Eller Media Co. v. Bruckner Outdoor Signs

6 Citing cases

  1. Vaccaro v. Town of Islip

    181 A.D.3d 751 (N.Y. App. Div. 2020)   Cited 8 times

    Auth. , 164 A.D.3d 1227, 1228, 83 N.Y.S.3d 590 [citations omitted]; seeCasini v. Sea Gate Assn. , 262 A.D.2d 593, 594, 692 N.Y.S.2d 676 ). Here, although the County was presumed to hold the property for public use for three years after the tax lien foreclosure (see RPTL 406[5] ; Eller Media Co. v. Bruckner Outdoor Signs , 299 A.D.2d 166, 167, 753 N.Y.S.2d 28 ; Casini v. Sea Gate Assn. , 262 A.D.2d at 595, 692 N.Y.S.2d 676 ), the presumption expired in 1994. Although its conveyance to the Town in December 2001 was "for municipal purposes," and provided that title to the property would revert to the County in the event that the Town attempted to put the property to any other use or to sell it unfettered by such a restriction, there is no evidence in the record that the Town used the property for municipal purposes, or made any use of it at all.

  2. Walsh v. John Jerome Ellis

    64 A.D.3d 702 (N.Y. App. Div. 2009)   Cited 38 times

    The plaintiff also testified that on unspecified occasions in the past, he had cut down two rotting trees, planted two new trees, planted an unknown number of shrubs, and performed de minimis maintenance upon a chain link fence, which is approximately one foot high and runs along the side of the Lot bordering a roadway. This was insufficient to establish the usual cultivation and improvement or substantial enclosure necessary to support an adverse possession claim ( see Giannone v Trotwood Corp., 266 AD2d 430, 431; Manhattan School of Music v Solow, 175 AD2d 106, 108; compare Eller Media Co. v Bruckner Outdoor Signs, 299 AD2d 166; Birnbaum v Brody, 156 AD2d 408, 409). Thus, the court erred in determining that the plaintiff had acquired the Lot by adverse possession.

  3. Eastside Floor Suplies Letd. v. Torres-Springer

    2018 N.Y. Slip Op. 33300 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2018)

    In addition, plaintiffs claim that the city's status as a municipality does not affect their right to adversely possess the Property. Although plaintiffs concede that the City is immune from adverse possession claims when it holds real property in its governmental capacity (see Gallo v City of New York, 51 AD3d 630, 631 [2d Dept 2008]), they contend that in the instant case no public purpose is at issue and therefore this principle does not apply (see Eller Media Co. v Bruckner Outdoor Signs, Inc., 299 AD2d 166, 167 [1st Dept 2002], lv denied, 100 NY2d 507 [2003]). Further, to the extent that the City may have intended to use the property for a public purpose initially, plaintiffs suggest, the City subsequently abandoned the use of the area in this fashion (citing, inter alia, Albany Parking Serv., Inc. v City of Albany, 3 AD3d 711 [3rd Dept 2004] [holding that property lost its governmental character after a city ordinance and resolution, standing together, set a new boundary line]; and Casini v Sea Gate Assoc., 262 AD2d 593 [2nd Dept 1999] [adverse possession applied where city held property for a non-public use]).

  4. Eastside Floor Supplies Ltd. v. Torres-Springer

    62 Misc. 3d 1206 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2018)

    In addition, plaintiffs claim that the city's status as a municipality does not affect their right to adversely possess the Property. Although plaintiffs concede that the City is immune from adverse possession claims when it holds real property in its governmental capacity (seeGallo v. City of New York , 51 AD3d 630, 631 [2d Dept 2008] ), they contend that in the instant case no public purpose is at issue and therefore this principle does not apply (seeEller Media Co. v. Bruckner Outdoor Signs, Inc. , 299 AD2d 166, 167 [1st Dept 2002], lv denied , 100 NY2d 507 [2003] ). Further, to the extent that the City may have intended to use the property for a public purpose initially, plaintiffs suggest, the City subsequently abandoned the use of the area in this fashion (citing, inter alia, Albany Parking Serv., Inc. v. City of Albany , 3 AD3d 711 [3rd Dept 2004] [holding that property lost its governmental character after a city ordinance and resolution, standing together, set a new boundary line]; and Casini v. Sea Gate Assoc. , 262 AD2d 593 [2nd Dept 1999] [adverse possession applied where city held property for a non-public use] ).

  5. Niagara Mohawk Power Corp. v. Chiaro

    2009 N.Y. Slip Op. 52415 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2009)

    Yet defendants do not contend that this apparent leasehold interest supports their claim of adverse possession. In fact, the lease only makes defendants' claim of adverse possession more tenuous, since there is appellate authority holding that a person who leases property to another without title to such property may be deemed an adverse possessor ( see Eller Media Comp. v Bruckner Outdoor Signs, 299 Ad2d 166 [1st Dept 2002]). In such a case, the lessor's actions in leasing the land can satisfy certain elements of RPAPL § 521, such as entry under a claim of right, with the tenant's conduct used to supply other necessary elements, such as the open, notorious and exclusive possession of the land ( see id.; see also RPAPL § 531 [possession of the tenant is deemed the possession of the landlord]).

  6. MAN YUM NG v. METROPOLITAN TRANSP. AUTH.

    2007 N.Y. Slip Op. 51916 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2007)

    [ Emphasis added] See Casini v Sea Gate Ass'n., supra; Starner Tree Service Co., Inc. v City of New Rochelle, 271 AD2d 681 (2nd Dept 2000); Eller Media Co. v Bruckner Outdoor Signs, Inc., 299 AD2d 166 (1st Dept 2002); Albany Parking Services, Inc. v City of Albany, 3 AD3d 711 (3rd Dept 2004). Plaintiffs have demonstrated to the court that if a preliminary injunction is not granted to them to restrain the MTA and/or TA, and their agents, acting for SBRC, from entering the land in question and removing their personal property, they will suffer irreparable harm.