Opinion
No. 05-03-00767-CR
Opinion issued November 26, 2003. DO NOT PUBLISH. Tex.R.App.P. 47.
On Appeal from the 219th Judicial District Court, Collin County, Texas, Trial Court Cause No. 219-81541-02.
Before Justices WHITTINGTON, JAMES, and O'NEILL.
OPINION
A jury convicted David Lynn Ellison of evading arrest or detention while using a vehicle. See Tex. Pen. Code Ann. § 38.04 (Vernon 2003). During the punishment phase, appellant pleaded true to one enhancement paragraph. The trial court found the enhancement paragraph true and sentenced appellant to four years' confinement. In a single point of error, appellant contends he did not receive effective assistance of counsel. We affirm the trial court's judgment. To prevail on his claim, appellant must show counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, and there is a reasonable probability the results of the proceedings would have been different in the absence of counsel's errors. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88, 694 (1984); Bone v. State, 77 S.W.3d 828, 833 (Tex.Crim. App. 2002). Appellant has the burden of proving ineffective assistance of counsel by a preponderance of the evidence. See Thompson v. State, 9 S.W.3d 808, 813 (Tex.Crim.App. 1999). When faced with a silent record as to defense counsel's strategy, the court will not speculate as to counsel's tactics or reasons for taking or not taking certain actions. See Jackson v. State, 877 S.W.2d 768, 771 (Tex.Crim.App. 1994). Without evidence of the strategy and methods involved concerning counsel's actions at trial, the court will presume sound trial strategy. See Thompson, 9 S.W.3d at 814. Appellant argues counsel was ineffective for failing to file a plea to the trial court's jurisdiction because there was no order transferring his case from the 380th Judicial District Court, where the indictment was returned, to the 219th Judicial District Court, where the judgment was rendered. Appellant argues that but for counsel's unprofessional error, the result of the trial would have been different. The State responds counsel could not have been deficient for failing to make an objection that had no basis, and appellant fails to show how he was harmed by counsel's alleged failures. We agree with the State. The judge of a district court in a county with two or more district courts may, in his discretion, transfer any criminal proceedings on his docket to the docket of one of the other district courts. See Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 24.303(a) (Vernon 1988); see also Gregory v. State, 495 S.W.2d 891, 892 (Tex.Crim. App. 1973). The fact that no transfer order is contained in the record does not render the actions of the transferee court void, but merely makes them subject to a valid and timely plea to the court's jurisdiction. See Sharkey v. State, 994 S.W.2d 417, 419 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1999, no pet.). If a defendant does not file a timely plea to the jurisdiction, he waives any right to complain that a transfer order does not appear in the record. See id. at 419. Here, the record shows the indictment was returned in the 380th Judicial District Court, but the cause was set on the docket for disposition in the 219th Judicial District Court. There is no transfer order contained in the record. Although counsel did not file a plea to the trial court's jurisdiction, nothing in the record shows the trial would not have proceeded in the 219th Judicial District Court had an objection been made, nor does the record reflect appellant objected to proceeding in the 219th Judicial District Court. Likewise, nothing in the record shows appellant would not have been convicted by the jury and sentenced by the trial court had counsel complained about the lack of a transfer order. Other than his bare statements, appellant has not shown the results of the proceeding would have been different had counsel objected about the absence of a transfer order. Thus, we conclude appellant has not met his burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that counsel was ineffective. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-88; Thompson, 9 S.W.3d at 813. Accordingly, we overrule appellant's sole point of error. We affirm the trial court's judgment.