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Ellis v. National Railroad Passenger Corporation

United States District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania
Jun 2, 2004
Civil Action No. 02-8059 (E.D. Pa. Jun. 2, 2004)

Opinion

Civil Action No. 02-8059.

June 2, 2004


MEMORANDUM


Presently before the Court is Plaintiff Derek E. Ellis' ("Plaintiff") Motion for a New Trial and Defendant National Railroad Passenger Corporation's ("Amtrak") Opposition thereto. For the reasons set forth below, Plaintiff's motion is denied.

I. BACKGROUND

On or around July 11, 1994, Amtrak hired Plaintiff — an African American — as a Helper. During subsequent times in his employment with Amtrak, Plaintiff held the positions of Signalman Trainee and Signalman. Except for the first sixty days of his employment, Plaintiff was at all times a member of a collective bargaining unit that was covered by a collective bargaining agreement ("CBA") between Amtrak and the Brotherhood of Railroad Signalmen, Local 18 ("Union").

On or around January 15, 2001, Amtrak eliminated approximately twenty Signalman positions when it abolished several work gangs located in the Pennsylvania Coach Yard. Plaintiff was one of the Signalmen who lost his position. Pursuant to the CBA, Signalmen who lost their positions were permitted to bid for vacant positions within their seniority district, bump less senior employees by exercising their displacement rights or transfer to another seniority district. Any employee who failed to obtain a vacant position, bump a less senior employee or transfer to a different district was furloughed. Faced with these options, Plaintiff bumped into other positions, but each time he bumped into a position, he was ultimately bumped out of the position by a more senior employee. Eventually, Plaintiff ran out of bumps, and with no vacant positions available, Plaintiff decided to accept furlough instead of transferring into another seniority district. Plaintiff was furloughed on or around January 22, 2001.

In or around April, 2001, while Plaintiff remained on furlough, a caucasian employee with less seniority — George Dorman — returned from a medical leave of absence and obtained a position within Plaintiff's seniority district. Amtrak claimed that its decision to award a position to Dorman was based on the CBA. Specifically, Amtrak argued that the CBA granted "active" status rights to an employee on a medical leave of absence; therefore, Dorman had greater rights than an inactive employee on furlough.

On or around October 24, 2002, Plaintiff filed the instant action alleging that Amtrak intentionally discriminated against Plaintiff by awarding a position to a less senior white employee before awarding him a position, and that Amtrak's actions violated the CBA. Specifically, Plaintiff alleged the following three causes of action: 1) violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.; 2) violation of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1981; and 3) Violation of the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act, 43 Pa.C.S.A. § 951 et seq.

On April 21, 2004, following a two day trial, a jury returned a verdict in favor of Amtrak. On or around April 28, 2004, Plaintiff filed the instant motion seeking a new trial pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

A court should grant a new trial under Rule 59 to prevent a miscarriage of justice only when the jury's "verdict is contrary to the great weight of the evidence," Roebuck v. Drexel Univ., 852 F.2d 715, 736 (3d Cir. 1988), or when a "court commits an error of law which prejudices a substantial right of a party."Paul Morelli Design, Inc. v. Tiffany and Co., 200 F. Supp.2d 482, 484 (E.D. Pa. 2002). With regard to jury trials, a court should only exercise its discretion to grant a new trial "when the record shows that the jury's verdict resulted in a miscarriage of justice or where the verdict, on the record, cries out to be overturned or shocks our conscience." Williamson v. Consol. Rail Corp., 926 F.2d 1344, 1353 (3d Cir. 1991).

III. DISCUSSION

A. Pennsylvania Human Relations Act Claim

Plaintiff now claims for the first time that the Court — not the jury — should make a decision regarding the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act claim. Specifically, Plaintiff states, "prior to the beginning of the trial, Amtrak requested that the Court should make its own finding of fact and conclusion of law as to Plaintiff's PHRA claim." (Pl.'s Br. at 6.) "Amtrak submitted that, there is no right to a jury trial for Plaintiff's PHRA claim . . ." (Id.)

