Ellis v. Ellis

146 Citing cases

  1. Brooks v. Brooks

    No. W2008-02349-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 24, 2009)   Cited 1 times

    Id. (citing Wade v. Wade, 897 S.W.2d 702, 715 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1994)). Our Supreme Court rejected this argument in Ellis v. Ellis, 748 S.W.2d 424 (Tenn. 1988). In Ellis, the wife inherited a home and thirty-nine acres during the parties' marriage.

  2. Cohen v. Cohen

    937 S.W.2d 823 (Tenn. 1996)   Cited 312 times
    Holding that unvested retirement benefits accruing during the marriage are marital property

    Our courts have consistently interpreted the phrase "any increase in value" as all inclusive. Ellis v. Ellis, 748 S.W.2d 424, 427 (Tenn. 1988) (disallowing exception based on inflation); Sherrill v. Sherrill, 831 S.W.2d 293, 294 (Tenn. App.), perm. to appeal denied, (Tenn. 1992); Mondelli v. Howard, 780 S.W.2d at 774. However, the spouse must have made a substantial contribution to the increase before it is subject to division as marital property.

  3. Harden v. Harden

    No. M2009-01302-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. Jun. 30, 2010)   Cited 43 times
    Holding that "[t]he fact that the trial court did not assign values to all of the property does not prohibit [the appellant] from providing this Court with the value [the appellant] contends ought to be assigned and a citation to the record to support such an assertion."

    The division of marital property is rooted in equity, and a division of marital property is not rendered inequitable merely because it is not precisely equal, Cohen v. Cohen, 937 S.W.2d 823, 832 (Tenn. 1996); Ellis v. Ellis, 748 S.W.2d 424, 427 (Tenn. 1988) or because each party does not receive a share or portion of each marital asset. Cohen, 937 S.W.2d at 833 (citing Brown v. Brown, 913 S.W2d 163, 168 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1994)).

  4. Matthews v. Matthews

    No. M2009-00413-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 28, 2010)   Cited 3 times

    The court is charged with reaching an equitable division of marital property, which is not necessarily an equal division. Ellis v. Ellis, 748 S.W.2d 424, 427 (Tenn. 1988); Watters v. Watters, 959 S.W.2d 585, 591 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1997); Harrington v. Harrington, 798 S.W.2d 244, 245 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1990). In this case, the trial court did not believe that the separation of the parties warranted a reduction in Wife's share of Husband's military retirement.

  5. Eganey v. Eganey, Jr.

    No. M2005-01755-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 19, 2006)   Cited 4 times

    Id., (citing Cohen v. Cohen, 937 S.W.2d 823, 832 (Tenn. 1996); Ellis v. Ellis, 748 S.W.2d 424, 427 (Tenn. 1988)). Neither does a property division become inequitable simply because each party does not receive a share or portion of each marital asset.

  6. Bates v. Bates

    No. M2002-02037-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. Sep. 22, 2003)

    See Cohen v. Cohen, 937 S.W.2d 823, 832 (Tenn. 1996); and Ellisv. Ellis, 748 S.W.2d 424, 427 (Tenn. 1988). Dividing a marital estate is not a mechanical procedure but rather is guided by a consideration of the factors in T.C.A. ยง 36-4-121).

  7. Gentry v. Gentry

    Appeal No. 01-A-01-9611-CH-00512 (Tenn. Ct. App. May. 14, 1997)

    Tenn. Code Ann. ยง 36-4-121(b)(1)(A)(B) (1996). The phrase "any increase in value during the marriage" in section 36-4-121(b)(1)(B) means the reason for the appreciation is irrelevant. Ellis v. Ellis, 748 S.W.2d 424, 426-27(Tenn. 1988); see also Harrison v. Harrison, 912 S.W.2d 124, 127 (Tenn. 1995) (explaining Ellis). "The word `any' is all inclusive and does not allow exception." Ellis, 748 S.W.2d at 426.

  8. Robertson v. Robertson

    76 S.W.3d 337 (Tenn. 2002)   Cited 353 times
    Holding that in setting an alimony award, the court should consider a number of factors, but "the two that are considered the most important are the disadvantaged spouse's need and the obligor spouse's ability to pay"

    See Crabtree, 16 S.W.3d at 361 n. 4 ("In cases in which there is a disparity between the relative earning capacities of the parties, a trial court also may consider adjusting the award of marital assets to assist the disadvantaged spouse."); see also Renfro v. Renfro, 848 P.2d 830, 834 (Alaska 1993) (establishing a preference for meeting the parties' needs with the division of marital property, rather than with alimony). Section 36-4-121 of the Tennessee Code Annotated does not require an equal division of marital property but an equitable division. Tenn. Code Ann. ยง 36-4-121(a)(1); see Ellis v. Ellis, 748 S.W.2d 424, 427 (Tenn. 1988). When practical, therefore, a trial court should consider awarding more assets to an economically disadvantaged spouse to provide future support, rather than relying solely upon an award of alimony.

  9. Harrison v. Harrison

    912 S.W.2d 124 (Tenn. 1996)   Cited 46 times
    In Harrison, the Court refused to allow the wife to share in the increased value of her husband's separate property, noting that it was undisputed that the sole cause of the land's increased value was the construction of Interstate 24.Id. at 125.

    The increase in value constitutes marital property only when the spouse has substantially contributed to its preservation and appreciation. In Ellis v. Ellis, 748 S.W.2d 424 (Tenn. 1988), the issue was whether the value of marital property was limited to the cost of the husband's contribution or extended to the entire amount whereby the property had increased during marriage. In explanation, the Court stated:

  10. Grider v. Grider

    No. M2022-00213-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 30, 2023)

    A division is not rendered inequitable simply because it is not precisely equal, see Cohen v. Cohen, 937 S.W.2d 823, 832 (Tenn. 1996); Ellis v. Ellis, 748 S.W.2d 424, 427 (Tenn. 1988), or because each party did not receive a share of every piece of marital property. See Brown v. Brown, 913 S.W.2d 163, 168 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1994).