Opinion
21-15265
02-22-2022
RUDOLPH ELLIS, Jr., Plaintiff-Appellant, v. RALPH DIAZ, Secretary of Corrections, Defendant-Appellee.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of California No. 1:20-cv-00134-DAD-EPG Dale A. Drozd, District Judge, Presiding
Before: FERNANDEZ, TASHIMA, and FRIEDLAND, Circuit Judges.
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
California state prisoner Rudolph Ellis, Jr. appeals pro se from the district court's judgment dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging constitutional claims. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680 F.3d 1113, 1118 (9th Cir. 2012) (dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A); Watison v. Carter, 668 F.3d 1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012) (dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)). We affirm.
The district court properly dismissed Ellis's First and Fourteenth Amendment claims stemming from the denial of family visits because Ellis failed to allege facts sufficient to state a plausible claim. See Vill. of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000) (per curiam) (setting forth elements of an equal protection "class of one" claim); Ramirez v. Galaza, 334 F.3d 850, 860 (9th Cir. 2003) (explaining that "inmates lack a separate constitutional entitlement to a specific prison grievance procedure"); Gerber v. Hickman, 291 F.3d 617, 621 (9th Cir. 2002) (noting "it is well-settled that prisoners have no constitutional right while incarcerated to contact visits or conjugal visits"); 15 C.C.R. § 3177 (defining "family visits" as "extended overnight visits"); see also Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 341-42 (9th Cir. 2010) (stating that although pro se pleadings are liberally construed, a plaintiff must allege facts sufficient to state a plausible claim).
The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Ellis leave to amend because amendment would have been futile. See Cervantes v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 656 F.3d 1034, 1041 (9th Cir. 2011) (setting forth standard of review and explaining that a district court may dismiss without leave to amend when amendment would be futile).
We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued in the opening brief. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).
AFFIRMED.