Plaintiff's argument is without merit. First, this argument was advanced by Amtrak — not Plaintiff — and at the time it was made, Plaintiff objected to it. Secondly, Amtrak ultimately abandoned this position and agreed that the PHRA claim would be decided by the jury, and neither party submitted proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law. Lastly, Plaintiff never advocated his present position until after the jury returned a verdict in Amtrak's favor; therefore, Plaintiff's argument is not timely. Accordingly, the Court will not issue findings of fact and conclusions of law, nor will it grant a new trial based on this issue.

B. Verdict Against Weight of Evidence

Plaintiff baldly states that "a new trial should be ordered as the verdict of the jury is against the clear weight of the evidence . . ." (Pl.'s Br. at 4) Plaintiff, however, does not spend a single paragraph of his brief explaining why or how the verdict was against the weight of the evidence. There is a total absence of support for this argument.

Regardless of Plaintiff's unsupported position, the Court finds that the verdict was not against the weight of the evidence. There was sufficient evidence presented so that a jury could conclude that Amtrak had a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for awarding a position to Dorman before Plaintiff. Based on the evidence presented at trial, it is not a "miscarriage of justice" for the jury to have found that Amtrak interpreted and followed the CBA in making its decision. The Court will not grant a new trial based on Plaintiff's unsupported assertion.

C. Testimony of James York

Lastly, Plaintiff argues that the Court committed "prejudicial error" in permitting certain portions of testimony from Plaintiff's own witness — James York. Mr. York is a Union official who Plaintiff called for the purpose of establishing that Union disagreed with Amtrak's interpretation of the CBA. Plaintiff alleges that Amtrak, in its cross-examination of Mr. York, "went beyond the scope of Plaintiff's direct examination of Mr. York, and initiated a detailed discussion regarding the Union's grievance procedure, what the Union did regarding Plaintiff's grievance, why the grievance was denied and the discussion of an arbitrator's ruling in a totally separate matter . . ." (Pl.'s Br. at 2) Plaintiff claims that this testimony was "highly prejudicial." (Id.)

The Court disagrees with Plaintiff's position because the testimony was relevant to the case. During the course of the trial, Amtrak claimed that it awarded a position to Dorman based on a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason — interpretation of the CBA. In response, Plaintiff claimed that Amtrak's proffered reason was pretext for discrimination. Plaintiff offered Mr. York to show that Union did not agree with Amtrak's interpretation of the CBA and that Amtrak's interpretation was unreasonable.

Additionally, Plaintiff did not object to certain portions of the testimony in a timely fashion. For example, Amtrak questioned York extensively regarding the general grievance process before Plaintiff objected to that line of questioning. (York Testimony at 23-25.)

Mr. York's testimony regarding the grievance process was relevant because it demonstrated that although Union disagreed with Amtrak's interpretation of the CBA, three different managers at Amtrak upheld the decision to award the position to Dorman. The testimony showed that Amtrak interpreted the CBA in a consistent manner and, accordingly, undercut Plaintiff's claim that Amtrak's legitimate reason was pretext for discrimination. Mr. York provided testimony that was important and relevant to Amtrak's case. The fact that it hurt Plaintiff's case does not make it "prejudicial error." Accordingly, the Court will not grant a new trial based on this issue.

Mr. York testified that there are three steps in the grievance process. (York Testimony at 23.) At each step, a different member of Amtrak management reviews the grievance. (Id.)

A plaintiff can prove pretext by showing inconsistencies and contradictions in an employer's proffered legitimate reason.Fuentes v. Perskie, 32 F.3d 759, 765 (3d Cir. 1994).

ORDER

AND NOW, this 2nd day of June, 2004, upon consideration of Plaintiff Derek E. Ellis' Motion for a New Trial (Docket No. 38) and Defendant National Railroad Passenger Corporation's Opposition thereto (Docket No. 41), it is hereby ORDERED that Plaintiff's Motion is DENIED.


Summaries of

Ellis v. National Railroad Passenger Corporation

United States District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania
Jun 2, 2004
Civil Action No. 02-8059 (E.D. Pa. Jun. 2, 2004)
Case details for

Ellis v. National Railroad Passenger Corporation

Case Details

Full title:DEREK E. ELLIS, Plaintiff, v. NATIONAL RAILROAD PASSENGER CORPORATION and…

Court:United States District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania

Date published: Jun 2, 2004

Citations

Civil Action No. 02-8059 (E.D. Pa. Jun. 2, 2004)