r] transferring ... an estate or interest in real property must be construed according to the intent of the parties, so far as such intent can be gathered from the whole instrument, and is consistent with the rules of law" ( Real Property Law § 240[3] ; seeCannon v. Hampton, 198 A.D.3d 1230, 1231, 157 N.Y.S.3d 162 [2021] ; Margetin v. Jewett, 78 A.D.3d 1486, 1488, 912 N.Y.S.2d 356 [2010] ). The construction of a deed is generally a question of law for the courts to decide (seeLewis v. Young, 92 N.Y.2d 443, 449, 682 N.Y.S.2d 657, 705 N.E.2d 649 [1998] ; Jankoski v. Lake Forest Acres Homeowners, Inc., 107 A.D.3d 1367, 1368, 968 N.Y.S.2d 240 [2013] ; Hush v. Taylor, 84 A.D.3d 1532, 1533, 923 N.Y.S.2d 284 [2011] ), and, "[i]n construing [a] deed, all other deeds to which it refers, and which refer to each other[,] are required to be considered" ( Riegel v. Larnard, 178 App.Div. 355, 356, 164 N.Y.S. 763 [1917] ; seeLoch Sheldrake Assoc. v. Evans, 306 N.Y. 297, 305, 118 N.E.2d 444 [1954] ; Elm Lansing Realty Corp. v. Knapp, 192 A.D.3d 1348, 1350, 145 N.Y.S.3d 160 [2021] ; Finster Inc. v. Albin, 152 A.D.3d 922, 924–925, 58 N.Y.S.3d 745 [2017] ). Defendants’ 1994 and 1999 deeds provide that the conveyances were "subject to a footpath as it now stands and is now used for purpose of ingress and egress to lands now or formerly of George Bourgeois," as well as "any and all covenants, conditions, restrictions, easements and agreements of record, if any, contained in the chain of title affecting [the] premises."
The easement agreement refers to the easement as "permanent" and includes express references to "heirs and assigns" (see Webster v Ragona, 7 A.D.3d 850, 853-854 [3d Dept 2004]). Accordingly, given that the term "motor vehicle" is not ambiguous in the context presented, and that no evidence exists that this broad term was intended to apply in a more specific manner, the Court considers the resolution of the meaning of "motor vehicle" as a question of law, which may be decided on these motions for summary judgment (see Acosta v Vincenti, 185 A.D.3d 763, 765 [2d Dept 2020]; Spencer v Connolly. 25 A.D.3d 832, 833-834 [3d Dept 2006]; see also Elm Lansing Realty Corp, v Knapp, 192 A.D.3d 1348, 1348-1352 [3d Dept 2021]; Goldman v Emerald Green Prop, Owners Assn., Inc., 116 A.D.3d 1279, 1280-1281 [3d Dept 2014]; compare Gangl v Cutia, 70 A.D.2d 969 [3d Dept 1979]).
The construction of a deed is generally a question of law for the courts to decide (see Lewis v Young, 92 N.Y.2d 443, 449 [1998]; Jankoski v Lake Forest Acres Homeowners, Inc., 107 A.D.3d 1367, 1368 [2013]; Hush v Taylor, 84 A.D.3d 1532, 1533 [2011]), and, "[i]n construing [a] deed, all other deeds to which it refers, and which refer to each other[, ] are required to be considered" (Riegel v Larnard, 178 A.D. 355, 356 [1917]; see Loch Sheldrake Assoc. v Evans, 306 NY 297, 305 [1954]; Elm Lansing Realty Corp. v Knapp, 192 A.D.3d 1348, 1350 [2021]; Finster Inc. v Albin, 152 A.D.3d 922, 924-925 [2017]). Defendants' 1994 and 1999 deeds provide that the conveyances were "subject to a footpath as it now stands and is now used for purpose of ingress and egress to lands now or formerly of George Bourgeois," as well as "any and all covenants, conditions, restrictions, easements and agreements of record, if any, contained in the chain of title affecting [the] premises."