967, 19 L.Ed.2d 1247 (1968); Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 174, 89 S. Ct. 961, 22 L.Ed. 2d 176 (1969) ("Fourth Amendment rights are personal rights which, like some other constitutional rights, may not be vicariously asserted.").
Accordingly, Plaintiff's Fourth Amendment claim is dismissed without leave to amend. Schreiber Dist. Serv-Well Furniture Co., 806 F.2d 1393, 1401 (9th Cir. 1986) ("If a complaint is dismissed for failure to state a claim, leave to amend should be granted unless the court determines that the allegation of other facts consistent with the challenged pleading could not possibly cure the deficiency.").
D. Plaintiff's Monell claim stands as Plaintiff alleges a constitutional violation.
As Plaintiff's substantive due process claim stands, Plaintiff can state a Monell claim against the City of Los Angeles. City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 109 S.Ct. 1997, 103 L.Ed.2d 412 (1989) (setting forth the requirements for a Monell claim: (1) violation of constitutional rights; (2) existence of municipal policy or custom; and (3) a causal nexus between (1) and (2)); City of Los Angeles v. Heller, 475 U.S. 796, 106 S.Ct. 1571, 89 L.Ed. 2d 806 (1986) ("If a person has suffered no constitutional injury at the hands of the individual police officer, the fact that the departmental regulations might have authorized the use of constitutionally excessive force is quite beside the point.").
Accordingly, Plaintiff's Monell claim stands.
IV. Conclusion
Defendants have not established that Plaintiff cannot state a claim for substantive due process protection and Monell damages. Defendants, however, have shown that Plaintiff cannot state a claim for violation of his father's constitutional rights. Accordingly, Plaintiff's first, second, and fifth claims remain, and his third and fourth claims are dismissed without leave to amend.
IT IS SO ORDERED.