Because Joiner was not indicted as a habitual offender, and he did not knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waive the right to be indicted as a habitual offender, I would reverse the Court of Appeals and the circuit court, grant the petition for post-conviction relief to vacate the habitual-offender portion of Joiner's sentence for Count I, felony flight, and remand for resentencing as to Count I as a nonhabitual offender. The facts of this case are distinguishable from those in Elliott v. State, 993 So.2d 397 (Miss.Ct.App.200'8), and Smith v. State, 965 So.2d 732 (Miss.Ct.App. 2007). In both cases, the defendant had agreed to habitual-offender sentencing as part of a plea bargain, although neither defendant's original indictment had charged habitual-offender status.

See Trotter v. State, 554 So.2d 313, 315 (Miss.1989) ("an appeal from a sentence imposed pursuant to a guilty plea is not equivalent to an appeal from the guilty plea itself"). In a recent case, Elliott v. State, 993 So.2d 397, 399 (¶ 10) (Miss.Ct.App.2008), the defendant raised the same issue as the one put forth by Graham, and this Court found that: "While it is true that a defendant may appeal the sentence resulting from a plea of guilty independently of the plea itself, there is no corresponding requirement that the circuit court notify the defendant of that right during the plea process." Accordingly, we found that the circuit court's failure to inform a defendant of the ability to appeal the sentence separately did not deny the defendant due process.

1989) ("an appeal from a sentence imposed pursuant to a guilty plea is not equivalent to an appeal from the guilty plea itself"). In a recent case, Elliott v. State, 993 So. 2d 397, 399 (¶ 10) (Miss. Ct. App. 2008), the defendant raised the same issue as the one put forth by Graham, and this Court found that: "While it is true that a defendant may appeal the sentence resulting from a plea of guilty independently of the plea itself, there is no corresponding requirement that the circuit court notify the defendant of that right during the plea process." Accordingly, we found that the circuit court's failure to inform a defendant of the ability to appeal the sentence separately did not deny the defendant due process.

Although Edwards may still appeal his sentence resulting from the guilty plea, "there is no corresponding requirement that the [trial] court notify the defendant of that right during the plea process." Elliott v. State, 993 So.2d 397, 399 (¶ 10) (Miss.Ct.App. 2008). Section 99-35-101 of Mississippi Code Annotated has been amended, effective July 1, 2008, to provide that "where [a] defendant enters a plea of guilty and is sentenced, then no appeal from the circuit court to the Supreme Court shall be allowed."

While it is true that a defendant may appeal the sentence resulting from a guilty plea independently of the plea itself, there is no corresponding requirement that the circuit court notify the defendant of that right during the plea process. Elliott v. State, 993 So.2d 397, 399 (¶ 10) (Miss.Ct.App. 2008). Accordingly, we find Barnes's argument on this issue is without merit.