Bivins v. Hosp. Corp. of Am. , 910 S.W.2d 441, 447 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1995) (citing 7 C.J.S. Attorney and Client § 31, p. 869, n. 13). The case of the Elm Children's Educ. Tr. v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. , 468 S.W.3d 529 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2014), illustrates this point. In Elm , a notice of appeal was purportedly filed on behalf of the plaintiff trust.
We also dismiss this appeal on the same ground because the trustee signed the notice of appeal on behalf of the trust, and a non-attorney may not represent a trust in our Tennessee courts. See ELM Children's Educational Trust v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 468 S.W.3d 529, 530 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2014); see also Tenn. R. Civ. P. 11 and Old Hickory Eng'g & Machine Co, Inc. v. Henry, 937 S.W.2d 782, 786 (Tenn. 1996). Accordingly, this appeal is dismissed.
Elm Children's Educ. Tr. v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 468 S.W.3d 529, 533 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2014).
"[T]he purpose of the statutory prohibition against the unauthorized practice of law protects the public by ensuring that the public receives high quality legal services." Fifteenth Judicial Dist. Unified Bar Ass'n v. Glasgow, No. M1996-00020-COA-R3-CV, 1999 WL 1128847, at *6 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 10, 1999) (citing In re Petition of Burson, 909 S.W.2d at 776-77; Haverty Furniture Co. v. Foust, 174 Tenn. 203, 210, 124 S.W.2d 694, 697 (1939)); see also Elm Children's Educ. Trust v. Wells Fargo Bank, 468 S.W.3d 529, 532 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2014) ("The purpose of our statutes regulating the practice of law is to prevent the public's being preyed upon by those who, for valuable consideration, seek to perform services which require skill, training and character, without adequate qualifications.") (citations omitted).
Id. at 553 (explaining that, "[w]hile Rule 17.03 allows a parent to ‘sue’ on behalf of a minor child, the rule does not authorize a parent to practice law while acting on behalf of the child"). Similarly, a non-attorney president of a corporation cannot file a lawsuit on behalf of the corporation; corporations are artificial entities, so for the president of a corporation to sign a complaint purely as the corporation's legal representative constitutes the unauthorized practice of law. Old Hickory , 937 S.W.2d at 786 ("[A] corporation cannot act pro se in a court proceeding nor can it be represented by an officer or other non-lawyer agent."); seeELM Children's Educ. Trust v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. , 468 S.W.3d 529, 533 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2014) (holding that a non-attorney trustee's signature on a notice of appeal was insufficient to confer appellate jurisdiction because "[a] trustee and a trust ... are two separate entities" that "are not interchangeable"). But seeBass v. Leatherwood , 788 F.3d 228, 230 (6th Cir. 2015) (holding that, under federal law, a non-attorney beneficiary of an estate may represent the estate pro se if he is the sole beneficiary and the estate has no creditors).
Furthermore, looking outside of Iowa, many other states prohibit nonlawyer trustees from representing a trust in civil actions-relying on the same corporate-representation principles adopted in Hawkeye. See, e.g., Elm Child.'s Edu. Tr. v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 468 S.W.3d 529, 533 (Tenn.App. 2014) (explaining "a non-attorney trustee may not represent a trust in our Tennessee courts" because "a situation wherein a non-attorney trustee is attempting to represent a trust in court is analogous to a situation wherein a non-attorney corporate officer or shareholder is attempting to represent a corporation in court"); Bluel v. Nigg, 528 P.3d 461, 462 (Alaska 2023) ("A non-lawyer trustee for an express trust may not provide legal representation to the trust, which is a distinct legal person."); Ziegler v. Nickel, 64 Cal.App.4th 545, 549 (Cal.Ct.App. 1998) ("A non-attorney trustee who represents the trust in court is representing and affecting the interests of the beneficiary and is thus engaged in the unauthorized practice of law.")
However, as Mr. Grose admits, he is not an attorney licensed to practice law in the State of Tennessee; therefore, he cannot appear or file pleadings on behalf of the other plaintiffs. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 23-3-103 (2021) ("No person shall engage in the practice of law ... unless the person has been duly licensed and while the person's license is in full force and effect[.]"); Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 7, § 1.01 (prohibiting the unauthorized practice of law); Elm Children's Educ. Tr. v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 468 S.W.3d 529, 533 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2014) (holding that a non-attorney trustee could not represent the trust in court). As this Court has previously explained:
To be sure, "our Supreme Court has addressed the issue of whether a non-attorney may represent a corporation in court and has held that a non-attorney may not represent a corporation in our Tennessee courts." Elm Children's Educ. Tr. v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 468 S.W.3d 529, 532 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2014) (citing Old Hickory Eng'g & Machine Co. v. Henry, 937 S.W.2d 782 (Tenn.1996)).
As a threshold matter, we note that Mr. Grose has averred in his appellate brief that he is acting on behalf of all Plaintiffs and that he purported to sign the brief as a representative of his siblings. However, as Mr. Grose admits, he is not an attorney licensed to practice law in the State of Tennessee; therefore, he cannot appear or file pleadings on behalf of the other plaintiffs. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 23-3-103 (2021) ("No person shall engage in the practice of law . . . unless the person has been duly licensed and while the person's license is in full force and effect[.]"); Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 7, § 1.01 (prohibiting the unauthorized practice of law); Elm Children's Educ. Tr. v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 468 S.W.3d 529, 533 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2014) (holding that a non-attorney trustee could not represent the trust in court). As this Court has previously explained:
Their cases offer persuasive authority that non-lawyer trustees lack standing to raise a claim on a trust's behalf. See, e.g., Application for Water Rights of Town of Minturn , 359 P.3d 29, 32 (Colo. 2015) ; Mayer v. Lindenwood Female College , 453 S.W.3d 307, 315 (Mo. App. 2014) ; Elm Children's Educational Trust v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. , 468 S.W.3d 529, 533 (Tenn. App. 2014). Cf. J.J. Rissell, Allentown, PA Trust v. Marchelos , 976 F.3d 1233, 1236 (11th Cir. 2020) ("When an appeal is taken on behalf of an artificial entity by someone without legal authority to do so, the appeal should be dismissed.").