2. We are guided to a decision in this case by the prior case of Ellis v. State, 256 Ga. 751 ( 353 S.E.2d 19) (1987). In Ellis, we held that a pen register is a "device" as defined in OCGA § 16-11-60, the use of which requires a properly issued warrant under state law.

And, an individual can successfully argue for suppression of the product of a Fourth Amendment violation only if that person's rights were violated by the search itself; suppression of the evidence is not available to one who is aggrieved solely by the introduction of damaging evidence because the exclusionary rule is to protect individuals whose Fourth Amendment rights have been violated. Ellis v. State, 256 Ga. 751, 755(2), 353 S.E.2d 19 (1987) (applied Fourth Amendment search principles to determine whether defendant had standing to challenge the electronic surveillance of a co-defendant's telephone). In this case Hampton is arguing that he has a right to suppression under the cited federal and state statutes.

It thus appears that these amendments were intended to streamline Georgia's rules in this area and harmonize them with federal standards. Though we have long recognized that state-authorized wiretaps must comply with both federal and state statutory requirements, see Ellis v. State, 256 Ga. 751(2), 353 S.E.2d 19 (1987) ; Evans v. State, 252 Ga. 312(1), 314 S.E.2d 421 (1984), our current statute's express deference to the federal statute underscores this point. Accordingly, we look to the federal statute and case law for guidance regarding the jurisdictional question presented in this case.

"When the properly admitted evidence to sustain a guilty verdict is overwhelming so as to negate the possibility that the tainted evidence contributed to the verdict, the constitutional error may be harmless." Ellis v. State, 256 Ga. 751, 755 (2) ( 353 S.E.2d 19) (1987). See also Jones, supra.

Similarly, the failure of the judge who issued the warrant in the present case to maintain custody of the originals of the application for the warrant and its supporting documents did not affect the gathering or the safeguarding of evidence. When this court held in Ellis v. State, 256 Ga. 751 (2) ( 353 S.E.2d 19) (1987), that a pen register is a device within the meaning of the Georgia statutes regulating electronic surveillance and that a warrant must issue for the use of a pen register, the chief concern was to protect the citizens of Georgia from invasions of privacy. This court still holds that concern and adheres to the holding in Ellis and the principles behind it.

We require the police to obtain a search warrant and to follow certain procedures before installing a pen register, a device which records the phone numbers of both incoming and outgoing calls. OCGA § 16-11-60; Ellis v. State, 256 Ga. 751 ( 353 S.E.2d 19) (1987). By its decision today, the majority allows a newspaper to obtain, without a warrant, the same information as is gathered by a pen register, and gives any member of the public, under the guise of the Open Records Act, OCGA § 50-18-72 et seq., the ability to conduct an otherwise illegal search.

Moreover, regarding the other assertions by Guimond and Laws concerning why their motions to sever should have been granted, we conclude that they failed to make the showing of clear prejudice that is necessary to warrant a severance. Satterfield v. State, supra, 256 Ga. at 595-597 (3); Ellis v. State, 256 Ga. 751, 755 (3) ( 353 S.E.2d 19) (1987). 4.

HUNT, Justice. We granted certiorari to the Court of Appeals to answer the question: "Whether the convictions of Uhler and Bridges should be reversed in light of Ellis v. State, 256 Ga. 751 ( 353 S.E.2d 19) (1987)." Upon plenary review of this case, however, it appears that the issues involved in Ellis were not raised. No state law challenge to the pen register warrant was raised or ruled upon in the trial court or in the Court of Appeals and no state challenge to the call-forwarding warrant, issued on an oral affidavit, was raised or ruled upon by either court.

Moreover, “[t]he only authority for a motion to suppress is [OCGA § 17–5–30], and under the provisions of that statute a pretrial motion to suppress is available only to the person aggrieved by an unlawful search and seizure.” Ellis v. State, 256 Ga. 751, 755(2), 353 S.E.2d 19 (1987) (citations and punctuation omitted) (applying Fourth Amendment search principles to analyze whether defendant had standing to challenge the electronic surveillance of a co-defendant's telephone). Romano, supra at 819(1)(a), 292 S.E.2d 533 (citation omitted); see Burgeson v. State, 267 Ga. 102, 106(3)(d), 475 S.E.2d 580 (1996) ( “The focus of our state statutes [regulating eavesdropping, surveillance, or the interception of communication, OCGA §§ 16–11–62 through 16–11–67] is to protect persons from invasions of their privacy.”) (emphasis supplied).

Moreover, "[t]he only authority for a motion to suppress is [OCGA § 17-5-30], and under the provisions of that statute a pretrial motion to suppress is available only to the person aggrieved by an unlawful search and seizure."Ellis v. State, 256 Ga. 751, 755 (2) (353 SE2d 19) (1987) (citations and punctuation omitted) (applying Fourth Amendment search principles to analyze whether defendant had standing to challenge the electronic surveillance of a co-defendant's telephone). Romano, supra at 819 (1) (a) (citation omitted); see Burgeson v. State, 267 Ga. 102, 106 (3) (d) (475 SE2d 581) (1996) ("The focus of our state statutes [regulating eavesdropping, surveillance, or the interception of communication, OCGA § 16-11-62 through 16-11-67] is to protect persons from invasions of their privacy.") (emphasis supplied).