Id. (citing Wade v. Wade, 897 S.W.2d 702, 715 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1994)). Our Supreme Court rejected this argument in Ellis v. Ellis, 748 S.W.2d 424 (Tenn. 1988). In Ellis, the wife inherited a home and thirty-nine acres during the parties' marriage.
Our courts have consistently interpreted the phrase "any increase in value" as all inclusive. Ellis v. Ellis, 748 S.W.2d 424, 427 (Tenn. 1988) (disallowing exception based on inflation); Sherrill v. Sherrill, 831 S.W.2d 293, 294 (Tenn. App.), perm. to appeal denied, (Tenn. 1992); Mondelli v. Howard, 780 S.W.2d at 774. However, the spouse must have made a substantial contribution to the increase before it is subject to division as marital property.
The division of marital property is rooted in equity, and a division of marital property is not rendered inequitable merely because it is not precisely equal, Cohen v. Cohen, 937 S.W.2d 823, 832 (Tenn. 1996); Ellis v. Ellis, 748 S.W.2d 424, 427 (Tenn. 1988) or because each party does not receive a share or portion of each marital asset. Cohen, 937 S.W.2d at 833 (citing Brown v. Brown, 913 S.W2d 163, 168 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1994)).
The court is charged with reaching an equitable division of marital property, which is not necessarily an equal division. Ellis v. Ellis, 748 S.W.2d 424, 427 (Tenn. 1988); Watters v. Watters, 959 S.W.2d 585, 591 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1997); Harrington v. Harrington, 798 S.W.2d 244, 245 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1990). In this case, the trial court did not believe that the separation of the parties warranted a reduction in Wife's share of Husband's military retirement.
Id., (citing Cohen v. Cohen, 937 S.W.2d 823, 832 (Tenn. 1996); Ellis v. Ellis, 748 S.W.2d 424, 427 (Tenn. 1988)). Neither does a property division become inequitable simply because each party does not receive a share or portion of each marital asset.
See Cohen v. Cohen, 937 S.W.2d 823, 832 (Tenn. 1996); and Ellisv. Ellis, 748 S.W.2d 424, 427 (Tenn. 1988). Dividing a marital estate is not a mechanical procedure but rather is guided by a consideration of the factors in T.C.A. ยง 36-4-121).
Tenn. Code Ann. ยง 36-4-121(b)(1)(A)(B) (1996). The phrase "any increase in value during the marriage" in section 36-4-121(b)(1)(B) means the reason for the appreciation is irrelevant. Ellis v. Ellis, 748 S.W.2d 424, 426-27(Tenn. 1988); see also Harrison v. Harrison, 912 S.W.2d 124, 127 (Tenn. 1995) (explaining Ellis). "The word `any' is all inclusive and does not allow exception." Ellis, 748 S.W.2d at 426.
See Crabtree, 16 S.W.3d at 361 n. 4 ("In cases in which there is a disparity between the relative earning capacities of the parties, a trial court also may consider adjusting the award of marital assets to assist the disadvantaged spouse."); see also Renfro v. Renfro, 848 P.2d 830, 834 (Alaska 1993) (establishing a preference for meeting the parties' needs with the division of marital property, rather than with alimony). Section 36-4-121 of the Tennessee Code Annotated does not require an equal division of marital property but an equitable division. Tenn. Code Ann. ยง 36-4-121(a)(1); see Ellis v. Ellis, 748 S.W.2d 424, 427 (Tenn. 1988). When practical, therefore, a trial court should consider awarding more assets to an economically disadvantaged spouse to provide future support, rather than relying solely upon an award of alimony.
The increase in value constitutes marital property only when the spouse has substantially contributed to its preservation and appreciation. In Ellis v. Ellis, 748 S.W.2d 424 (Tenn. 1988), the issue was whether the value of marital property was limited to the cost of the husband's contribution or extended to the entire amount whereby the property had increased during marriage. In explanation, the Court stated:
A division is not rendered inequitable simply because it is not precisely equal, see Cohen v. Cohen, 937 S.W.2d 823, 832 (Tenn. 1996); Ellis v. Ellis, 748 S.W.2d 424, 427 (Tenn. 1988), or because each party did not receive a share of every piece of marital property. See Brown v. Brown, 913 S.W.2d 163, 168 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1994).