And earlier this year, we held that the Georgia Constitution's right against compelled self-incrimination prohibits the State from introducing evidence of a defendant's exercise of that right; the federal right is similar in its exclusion of evidence of a defendant's exercise. See Elliott v. State, 305 Ga. 179, 210 (IV), 824 S.E.2d 265 (2019). But our holding in Elliott was not based on federal precedent, which we found unpersuasive; instead, our conclusion was again based on the language, history, and context of Georgia's Constitution.

This appeal was previously transferred by this Court to the Supreme Court of Georgia because the appeal concerns the constitutionality of evidentiary admission of refusals to consent to State-administered breath tests. The Supreme Court transferred the case back to this Court following its opinion in Elliott v. State , 305 Ga. 179, 824 S.E.2d 265 (2019), as the appeal no longer presents a novel constitutional question. Following this transfer, we find that the trial court correctly determined that the State cannot comment on Johnson's invocation of his right not to incriminate himself by refusing a breath test.

This Court has held that the right against compelled self-incrimination protected by Article I, Section I, Paragraph XVI of the Georgia Constitution of 1983 ("Paragraph XVI") prohibits the State from admitting into evidence both the results of a compelled state-administered breath test and a defendant's refusal to submit to a state-administered breath test. See Olevik v. State , 302 Ga. 228, 228-229, 246 (2) (c) (iv), 806 S.E.2d 505 (2017) ; Elliott v. State , 305 Ga. 179, 179-180, 223 (IV) (E), 824 S.E.2d 265 (2019). In the wake of this precedent, we granted certiorari to determine whether the scope of Paragraph XVI extends to another test sometimes administered in driving-under-the-influence cases, namely, a chemical test of urine.

Kallon argues that the trial court erred in admitting the results of the state-administered breath test because the "unconstitutional implied consent notice" that was read to him is inherently coercive when applied to a breath test and that he was unlawfully coerced into submitting to the test. For the reasons that follow, we vacate the trial court's denial of Kallon's motion to suppress and motion in limine and remand the case for the trial court to consider his suppression argument in light of the Supreme Court of Georgia's decision in Elliott v. State , 305 Ga. 179, (824 S.E.2d 265) (2019). When this case was initially before this Court, Kallon's main argument was that, under Miranda v. Arizona , 384 U. S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.E.2d 694 (1966), Miranda warnings are necessary before a request for a state-administered breath test.

Id. at 228-229, 806 S.E.2d 505. Two years later, in Elliott v. State , 305 Ga. 179, 210, 824 S.E.2d 265 2019, we determined that admission of evidence that the defendant refused to consent to a chemical breath test likewise violates the rights protected by Paragraph XVI, noting that " Paragraph XVI generally prohibits admission of a defendant's pretrial refusal to speak or act." And earlier this year, we recognized that this protection extended to state-administered urine tests.

Given the textual changes to the Just Compensation Provision that followed, particularly in 1960, 1978, and 1983, we must bear in mind that we cannot apply uncritically our decisions interpreting old versions of a constitutional provision to new language. See Stratacos v. State , 293 Ga. 401, 408 (2) (b) n.10, 748 S.E.2d 828 (2013) ("[I]t is always risky for courts to rely on a precedent interpreting a statute or other legal text without first examining whether the legal text on which the precedent was based has been revised and then considering the effect of any such change."); cf. Elliott v. State , 305 Ga. 179, 184-187 (II) (B), 824 S.E.2d 265 (2019) (a constitutional provision that is readopted without material change into a new constitution and that has received a consistent and definitive construction is presumed to carry forward that consistent construction). But such decisions construing prior versions of a provision often provide important context, particularly if the pertinent language is similar, in understanding the meaning of a more recent version of that provision.

the application of well-established constitutional principles to the facts of this case. See Elliott v. State , 305 Ga. 179, 824 S.E.2d 265 (2019) ; Olevik v. State , 302 Ga. 228, 806 S.E.2d 505 (2017). We granted Melton's application for interlocutory appeal, and this appeal ensued.

We trust that this decision will make clear that, in the future, Georgia courts should apply principles of federal standing only to the extent they are (1) following binding precedents of this Court or (2) considering other federal precedent as persuasive authority only "to the extent that [those federal] decisions actually were guided by th[e] same language, history, and context" as that of the relevant state provision. Elliott v. State , 305 Ga. 179, 188 (II) (C), 824 S.E.2d 265 (2019).

OCGA § 40-6-392 (d) ; see also OCGA § 40-5-67.1 (b). Compare Elliott v. State , 305 Ga. 179, 223 (IV) (E), 824 S.E.2d 265 (2019) (" OCGA §§ 40-5-67.1 (b) and 40-6-392 (d) are unconstitutional to the extent that they allow a defendant's refusal to submit to a breath test to be admitted into evidence at a criminal trial."). Whether these statutes are unconstitutional with regard to urine tests is not before us.

To the extent that our standing injury requirement arises from our Constitution's Separation of Powers Provision, there's thus a good argument that it was baked into the 1983 Constitution. See Elliott v. State , 305 Ga. 179, 181-182 (II), 824 S.E.2d 265 (2019). And given that we've often said a lack of standing deprives us of subject-matter jurisdiction — the power to decide a case — it would be odd for standing to have a sub-constitutional status.