" Although we think that more artfully drafted findings of fact would more clearly provide the explicit basis for the trial court's determination, Ellendale Farmers Union Cooperative Ass'n v. Davis, 219 N.W.2d 829 (N.D. 1974), we believe that we understand what the trial court intended with respect to each of the 10 factors listed in § 14-09-06.2. The findings of fact are not "grossly inadequate."
From the findings of fact, I am able to obtain a clear understanding of the basis for the trial court's conclusions. See Ellendale Farmers Union Cooperative Ass'n v. Davis, 219 N.W.2d 829, 836 (N.D. 1974). With or without giving due regard to the opportunity of the district judge to judge of the credibility of the witnesses, I could reach no other conclusion than that those findings are not clearly erroneous.
Hanson argues Schaffner's appeal is improper because his notice of appeal referenced the order denying his Rule 52(b), N.D.R.Civ.P. motion, which is not an appealable order. Ellendale Farmers Union Co-op v. Davis , 219 N.W.2d 829, 831 (N.D. 1974). Schaffner's notice of appeal purports to appeal an order dated January 26, 2017, which matches neither order, and encompasses issues relating to both the January 4 and January 24 orders. We treat court orders as final judgments if the district court intended the order to be a final judgment.
Meyer, having established that waste had occurred, was not required to prove the amount of his recovery with mathematical nicety as long as he provided a reasonable basis for computing the approximate level of damages. Ellendale Farmers Union Coop Ass'n v. David, 219 N.W.2d 829 (N.D. 1974). Meyer testified that when Dickinson Associates took possession of the hotel in 1980 it was worth $1,682,000 and when he retook possession in 1982 its value had decreased to $850,000.
We accept the view that a significant purpose to be served by findings of fact in any type of case is to disclose with specificity the factual basis for the conclusion, in order that there be a clear understanding thereof by the parties and by this court. Hust v. Hust, 295 N.W.2d 316, 321 (N.D. 1980); DeForest v. DeForest, 228 N.W.2d 919, 924 (N.D. 1975); Ellendale Farmers Union Cooperative Ass'n v. Davis, 219 N.W.2d 829, 836 (N.D. 1974); 9 Wright Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure, Civil, § 2582 at 722. We have criticized the practice of using preprinted forms that do not fulfill the requirements of the statutes and due process of law.
Voskuil v. Voskuil, 256 N.W.2d 526, 530 (N.D. 1977). See also, Vetter v. Vetter, 267 N.W.2d 790 (N.D. 1978); Matson v. Matson, 226 N.W.2d 659 (N.D. 1975); and Ellendale Farmers Union Cooperative Ass'n v. Davis, 219 N.W.2d 829 (N.D. 1974). Compare, however, Struchynski v. Decker, 194 N.W.2d 741 (N.D. 1972) and Commissioner v. Duberstein, 363 U.S. 278, 80 S.Ct. 1190, 4 L.Ed.2d 1218 (1960). Professor Davis in 2 Administrative Law Treatise § 16.06 (1958) describes the adequacy of administrative agency findings in relation to ". . . the need of the reviewing court for a clear view of the basis for the agency's action.
". . . that partition of Schnell Ranch cannot be accomplished without great prejudice to the owners; . . ." Joan could have argued that: (1) there were inadequate findings, Struchynski v. Decker, 194 N.W.2d 741 (N.D. 1972), or they do not disclose the basis for the decision, Ellendale Farmers Union Cooperative Ass'n v. Davis, 219 N.W.2d 829 (N.D. 1974), or they are too "sparse and conclusory," Commissioner v. Duberstein, 363 U.S. 278, 292, 80 S.Ct. 1190, 1200, 4 L.Ed.2d 1218 (1960); (2) the findings are without substantial evidentiary support, Winter v. Winter, 338 N.W.2d 819, 822 (N.D. 1983), or, even though there is some evidentiary support, this court should be left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made, Gross v. Sta-Rite Industries, Inc., 336 N.W.2d 359, 361 (N.D. 1983); or (3) that the finding was induced by an erroneous view of the applicable law, Winter v. Winter, supra. Instead, as I interpret Joan's argument, she urges that we give her a trial de novo, which was abolished in 1971 by the repeal of § 28-27-32, NDCC; or that we should view the facts differently somehow than the trial court did, which we have repeatedly said we are not entitled to do, see Hall GMC, Inc. v. Crane Carrier Co., 332 N.W.2d 54, 60 (N.D. 1983); or that we should substitute our judgment for that of the trial court, which we
Nevertheless, if this court is to give trial court findings of fact the deference that Rule 52(a) contemplates, we must clearly understand how those findings support the conclusion reached. See, e.g., Vetter v. Vetter, 267 N.W.2d 790, 794-795 (N.D. 1978), and Ellendale Farmers Union Cooperative Ass'n v. Davis, 219 N.W.2d 829, 836 (N.D. 1974). We do not intend to imply that an unexplained finding that the contract "was given by mistake" or "obtained through fraud" would be alone adequate.
We repeat that which we have often said — findings of fact are adequate when they provide us with a clear understanding of the basis of the trial court's decision. See, e.g., Vetter v. Vetter, 267 N.W.2d 790, 794-95 (N.D. 1978), and Ellendale Farmers Union Cooperative Ass'n v. Davis, 219 N.W.2d 829, 836 (N.D. 1974). In this case there are no documents labeled "findings of fact" or even "memorandum decision," but there is an "order amending judgment," which contains the following:
The testimony supports the judge's finding, which is not clearly erroneous. Rule 52(a), N.D.R. Civ.P. Ellendale Farmers Union Co-op Ass'n v. Davis, 219 N.W.2d 829 (N.D. 1974). The trial court also found that Nokleberg's assertion of a $150.