Opinion
DOCKET NO. A-4967-11T1
05-17-2013
STEVEN M. ELLIOTT, individually and d/b/a ELLIOTT RACING STABLE and STANLEY FORD, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. JOHN GREEN, individually and d/b/a PINNACLE RACING STABLE, Defendant-Respondent.
Jeffrey R. Pocaro argued the cause for appellants. Thomas F. Rinaldi argued the cause for respondent (Ronan, Tuzzio & Giannone, attorneys; Gregory W. Boyle, of counsel and on the brief; Mr. Rinaldi, on the brief).
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
Before Judges Lihotz and Kennedy.
On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Monmouth County, Docket No. L-2500-11.
Jeffrey R. Pocaro argued the cause for appellants.
Thomas F. Rinaldi argued the cause for respondent (Ronan, Tuzzio & Giannone, attorneys; Gregory W. Boyle, of counsel and on the brief; Mr. Rinaldi, on the brief). PER CURIAM
Plaintiffs appeal from an order of the Law Division vacating a consent judgment and dismissing their complaint with prejudice. Plaintiffs argue that defendant failed to comply with the terms of the consent judgment, which, in effect, memorialized a settlement between the parties, and, as a consequence, was not entitled to an order to vacate the judgment. We disagree and affirm.
Plaintiffs filed a complaint against defendant alleging he failed to pay debts he owed for the shipping and training of various horses. Plaintiff Steve Elliott alleged defendant owed $23,312.50 for services rendered in boarding and training defendant's horses, and plaintiff Stanley Ford alleged defendant owed $3239 for shipping services.
On December 2, 2011, the parties reached a settlement memorialized in a consent judgment executed by the trial court and filed on December 20, 2011. The consent judgment stated that judgment "is hereby entered" against defendant and in favor of plaintiff Elliott for $18,371.03, and in favor of plaintiff Ford for $1690. The consent judgment further provided:
There is to be no execution on the judgments as long as [defendant] lives up to the payment schedule, which is as follows:Payments were to be "delivered" either by check or wire transfer to the trust account of plaintiffs' attorney.
a) $5000 to be paid on or before January 3, 2012;
b) $5000 to be paid on or before February 2, 2012;
c) $4000 to be paid on or before March 2, 2012[.]
The consent judgment further stated "[t]here is no grace period on any of the payments[,]" and in the event of a default - defined as "any payment not made by a particular due date" or, if checks or transfers were not honored - then plaintiffs' agreement to withhold notification to "state racing commissions and the United States Trotting Association" about the entry of judgment would be "automatically dissolved."
Further, if all payments "have been made on time[,]" plaintiffs agreed to vacate the consent judgment and execute a stipulation of dismissal with prejudice. However, "if there is a default in the payments," defendant would be required to pay the judgment "and all taxed costs . . . in full[.]"
Defendant made payment of the first and second installments by wire transfer on January 3 and February 1. On Friday, March 2, the day the third installment was due, defendant initiated payment by wire transfer at 4:44 p.m. The next day, plaintiffs' counsel advised defendant's counsel the funds had not been posted into his trust account. On Sunday, March 4, defendant's counsel advised plaintiffs' counsel that defendant initiated payment on March 2, 2012, and enclosed defendant's bank statement. On Monday, March 5, the funds were posted to plaintiffs' counsel's trust account at 3:15 p.m.
The next day, in a letter to defendant's counsel, plaintiffs' counsel advised that he would seek "judgment for the full amount" and stated he believed he was "permitted to notify [racing] officials of the judgment" and in fact had "done so under separate cover." Plaintiffs' counsel sent correspondence to the United States Trotting Association, the New Jersey Racing Commission, Rosecroft Raceway and Yonkers Raceway, advising them to "immediately suspend [defendant] until the judgment has been paid in full." That same day, plaintiffs' counsel sent an additional letter advising that after crediting defendant with $14,000, he would be seeking judgment for an additional $6,329.12, and asked "[w]hen can I expect payment in full?"
Defendant's counsel filed a motion to enforce the settlement and to vacate the consent judgment and compel plaintiffs' counsel to withdraw the correspondence he had sent to the race tracks and associations. Defendant claimed he had fully complied with the terms of the consent order and that, by its terms, he was entitled to have the judgment vacated and dismissal entered. The trial court granted the motion on April 20, 2012, finding that defendant substantially complied with the terms of the settlement agreement. The court also explained that defendant "apparently attempted to transfer too late in the day . . . [and had] complied with the spirit of the [consent judgment.]" The court added that the consent judgment's use of the phrase "payments are to be delivered" to the trust of plaintiffs' counsel was "somewhat ambiguous." This appeal followed.
Plaintiffs contend that the trial court abused its discretion in granting the motion. We disagree.
Rule 4:50-1(e) provides for relief from judgment where "the judgment or order has been satisfied, released or discharged, or a prior judgment or order upon which it is based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that the judgment or order should have prospective application[.]" The rule permits relief "in changed circumstances that call the fairness of the judgment into question." DEG, LLC v. Twp. of Fairfield, 198 N.J. 242, 265-66 (2009). In that case, the Court held that the defendant was not entitled to relief from the consent judgment under Rule 4:50-1(e) because it "made no effort whatsoever to comply with the consent judgment, let alone a good faith effort to do so." Id. at 269. Here, of course, the facts are quite different, and it clearly appears that defendant had made good faith efforts to comply with the consent order by remitting timely payments.
Further, when examining the grant or denial of relief from a judgment under Rule 4:50-1, we defer to the trial court's exercise of discretion. "A motion under Rule 4:50-1 is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court, which should be guided by equitable principles in determining whether relief should be granted or denied[,]" and "[t]he decision granting or denying an application . . . will be left undisturbed unless it represents a clear abuse of discretion." Hous. Auth. of Morristown v. Little, 135 N.J. 274, 283 (1994) (citation omitted). The Appellate Division's review of a trial judge's exercise of discretion is thus quite limited.
"[J]udicial discretion" is the option which a judge may exercise between the doing and the not doing of a thing which cannot be demanded as an absolute legal right, guided by the spirit, principles and analogies of the law, and founded upon the reason and conscience of the judge, to a just result in the light of the particular circumstances of the case.The exercise of "[j]udicial discretion is not unbounded and it is not the personal predilection of the particular judge." State v. Madan, 366 N.J. Super. 98, 109 (App. Div. 2004). To constitute an abuse of discretion, however, the decision must have been "made without a rational explanation" or must have "'inexplicably departed from established policies, or rested on an impermissible basis.'" United States v. Scurry, 193 N.J. 492, 504 (2008) (quoting Flagg v. Essex Cnty. Prosecutor, 171 N.J. 561, 571 (2002)).
[Smith v. Smith, 17 N.J. Super. 128, 132 (App. Div. 1951) (citations omitted), certif. denied, 9 N.J. 178 (1952).]
Here, it is evident that "it is no longer equitable the judgment should have prospective application." R. 4:50-1(e). Defendant had remitted the payments in a timely fashion and plaintiffs' counsel accepted these payments. As the trial court explained, the consent judgment did not "say [the funds must] be received in the . . . account" by a date certain; it required delivery. Furthermore, as the trial court noted, "[t]here's . . . no dispute that on the date of the third payment . . . defendant attempted to have funds wired to plaintiff[s]" and that "the total amount that was due . . . was in fact accepted by the plaintiff[s] on . . . the next business day . . . ." Accordingly, we do not find the trial court abused its discretion in granting defendant's motion.
Affirmed.
I hereby certify that the foregoing is a true copy of the original on file in my office.
CLERK OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION