On removal of the restrictions the owner of the land and the funds was at full liberty to use, dispose of, and contract with relation to them in his or her individual capacity, without reference to approval or disapproval of the Secretary of the Interior, subject only to approval of the court of competent jurisdiction, in this instance the county court of Hughes county, Okla. We are little concerned with the question whether or not, under the Oklahoma law, the services rendered by Warren created a lien against the land and funds here involved. It may be observed, however, that while it has been held by the courts of Oklahoma that such a lien can only be created where the attorney is acting in an affirmative case for the recovery of property (Elliott v. Orton, 69 Okla. 233, 171 P. 1110, L.R.A. 1918E, 103; Holloway v. Wright, 91 Okla. 57, 215 P. 937), the services here rendered were not in defense of any right claimed by Betsy Harjo, but in an affirmative action to have her right to the property derived from the estate of Joseph Harjo, her son, decreed to her. The claim of each litigant in that action was of an affirmative nature and not defensive, and hence the property acquired through the litigation would be subject, were it here material, to a lien under the Oklahoma law and the decisions of the Oklahoma courts.

To elaborate, a defense attorney may, for example, claim a charging lien where he successfully obtains an affirmative judgment in favor of his client, as in the case of a setoff or counterclaim. See 7 AM. JUR. 2D, Attorneys at Law § 346 (1997) (citing T. Harlan Co. v.Bennett, Robbins Thomas, 106 S.W. 287 (Ky. Ct. App. 1907); O'Connor v. St. Louis Transit Co., 97 S.W. 150 (Mo. 1906); Elliott v. Orton, 171 P. 1110 (Okla. 1918)). Or in certain states, it is possible for a defense attorney to obtain a charging lien on land where he successfully defends an adverse claim on the land.

He cannot `have his cake eat it too.' He cannot save his cake by protesting the flavor and at the same time eating it. This would not be fair or just."Elliott v. Orton, 69 Okla. 233, 171 P. 1110-12 (1918) is also illustrative of the waiver principle involved here. After accepting, on his client's behalf, disbursement of funds following a foreclosure sale, the lawyer tried to impress an attorney's lien on the foreclosed property.

Wallace v. Boston Mutual Life Insurance Co., 197 Okla. 698, 172 P.2d 629 (1946).Elliot v. Orton, 69 Okla. 233, 171 P. 1110 (1918); Barnes v. Lynch, 9 Okla. 11, 59 P. 995 (1899). "Payment by defendant of a judgment against him constitutes full recognition of the validity of the judgment and operates as a waiver of the right to appeal."

II. The attorneys for Mr. and Mrs. McGowan waived any lien to which they were entitled and are now estopped to assert an attorneys' lien by virtue of the agreed or consent judgment of April 13, 1956, having been rendered. Elliott v. Orton, 171 P. 1110; Farmer v. Union Ins. Co. of Ind., 146 Miss. 600, 111 So. 584; Gray v. Hopkins-Carter Hardware Co., 32 F.2d 876; Harton v. Amason, 195 Ala. 594, 71 So. 180; Martin v. Hartley, 208 Miss. 112, 43 So.2d 875; Prichard v. Fulmer, 22 N.M. 134, 139 P. 39, 2 A.L.R. 474; 5 Am. Jur., Sec. 230 p. 400; 19 Am. Jur., Sec. 55 p. 661; 31 Am. Jur., Sec. 463 p. 107. III. If we assume for argument it is proper to impress an attorney's lien, then simple mathematics will reveal that the suggested distribution is in error for the reason that the amount of money recovered was the amount of the money judgment in the old replevin action, to wit, $6,374.50, and not the $11,399.

But herein the action was not for the recovery of the land and the title thereto was involved merely as an incident to support the right of action pursued. Such being true, any contention of a lien upon the land is not warranted and the force of the argument thereon falls on authority of Elliott et al. v. Orton et al., 69 Okla. 233, 171 P. 1110, where we declared: "It seems by the Oklahoma statute that the attorney only has lien upon his client's cause of action or counterclaim which attaches to any verdict, report, decision, findings, or judgment in his client's favor, and the proceeds thereof wherever found. It seems to indicate that in order for the lien to become effective that there must be affirmative relief in favor of his client, and that any services which he may render that merely protect his client in the possession and right to his property are not covered by the attorney's lien law.

"The rule is that any act on the part of a defendant by which he impliedly recognizes the validity of a judgment against him operates as a waiver to appeal therefrom or to bring error to reverse it." In Elliott et al. v. Orton, 69 Okla. 233, 171 P. 1110, it was held: "A party who voluntarily acquiesces in or ratifies either partially or in toto, a judgment against him, cannot appeal from it."

"This court has repeatedly held that any act, on the part of the appellant, by which he either expressly or impliedly recognizes the validity of a judgment against him, operates as a waiver of his right to appeal therefrom. Barnes et al. v. Lynch et al., 9 Okla. 11, 59 P. 995; City of Lawton v. Ayres, 40 Okla. 524, 139 P. 963; Yates v. Yates, 60 Okla. 217, 159 P. 1107; Lohr Trapnell et al. v. Johns-Manville Co., 64 Okla. 79, 166 P. 124; Elliott et al. v. Orton et al., 69 Okla. 233, 171 P. 1110, L.R.A. 1918E, 103; Haskell v. Ross, 71 Okla. 46, 175 P. 204; Home Builders' Lumber Co. v. White, 75 Okla. 294, 183 P. 725; Johnson v. First National Bank et al., 93 Okla. 194, 220 P. 47; Fooshee v. Craig, 110 Okla. 189, 237 P. 78; Smith v. Smith, 105 Okla. 218, 232 P. 399; Id., 111 Okla. 126, 236 P. 579; Brandt et al. v. Lane et al., 113 Okla. 14, 237 P. 459."

The order of the trial court sustaining the motion to deny review of judgment and dismiss appeal should be sustained. 4 C.J. 396-397; 2 Amer. Jur. 972; Harmon v. James (Kan.) 69 P.2d 690; Elliott v. Orton (Okla.) 171 P. 1110; Ottenheimer v. Mountain States Supply Company (Utah) 188 P. 1117; Paulson v. McCormick (Kan.) 1 P.2d 259; Paul v. Distributing Company (Kan.) 52 P.2d 379. The trial court did not err in granting the order restraining service of the writ of replevin and in refusing to vacate the same, nor was there error in adjudicating the question as to whether or not the lease assignments were absolute or conditional. The trial court properly restrained service of the writ of replevin and in adjudicating the question as to whether or not the lease assignments were absolute or conditional.

"Any act on the part of a defendant by which he impliedly recognizes the validity of a judgment against him operates as a waiver to appeal therefrom, or to bring error to reverse it." See, also, City of Lawton v. Ayres, 40 Okla. 524, 139 P. 963; Elliott v. Orton, 69 Okla. 233, 171 P. 1110; Ingram v. Johnson, 71 Okla. 171, 176 P. 241; Home Builders Lbr. Co. v. White, 75 Okla. 294, 183 P. 725; Ingram v. Groves, 84 Okla. 159, 202 P. 1019; Johnson v. First Nat'I Bank, 93 Okla. 194, 220 P. 47. By his pleadings Standley sought to establish his title to the certificates and, in the alternative, he sought to recover the value thereof from the parties allegedly responsible for his loss in event he should fail to establish his title.