Opinion
November 18, 1940.
1. — Old Age Assistance — Social Security — Paupers — Courts — Jurisdiction. Where after appeal to circuit court had been perfected from decree and order of Social Security Commission denying claimant old age assistance, commission restored claimant to roll and fixed amount of award at $1 per month such action of Commission in resuming jurisdiction pending appeal is ultra vires and presented nothing for review by circuit court.
2. — Old Age Assistance — Social Security — Paupers — Court. Under statute authorizing review by circuit court of action of Social Security Commission denying to claimant old age assistance on appeal circuit court was without jurisdiction to enter an order fixing any designated amount to be paid claimant and such order was void.
3. — Old Age Assistance — Social Security — Paupers — Courts. On appeal by claimant for old age assistance from order of Social Security Commission denying claim under statute only question within jurisdiction of circuit court was whether order denying claimant's application was the result of a fair hearing and determination of applicant's eligibility and rights under statute, or was the decision arbitrary and unreasonable.
Appeal from Linn Circuit Court. — Hon. Paul Van Osdol, Judge.
AFFIRMED IN PART AND REVERSED IN PART.
Hon. Roy McKittrick, Attorney-General, and Hon. Aubrey R. Hammett, Jr., Assistant Attorney-General, for appellant.
(1) It is a fundamental rule of construction that the courts in construing statutory provisions shall determine the intention of the General Assembly and if possible, give that provision such construction. State ex rel. City of St. Louis v. Mo. Pac. Ry. Co., 262 Mo. 720, 174 S.W. 73; State ex rel. Wabash Ry. Co., 106 S.W.2d 898; State ex rel. Jacobsmeyer v. Thatcher, 338 Mo. 622, 92 S.W.2d 640. (2) The Legislature may restrict the circuit court on appeal when the right of appeal is purely a statutory right, and in the absence of same there is no appeal. Western Tie Timber Co. v. Naylor Drainage Dist. No. 1, 126 S.W. 499, 505; Lucitt v. Toohey's Estate, 89 S.W.2d 662, 664; Magee v. Mercantile-Commerce Bank Trust Co., 98 S.W.2d 615. (3) Under section 16, page 475, Laws of 1937, the lower court on appeal has no jurisdiction to determine and fix the amount of monthly grant any recipient shall receive. State v. Hughes, 128 S.W.2d 671, 673; Maude Gibbons Gavin v. State Social Security Comm. of Mo., 129 S.W.2d 1051, 1053; Section 16, page 736, Laws of 1939; Borreson v. Department of Public Welfare, 14 N.E.2d 485; In Re Opinion of Judges (Supreme Court of New Hampshire), 85 N.H. 562, 154 A. 217.
A.L. Burns for respondent.
No brief.
This is an appeal from the action of the circuit court in reversing and remanding decree and order made by the Social Security Commission of Missouri.
The decree and order of the Commission in matter of claimant herein is as follows:
"That the claimant does not come within the purview of the statute, as he has adequate means of support, income, or other resources to provide a reasonable subsistence compatible with decency and health. Therefore, claimant's application for old age assistance is denied.
"Given at the City of Jefferson, State of Missouri, this 8th day of June, 1938."
Claimant duly appealed to the Circuit Court of Linn County, Missouri, where hearing was had March 4, 1939.
From an incomplete abstract of the record filed in this court, we glean that after claimant had perfected his appeal to the circuit court the Commission took further action and restored claimant to the roll and fixed the amount of award at $1.00 per month.
We further gather from the record before us that the case was reviewed in the circuit court as based upon the decrees and order of the after act of the Commission in placing claimant upon the roll at $1.00 per month.
In this hearing before the circuit court, the court entered its findings, conclusions and judgments wherein it is found that $1.00 per month was inadequate and found that claimant was entitled to be upon the roll and fixed his allowance at $30 per month.
The Commission filed motion to modify said judgment and thereafter said judgment was modified by making the award $12 per month and by awarding judgment in claimant's favor in the sum of $12 from and after the action of his removal to date. From this modified judgment, the Commission appealed.
We conclude that the action of the Commission in resuming jurisdiction pending appeal is ultra vires and presented nothing to be reviewed by the circuit court. We further conclude that any action by the circuit court fixing any designated amount for claimant is ultra vires and any action of the court touching same is coram non judice. However, the circuit court acting within its jurisdiction did reverse the action of the Commission in removing the claimant from the roll.
We have set forth, supra, the decree and order of the Commission that claimant appealed from, and it is clear that the jurisdiction of the circuit court is restricted to one question alone, to-wit: Was or was not the order denying claimant's application the result of a fair hearing and determination of the applicant's eligibility and rights under the act, or was the decision arbitrary and unreasonable?
We gather from the incomplete record before us, that the decision of the circuit court reversed the orders of the Commission on the question, supra. Further, the appellant in its brief says: "This appellant does not contend that the lower court exceeded its jurisdiction in restoring this claimant to the roll."
Social Security questions are yet in a formulative stage. Recent legislative enactments have been passed to meet situations that have been disclosed by opinions by reviewing courts. It is shown that the case at bar was commenced when the rule as expressed in section 16, Laws of 1937, page 475, was the law. However, it is now reviewed under different provisions as expressed in section 16, Laws of 1939, page 736-7.
Confronted with the situation disclosed by showing of record herein, and in consideration of the fact that appellant concedes as to jurisdiction as to restoration to the role, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court in such respect alone and remand the cause to the Commission for redetermination as provided by law. However, as to judgments, orders and decrees made by the circuit court fixing any designated amount claimant shall receive, or as to determination by the circuit court of any matter or matters other than reversal and remanding of the findings and awards, supra, made by the Commission on June 8, 1938, the judgment is reversed.
All concur.