Opinion
July 14, 1986
Appeal from the Supreme Court, Nassau County (Velsor, J.).
Appeal from the order dated October 7, 1985, dismissed, without costs or disbursements. No appeal lies from an order denying reargument (see, e.g., Fahey v County of Nassau, 111 A.D.2d 214; Amity Plumbing Heating Supply Corp. v Zito Plumbing Heating Corp., 110 A.D.2d 863).
Order dated May 31, 1985, reversed insofar as appealed from, without costs or disbursements, and that branch of the third-party defendants' motion which was to dismiss the third-party complaint denied.
The third-party defendants concede that Special Term erred in finding that no claim for contribution could be asserted against them because they were successive and independent tort-feasors (see, Schauer v Joyce, 54 N.Y.2d 1, 5). Special Term's reliance upon Bergan v Home for Incurables ( 75 A.D.2d 762) and Zillman v Meadowbrook Hosp. Co. ( 45 A.D.2d 267) is misplaced. Those cases stand for the proposition that a successive tort-feasor may not seek apportionment of damages from a prior tort-feasor because successive tort-feasors are only responsible for the aggravation of the original injury caused by their conduct. At bar, the appellant, as the first tort-feasor, is liable for the entire injury, and there is ample basis upon the pleadings for holding that the alleged tortious conduct of both the appellant and the third-party defendants was responsible for the plaintiff's injury (see, Helmrich v Lilly Co., 89 A.D.2d 441; Wiseman v 374 Realty Corp., 54 A.D.2d 119).
We further find that the third-party complaint satisfies the basic pleading requirements of CPLR 3013 (see, Grcic v Peninsula Hosp. Center, 110 A.D.2d 625; Torres v Southside Hosp., 84 A.D.2d 836). Mollen, P.J., Lazer, Thompson and Kunzeman, JJ., concur.